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THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ARIKANER IN THE
SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY
SUMMARY
The economic decline of the Afrikaner arose from a
centrifugal process in which the market, as centre and
facilitator of economic modemisation, could not fulfill its
function properly. The process commenced soon after
the release from duty in 1657 of VOC officials at the
Cape, to eam a living as Freeburghers in the private
sector, and would extend for almost two centuries. The
'push' factor was represented by the monopolistic trade
policy of the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie which
restricted the commercial activities of the Freeburghers.
The 'pull' factor consisted of the wide open spaces,
representative of the abundant factor of production and
natural resources, which, in the absence of capital and
technology, could be combined with labour without
making heavy demands on the fifth factor of production,
entrepreneurship.
The progressive use of this abundant factor in exten-
sive stock-farming operations induced a movement of
the production process ever further away from the
market as the White population increased. A generation
of Trekboers came into being who lost touch with the
developing Westem world of the time. This was not at
all a breeding-ground for the generation of entrepre-
neurship, the source and origin of economic
development. That their wealth consisted of livestock,
and capital formation required augmentations of their
herds, imparted a high degree of vulnerability and
fragility to the frontier economy. It was subject to the
onslaughts of stock diseases, adverse weather
conditions, plagues, human and animal predators and
devastating wars. The destruction of more than 60% of
this wealth in the two northem republics (Zuid-
Afrikaansche Republiek and Oranje Vrystaat) during the
Anglo-Boer War spelled a nadir in the economic
fortunes of the Afrikaner. In addition, the market value of
the language was destroyed by Milner's policy of angli-
cisation.
Perforce, a new trek of centripetal nature com-
menced, Le. from the rural to the urban areas,
where English speakers were in control of the
economy. Those who participated in the centrifugal
process were by no means prepared for the skill
requirements of the urban economy and had to
endure, moreover, the aversion of British employers
and British oriented
trade unions. As a result they had to accept, for the
most part, unskilled jobs, which did not prevent
additions to the ranks of the paupers.
An awareness of the arrearage of Afrikaners in the
non-agricultural sectors of the South African economy,
which arose among the leaders of the community,
prompted remedial action. While a number of com-
mercial enterprises had already been established by
Afrikaners before 1939, the clarion call for large-scale
engagement in such economic operations emanated
from the 1939 Ekonomiese Volkskongres, where the
battle-cry of "a people rescue itself" echoed as an
imperative. The ensuing six decades saw a regular
increase in the contribution of the Afrikaners in the
creation of the national product through the establish-
ment of enterprises in the secondary and tertiary
sectors of the economy. Moreover, their arrearage in
respect of per capita personal income, compared to that
of the English-speaking Whites, shrank signijicantly,
while their personal income in the aggregate, at the end
of the twentieth century, exceeded that of the latter.
The economic renaissance of the Afrikaner is attri-
butable in the main to the initiatives of a relatively small
number of innovating individuals who fulfilled the
function of the entrepreneur, and the generation of
human capital by means of education and training,
which, at least at the beginning, demanded great
financial sacrifices by their poor parents. The most
significant contribution of the National Party govemment
of 1948-1994 was the enforcement of the principle of
bilingualism, which established the market value of
Afrikaans, and its promotion of economic growth and
development.
Inasmuch as the Afrikaans language is sum and
substance of "the Afrikaner" in the exclusive sense used
in this monograph, the question arises whether their
contribution to the South African economy will, in days
to come, continue to be distinguishable.
Key words: Natural Resources, Entrepre-neurship,
Frontier Economy, 1939 Ekonomiese Volkskongres,
Market value of Afrikaans
OPSOMMING
Die ekonomiese verval van die Afrikaner vloei voort
uit 'n middelpuntvliedende proses waarin die mark, as
middelpunt en essensiele fasiliteerder van ekonomiese
modernisering, nie sy funksie na behore kon vervul
nie. Die proses neem 'n aanvang kort na die
uitdiensstelling van VOC-amptenare aan die Kaap in
1657 om as Vryburgers hul heenkome in die privaat
sektor te vind, en sou oor nagenoeg twee eeue strek.
Die afstotende krag het bestaan uit die mono-
polistiese handelsbeleid van die Vereenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie wat die handelsvryheid van die
Vryburgers aan bande geh3 het. Die aantrekkende
krag was die groot oop ruimtes, verteenwoordigend
van die volop produksiefaktor en natuurlike hulpbronne
wat, in die afwesigheid van kapitaal en tegnologie, met
arbeid gekombineer kon word sonder om besondere
eise aan die vyfde produksiefaktor, ondememings-
inisiatief, te stel.
Toenemende gebruikmaking van die volop produk-
siefaktor, in die beoefening van ekstensiewe vee-
boerdery, het die produksieproses algaande verder
weg van die mark(te) laat beweeg namate die blanke
bevolking vermeerder het. 'n Generasie van Trekboere
ontstaan, wat uit voeling raak met die destyds ont-
wikkelende Westerse wereld. Dit was allermins 'n
teelaarde vir die generering van ondernemerskap, die
bron en oorsprong van ekonomiese ontwikkeling. Oat
die rykdom uit lewende hawe, en kapitaalvorming uit
toenames daarin bestaan het, verleen aan die
voorpos-ekonomie 'n hoe mate van kwesbaarheid en
broosheid. Dit was onderhewig aan die aanslae van
veesiektes, ongunstige klimaatstoestande, plae,
menslike en dierlike predatore en verwoestende
oorloe. Die vernietiging van meer as 60% van hierdie
rykdom in die twee noordelike republieke (die OVS en
die ZAR) gedurende die Anglo-Boereoorlog van 1899-
1902 verteenwoordig 'n nadir in die ekonomiese
lotgevalle van die Afrikaner. Boonop is die
markwaarde van sy taal deur Milner se verengelsings-
proses vernietig.
Noodgedwonge is begin met 'n middelpunt-
soekende trek, die keer van die platteland na die
stedelike gebiede, waar die Engelssprekendes in
beheer van die ekonomie was. Diegene wat aan die
middelpuntvliedende proses deelgeneem het, was
hoegenaamd nie op die geskooldheidsvereistes van
die stedelike ekonomie
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voorbereid nie en moes ook die afkeer van Britse
werkgewers en Brits georienteerde vakunies verduur.
Hulle moes gevolglik meestal betrekkings van onge-
skoolde aard aanvaar, wat nie voorkom het dat die
aantal armlastiges toegeneem het nie.
'n Bewustheid van die agterstand van die Afrikaner
in die nie-Iandbousektore het tot die leiers van die
gemeenskap deurgedring, en dit het aanleiding gegee
tot remedierende optrede. Hoewel daar voor 1939
reeds verskeie kommersiele ondememings deur
Afrikaners gestig is, het die sterkste wekroep tot groot-
skaalse toetrede uit die Ekonomiese Volkskongres van
1939 gespruit, waar die wekroep "'n volk red homself"
weerklink het. Die dekades daama word dan ook
gekenmerk deur 'n gestadigde toename in die bydrae
van die Afrikaner tot die skepping van die nasionale
produk deur die oprigting van ondememings in die
sekondere en tersiere sektore van die ekonomie.
Daarbenewens het hul agterstand ten opsigte van per
capita persoonlike inkome, in vergelyking met die van
die Engelssprekende blankes, grootliks gekrimp, terwyl
hul totale persoonlike inkome aan die einde van die
twintigste eeu die van die laasgenoemdes oorskry het.
Die ekonomiese renaissance van die Afrikaner is
hoofsaaklik te danke aan die inisiatiewe van 'n betreklik
klein aantal innoverende individue wat die rol van die
ondememer vervul het, en die generering van menslike
kapitaal deur middel van opvoeding en opleiding wat,
minstens ten aanvang, groot finansiele opofferings van
arm ouers geverg het. Die Nasionale Party-regering van
1948-1994 se belangrikste bydrae was die toepassing
van die tweetaligheidsbeginsel wat die markwaarde van
Afrikaans gevestig het, en sy bevordering van ekono-
miese groei en ontwikkeling
In soverre die Afrikaanse taal die kern van
Afrikanerskap - in die eksklusiewe sin van die woord,
soos dit in hierdie monografie gedefinieer is - verteen-
woordig, ontstaan die vraag of die bydrae van "die
Afrikaner" tot die Suid-Afrikaanse ekonomie in die toe-
koms steeds, soos hierbo, onderskei sal kan word.
Trefwoorde: Ondernemerskap, Natuurlike hulp-
bronne, Voorpos-ekonomie, 1939 Ekonomiese
Volkskongres, Markwaarde van Afrikaans
THE FALL AND RISE OF THE AFRIKANER
IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY
PREFACE
The term "Afrikaner" is used in its exclusive sense of Whites whose home
language or mother tongue is Afrikaans. It is in accordance with the usage
in the literature. There could conceivably be many more Afrikaans speakers
who would consider themselves Afrikaners, but they are an unknown
quantity. The non-Afrikaner component of the white population will be
referred to as English speakers, or the English for short, though the home
language of some 6 per cent of them is not English according to the 1996
census.
While the nature of the subject matter treated in this monograph is of a
process over time and, therefore, has a historic dimension, it does not
aspire to the status of economic history in the sense of a chronicle of
events, based upon primary sources of information, but is, rather, an
exercise in cause and effect. It is an enquiry into the forces involved in the
process of economic decline and rise of the Afrikaner, or in other words, the
determinants of change and their outcome. The author's last excursion into
this field of enquiry arose from a request by the Canadian Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1965 to produce a
document for them on The Afrikaner in the South African Economy, since
Canada had to contend with problems analogous to those of South Africa.1
Since then significant changes have come about in South Africa and it was
thought that a reconsideration and updating of the subject matter may serve
a useful purpose in light, particularly, of misconceptions revealed in
parallels drawn between the pre-1994 political hegemony of Afrikaners and
that of Blacks/Africans after 1994. It may also provide some lessons for the
latter. But primarily it is, from the academic point of view, an interesting
study in its own right.
I. The Canadian Minister of Public Works and Government Services 2001 has granted permission to reproduce, with the customary acknowledgement,
selected excerpts from that document. The author will avail himself of this concession only in the case of historic events which cannot change with
the passage of time, and whose narration in new terms will be otiose.
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CHAPTER 1
THE ROOTS OF ECONOMIC
RETARDATION
With the release of a first group of nine officials from
the employ of the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Com-
pagnie (VOC) atthe Cape in 1657, the foundation was
laid for the evolution of a community who, in time,
would sever their sentimental links with their country
of origin, the Netherlands, identify themselves with the
southern part of Africa as their home and one and only
fatherland, evolve a new language, distinct from
Dutch, and become Afrikaners.
The Cape, having been established as a victualling
station for VOC ships passing to and from the colonies
in the East, the Freeburghers were allocated land to
augment the supply of agricultural produce required
by these ships and the VOC officials. As the Free-
burghers and their production increased, centrifugal
economic forces came into operation which induced a
movement of people ever further away from the
central victualling station, which was Cape Town, to
seek a livelihood. It was this movement which con-
tained the seeds of the economic retardation at issue.
Of overriding importance in this regard had been
the availability of land (large open spaces) which had
a commanding influence over the economic vision of
the Freeburghers. Of the three factors of production -
capital, technology and natural resources - that could
be combined with the two human factors - entrepre-
neurship and labour - for the purposes of production,
it was natural resources that stood out as the
abundant factor. Lacking capital and more than a
modicum of technology, the need for which was
indeed obviated by the natural resource endowment, it
made economic sense to exploit it, and use it
extensively rather than intensively, since there was no
need for economising on it, at least not in areas at
considerable distances from the market, and given the
demand/supply situation that developed in the vicinity
of Cape Town. For the Freeburgher the alternative
application of his labour in the wage market was not
an option in competition with the slaves or the
educated vac officials. In 1711 the slave population
was already somewhat larger than the Burgher
population; and when the authorities at the Cape were
asked whether they preferred more slaves or more
European immigrants, they opted for the former. By
1778 there were at least 11 107 of them, compared to
a Freeburgher population of 9 721 (Wilson &
Thompson, 1969: 201/205). They had become the
blue-collar skilled and semi-skilled labour force:
masons, shoemakers, tailors, cartwrights, etc. Also,
lodging houses had been multiplying too rapidly to
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permit the profitable operation of additional ones,
while any industrial activity of a non-agricultural nature
would have been discouraged by the VOC.
The VOC, true to its mercantilist principles, mono-
polised external trade, except for minor exceptions at
the end of the 18th century, and even disapproved of
private trade with the indigenous population. It was
interested in buying produce from the Freeburghers at
lowest prices so as to maximise its own profits. For
some time VOC officials, although forbidden to do so,
farmed and traded privately, raising the price-curtailing
supplies on the market. With the latter virtually
confined to Cape Town and the provisioning of
passing ships, supply soon began to outdistance
demand. By 1690 the allocation of land in the
Stellenbosch district had caused the production of
wheat to rise to the extent that its price was reduced
from 10 to 8 guilders per muid, which rendered it im-
possible for new farmers to produce it profitably (Van
der Merwe, 1938: 16).
The scarcity of fertile agricultural land in the
immediate vicinity of Cape Town obliged additions to
the Freeburgher community to seek new cultivable land
further away; which meant increasing costs of transport
and lower net returns to agricultural pursuits. Moreover,
over time, the fertility of the soil that had been cultivated
for many years, deteriorated, which reduced profitability
and induced the occupation of land ever further away
from the economic centre. According to the Oxford
history of South Africa, poverty was increasing at the
beginning of the 18th century and only some 30 families
could have been described as affluent (Wilson &
Thompson, 1969: 198).
The stage was set for the evolution of animal
husbandry as a means of securing a livelihood: "It had
cost very much less to breed or barter a sheep than to
produce a muid of wheat and it had about the same
market value" (freely translated from Van der Merwe,
1938: 23; see also Neumark, 1957: 38). The product
had, moreover, the advantage of being able to walk on
its own legs to the market. The stock farmer was, in
any case, much less dependent on the market than
the grain, wine and vegetable producer was. His
product provided him with the most important item in
his diet, and supplies did not need to be marketed at
specific times, but could be retained as additions to
his flocks or herds, to assume the status of nature-
based capital formation. Moreover, it would have been
a rational decision not to produce for a market which
did not exist, or was not within cost-effective reach.
This rationality would prove to be a basic factor in the
degree of economic retardation inherent in the nature
of the frontier economy. Also, fewer labourers were
required than in the case of intensive agricultural
cultivation, while the system of land tenure
(Ieningsplaats, later quitrent) suited the stock-farmer
admirably. It required no outlay of capital. Their
displeasure with the vac authorities would also have
induced a desire to distance themselves geo-
graphically.
The third stage in land use occurred when some
stock-farmers became Trekboers. As the population
increased and sons were following in the footsteps of
their fathers, it was necessary for new land to be
occupied ever further into the interior, while farmers
were migrating seasonally in search of pastures or
leaving permanently when the carrying capacity of
their land had been depleted, following upon over-
grazing, adverse climatological conditions or locust
plagues. The process was reinforced by depressions
in the Cape Town area as a result of agricultural
overproduction. The living conditions of the Trekboers
have been aptly portrayed by Cory: "They came to
lead a semi-nomadic existence; wandering about from
place to place with their flocks and herds as better
pastures and more water tempted them ... they were
becoming accustomed also to live in tent-wagons for
months together, so that the want of homes soon
ceased to be regarded as a matter of much hardship
by these dwellers of the wilds" (1965: 13). The wide
open spaces were beckoning. Trekking on, they pro-
gressively increased the distance between themselves
and the market, at least until the opening of new
harbours on the south-eastern coast brought the
market closer to some of the pastoralists. These
distances had to be traversed by means of the
lumbering ox-wagon, and would invariably have
involved months of travelling time with risks to both
travellers and those left behind. The descendants of
the seafaring Dutch became land-traversing Afri-
kaners.
They lost touch with the market and credit
economy. Their experience of the latter was restricted
to infrequent visits to distant markets to obtain, in
barter trade, necessities of life which they could not
produce themselves such as coffee, sugar, salt,
clothing material, medicines, guns, gunpowder and
iron for their wagons. For all practical purposes
pastoralism assumed the nature of a self-sufficient
subsistence economy, each family operating as a self-
supporting unit of production or family enterprise. In
these circumstances the wool industry could not
thrive. The trekking of the sheep required a type of
animal that had little value as producer of either wool
or mutton (Goodfellow, 1931: 42). Cattle were raised
for draught purposes and to provide the family with
meat. With the exchange economy, the price system
and the profit motive (or acquisitive society) with all
their implications as the norm, the conditions depicted
above spelled economic retardation. "Economic
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history", observed Grosskopf, "developed backwards
in South Africa - not as actual retrogression, but
through necessary adaptation to pioneer conditions"
(1925).
The following comparison with the North American
experience is instructive: "Except at the very
beginning and the very end of the frontier era, the
southern African frontiers were far more peripheral to
the market economy than those of North America ...
In North America every factor - the environment, the
land, the indigenous people, and the organisation and
impulse of the initial British settlers - conspired to
make the frontier an integral part of the European
system of merchant capitalism" (Lamar & Thompson
(eds.), 1981: 27-28). The presence of, among others,
navigable rivers accorded North America superiority in
(renewable) natural resource endowment.
The concomitant economic isolation could not but
entail cultural insulation as well. In the nature of
pastoralism, coupled with the quality of the pastorage,
farming units had to be large, which means that
families were isolated from one another, each of them
forming a community in miniature. The lack of a
frequent rubbing of shoulders with neighbours made
for individualism which militated against co-operation
in groups when that was required. The Trekboers
were out of touch with the intellectual currents that
were sweeping the Western World, at the same time
as the Industrial Revolution was changing the
economic face of Britain, followed by the continent of
Europe and North America. They did not enjoy the
benefit of newspapers or journals. Education, handled
by the mother in the family, and occasionally by an
itinerant teacher, was a bare minimum and consisted
of instruction in the written word and the reading of the
Bible, whose precepts determined their mode of life.
Lacking the culture of towns and cities (settled
concentrations of community life) they lost the taste
for the conveniences of civilisation and the refine-
ments of urban society. In the veld the trappings of
city life would, in any case, have been incongruous.2
The struggle with nature, and against indigenous
adversaries, particularly after they encountered the
westward moving African tribes on the eastern border
of the Cape, could be considered the veld-version of
the competitive struggle in urban business and the
clash of minds in social intercourse, and involved little
exercise of the intellect. The mental processes
remained dormant. The marginal utility of income was
low and the demand for income inelastic. Their living
conditions offered no incentive to exert greater effort
than that involved around the home (or tented wagon)
and the tending of the flocks.
The above mise-en-scene is appositely summed
2. Sadie, 1966:5. (Privy Council Office, Reproduced with the
permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government
Services, Canada 200 I).
up by De Kiewiet: "In the long quietude of the
eighteenth century the Boer race was formed ... When
the Trekboers entered [the interior] with their flocks
and tented wagons, they left the current of European
life and lost the economic habits of the nations from
which they had sprung. Though they never became
true nomads, the mark of nomadism was upon them,
and their dominant traits were those of a restless and
narrow existence ... their life gave them a tenacity of
purpose, a power of silent endurance, and the keenest
self-respect. But the isolation sank into their character
causing their imagination to lie fallow and their
intellects to become inert" (1941: 17). They became
casualties of the frontier economy which they had
created. They lacked the characteristics of the
"acquisitive society".
The process can be portrayed as the Africanization of
the Trekboer in the sense of an identification with the soil
of Africa. The Afrikaner had become a "territorial"African.
Obviously, they did not become "cultural" Africans,
although their daily life could not have differed very much
from that of the indigenous tribes. It has been maintained
that they might have begun to assimilate to the latter, the
common circumstances having "stimulated the rise of a
composite culture in which Khoikhoi influence was
apparent ... " (Elphick & Shell, 1979: 157). There was,
however, only a minimal occurrence of European-Xhosa
acculturation (Giliomee, 1979: 327), which had to be
attributed, according to historiographers, to the cardinal
role of the Bible, and of the Old Testament in particular.
A clear distinction was drawn between "Christian" and
"heathen"; and since the former was considered a
civilised person while the latter was a person of colour,
the distinction was associated with the difference in level
of civilisation, and the latter with race or colour. In conse-
quence a possible source of assimilation and misce-
genation of meaningful dimensions was inhibited (Van
Jaarsveld, 1971: 34; 1985: 14; Van der Merwe, 1938:
257; Esterhuizen, 1966: 8). The adversative relationship
between Black and White, involving frequent hostilities,
could have made a contribution as well. This non-
acculturation was due to become of noteworthy
economic significance during the twentieth century.
By 1779 the westward-moving Xhosas formed a
barrage to the continuation of the eastward movement
of the Trekboers on the Eastern border of the Cape. A
period of great turbulence followed involving raids,
counter-raids and wars in which large stock losses
were sustained. Land east of the Fish River was not
available to new potential claimants in accordance
with traditional usage, as population increased.
Giliomee found that by 1789 in the frontier district of
Graaff-Reinet only 26 per cent of the adult men were
owners of farms and the portion had shrunk to 18 per
cent by 1812 (Elphick and Giliomee, 1979: 54/5).
Landlessness and impoverishment ensued. But,
argued the landdrost of Graaff-Reinet in 1825, "as
long as a hope of the extension of the boundary
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exists", a switching to alternative economic pursuits
would not occur (Giliomee, 1981 (c): 98).
An additional foreign element entered the lives of
the Trekboers when Britain added to its Empire by
subjugating and occupying the Cape in 1806, and
establishing its authority on the eastern frontier, but
without affording them the expected protection against
attacks by the tribes. To the centrifugal force of
pressure of population on natural resources, as con-
ditioned by black adversaries, was now added the
wish for independence from this colonial power which
took over from the VOC. From then on there were
going to be two enemies to contend with: Blacks and
British, exacerbating their already precarious exis-
tence.
The Great Trek ensued. It differed from the pre-
ceding gradual process of migration in that it con-
stituted a mass exodus in a short period of time
around 1834-1840. Estimates of the numberof partici-
pants vary between 10000 and 15000 (accompanied
by some 10 000 servants) which meant that 20 to 29
per cent of the 52 000 Afrikaner inhabitants of the
Cape Colony were involved (Giliomee, 2000: Ch. 4;
Van Jaarsveld, 1971(a)). In an article in the
Grahamstown Journal of February 2, 1837 one of the
Voortrekker leaders, Piet Retief, aired the grievances
of the emigrants: "We despair of saving the colony
from those evils which threaten it by the turbulent and
dishonest conduct of vagrants who are allowed to
infest the country in every part ... We complain of the
severe losses which we have been forced to sustain
by the emancipation of our slaves ... We complain of
the continual system of plunder which we have
endured from the kaffirs and other coloured classes ...
We complain of the unjustifiable odium which has
been cast upon us by interested and dishonest
persons under the cloak of religion [the missionaries]
whose testimony is believed in England to the
exclusion of all evidence in our favour; and we can
foresee, as a result of this prejudice, nothing but the
total ruin of the country" (Leach, 1989: 24).
It is not possible to gauge the comparative signi-
ficance of economic factors - landlessness, stock
losses, emancipation of the slaves - vis-a-vis political
motivation. But subsequent events were due to
emphasise the importance of the latter. 3 "The
Voortrekkers were determined to become a free and
independent people in a free and independent state ...
the Great Trek was a rebellion against the British
government", wrote Wilson and Thompson (1969:
406). Though the promise of new land for the landless
would have been an incentive, the Great Trek itself
entailed a great deal of sacrifice of wealth for many,
3. Acouple of hundred Trekboers - as distinct from Voortrekkers - who
had been living north of the Orange River by 1842 denied that their
departure from the Cape Colony had been politically motivated
(Giliomee, 2000: Ch. 5: 24).
farms and homes having had to be sold in a buyers'
market to turn immovable property into liquid assets
which would serve the purposes of transportation in
ox-wagons. The governor of the Cape Colony at the
time, D'Urban, testified in a letter to Lord Glenelg that
a large number of the Boers who left the colony were
members of the oldest and most respected families,
and that the departure of those "fearless, patient,
industrious, law-abiding and devout people was an
incalculable loss to the Colony ... II (Lubbe, 1942: 66).
During the following sixty years the Voortrekkers
were not permitted - and sometimes did not permit
themselves - to settle down for any extended length of
time in the new territories occupied by them to a life of
peace, devoted to political, social and economic
development. Trekking through territory that was
inhabited, or used for grazing purposes, by the various
black tribes, or settling in parts of the country surrounded
by them, it was well-nigh inevitable that disputes and
internecine armed conflict would frequently erupt,
causing loss of life, the burning of wagons and homes
and the killing and theft of livestock, though it would
appear that in some counter-raids more animals were
reclaimed than had originally been rustled. To protect
their kith and kin and counter the military power of the
Zulus and Matabeles, the men had to become skilled in
the ways of the veld and military preparedness, and so
they became expert horsemen and marksmen and brave
fighters. In acquiring the qualities of rugged pioneers
who had to defy the dangers to their existence, they lost
the attributes and aptitudes required for economic
modernisation (Sadie 1966:7). The courage and initiative
engendered in such circumstances were evidently not
characteristics which could be transformed into
enterprise and initiatives in the economic sphere. In
learning to adapt to existing circumstances they lost the
ability to adapt to new ones or, better still, to create
circumstances which would ensure their economic well-
being when trekking came to an end, because the
frontier economy had been stretched to its limits and
there was no more new land to be occupied while rapid
population growth continued. Their territorial expansion
was not an expression of the acquisitive society.
Perhaps even more disturbing of an even tenor of
settled life was the harassment by the British Empire
builders who were in hot pursuit of the Voortrekkers.
The Piet Retief trek had scarcely established their
Republic of Natal when Britain declared Natal a British
colony in 1843. In 1848 the area between the Orange
and Vaal rivers was annexed, by the same colonial
power as the Orange River Sovereignty. In 1854 the
Orange Free State (OFS) was granted independence.
The Transvaal sued for recognition as a state
independent of Britain, and was accorded this status
at the Sand River Convention of 1852. But in 1877 it
was annexed by Theophilus Shepstone on behalf of
Imperial Britain. The Transvaal Afrikaners rebelled
and fought the first War of Independence in 1880,
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defeating the British in the battle of Majuba, after
which independence was restored, subject to British
suzerainty.
The Burgers themselves added to their woes by
intransigence, squabbles and schisms. While those in
the OFS - although embroiled with Moshweshe of
Basotholand - were putting an end to the frontier
economy, and were organising themselves into an
orderly community which had put down roots, the
Transvaal was being crippled by dissension. There
was conflict between the very democratic Volksraad
Party and the despotic Voortrekker leader, Potgieter;
at one stage several regional 'republics' had been
established; before political calm was restored in 1864
armed clashes between factions had occurred; there
were futile attempts at fusing the OFS and the
Transvaal (which came to be known as the ZAR, or
Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek); and the Nederduits
Hervormde Kerk and the Gereformeerde Kerk were
formed as disaffiliations from the Dutch Reformed
Church. These circumstances did not constitute a
milieu in which serious attention would be given to
economic advancement. They could not even offer
effective resistance to Pedi raids on farms.
Mineral resources which should have redounded to
the economic benefit of the two Republics, became
rather a source of conflict. At the end of the 1860s and
the beginning of the 1870s diamonds were discovered in
an area spanning the ill-defined borders of the Cape
Colony, the OFS, the Transvaal and Griqua territory. The
landowners, who were powerless to prevent fortune
seekers from flooding their land, soon sold their farms.
When it became clear that deep mining was the only
efficient method of exploitation, their role as individual
diggers dwindled into insignificance. Capital was
required which they did not have. Only a few Afrikaners
living in the vicinity of Cape Town benefited directly.
Imperialist Britain managed to preclude the claims of the
two republics to this source of revenue and wealth by
having the portions, to which they laid claim, awarded to
the Griquas. The latter were then declared British
subjects, and Griqualand-Westwas incorporated into the
Cape Colony in 1871. The OFS was awarded a paltry
amount in compensation. Having emigrated from the
Eastern Cape border because of, amongst others, their
conviction that Britain was favouring the Blacks at the
expense of Afrikaners, the latter found themselves once
more to have the worst of it.
Already by 1854 gold deposits had been known to
occur in the Transvaal. But the Volksraad, aware of
the tentacles of British imperialism, tried to keep it
secret for fear of losing their independence should the
fact become public knowledge (Esterhuizen, 1965:
10). Originally, almost all the land on the Witwaters-
rand on which gold was discovered and proclaimed as
a mining area in 1886, belonged to Afrikaner farmers.
Among the latter three categories had been
distinguished: (i) those who almost immediately tried
to sell their land at the best price; (ii) those who had
greater love for the soil than for potential wealth; and
(iii) a few who tried to mine the ore for their own
account, but failed because they lacked the know-how
and the capital. A fieldcornet, Jp Meyer, appeared to
have been the most successful mining entrepreneur,
while Colonel IP Ferreira, due to financial problems,
lost his share in the syndicate founded by him, and the
Paarl syndicate was obliged to sell its mining venture,
in which transaction SJ du Toit suffered a loss of :t
£140 000 (Van Zyl, 1986: 73). The entrepreneurial
participation of the Afrikaner in gold mining, accor-
dingly, was minimal and within ten years' time one-
quarter of the surface area of the ZAR had passed
into the hands of foreigners. "Two centuries of solitary
pastoral life", wrote Bryce in 1900, "have not only
given him an aversion for commerce, for industrial
pursuits, and for finance, but an absolute incapacity
for such occupations, so that when gold was
discovered in their country, they did not even attempt
to work it, but were content to sell, usually at a price
far below its value, the land upon which the gold reefs
lay, and move off with the proceeds to resume
elsewhere their pastoral life" (1900: 409). This industry
was due to transform the economy of South Africa,
while the immediate benefit to the Burghers was the
new market that came about for their wheat, maize,
rye, tobacco, vegetables and fruit.
For many years after 1899 the Burghers were not
going to enjoy the benefits that could have ensued
from this new source of wealth by way of political
control over the industry, such control having been
wrested from them by Imperial Britain in a war of
attrition and devastation. In addition to the imperialist
ambitions and designs of Chamberlain and Milner as
driving force in this operation, "Cecil Rhodes, an arch-
imperialist ... was determined to obtain for Britain the
riches of the North" (Leach, 1989: 26). To this end he
exploited the matter of the franchise for uitlanders
(foreigners, mostly British) who descended upon
Johannesburg in their thousands when the discoveries
became known. Suspecting that the real objective was
the subjugation of the ZAR to British rule, the Trans-
vaal delivered an ultimatum to the British governor to
withdraw its troops from the ZAR borders and
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relinquish its claims to the republic. With no response
coming forth from Britain the ZAR considered it a
declaration of war and the Anglo-Boer War began.
The OFS entered the war in support of its neighbour,
while later on some 10000 Cape Colonial Afrikaners
(considered rebels since they were residents of a
British colony and were subjected to martial law)
jOined the commando's. Fighting against over-
whelming odds in which British troops outnumbered
Burghers in a ratio of 6 to 1 (Leach, 1989: 27), they
soon resorted to guerrilla warfare. To deprive these
guerrillas of provisions and shelter the British military
practised a policy of scorched earth, and rounded up
the women and children into unhygienic, ill-equipped
and ill-provisioned concentration camps where the
incidence of mortality escalated to unprecedented
levels, calculated to break the spirit of the die-hards
on commando. Referring to these measures the
Liberal Party opposition leader, Campbell-Banner-
man, commented: "When is a war not a war? When it
is carried on by methods of barbarism in South
Africa" (Spies, 1977: 9). And in the year 2000 an
English-speaking journalist and amateur historian
published his research results in a volume: Fire in
the sky. The destruction of the Orange Free State
1899-1902 (Owen Coetzer), which followed upon his
1996 publication: The Road to Infamy 1899-1900.
The modern-day depiction of the events would
probably be considered a crime against humanity.
The defeated Burghers of the two republics
emerged from the war as foreigners in their own
country; vanquished, dispirited and destitute. Subsis-
tence affluence or poverty had been violently trans-
mitted into pauperism, the depths of which had not
been plumbed yet when the peace accord was signed
in 1902. More injury was going to be visited upon
them and insult added to injury.
For the next three-quarters of a century the
English-speaking society in South Africa, represen-
tative of the victorious Empire, was going to be
experienced as the adversary to the Afrikaner,
entailing energies spent on a political struggle which
could conceivably have been more profitably devoted
to economic enhancement.
CHAPTER 2
THE NEW COLONISTS:
AN ADVERSATIVE WHITE COMMUNITY
The British conquest of the Cape of Good Hope in
1806 heralded the emergence of a new community of
European extraction which was to have a pervasive
influence on the Afrikaners' future, for better and for
worse. It was apparently considered that occupation
by military force alone would not suffice to ensure
that the Cape, and later South Africa, would be
British in cultural orientation and medium of com-
munication. Accordingly, immigration of British sett-
lers was promoted. During the governorship of Lord
Charles Somerset, 3 000 settlers were assisted un-
der the British government's emigration scheme to
settle on the Eastern border, while 2 000 more immi-
grated on their own accord, while 800 discharged
German soldiers - later followed by another 3 000 -
settled there as well. Lacking experience of South
African conditions and having been allotted units of
land inadequate in size for profitable farming, two-
thirds of them soon abandoned their farms to become
hunters or traders and artisans in the newly-
established towns of Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown
and Bathurst. During 1844-474300 labourers arrived
from Britain to work as town dwellers. When the
Republic of Natal was proclaimed British territory in
1843, some 4 000 British immigrants were introduced
into one of the most fertile agricultural regions in
South Africa. A system of free passages and other
aid attracted 9000 more (mostly labourers) to the
colony during 1857-1862. As a result the European
population of the Cape increased very rapidly from
42217 in 1819 to 187439 in 1865 (Wilson and
Thompson, 1969: 274; Boeseken, et al., 1957; De
Kock, 1936: Ch. III).
The discovery of diamonds during the 1860s and
1870s occasioned a spate of immigration from
Europe (overwhelmingly from Britain). There was an
even greater rush of immigrants to the Witwatersrand
when gold was discovered. During 1886-1889 the
population of the Transvaal was augmented by
75 500 immigrants who came to be known as the
uit/anders (foreigners) (Van Zyl, 1986: 94), whose
presence became a central issue, or pretext, in
the political conflict that led to the Anglo-Boer War
(1899 - 1902).
Alfred Milner, who became governor of the two
ex-republics after the war, regarded himself as
"responsible for the future of British South Africa and
above all the jealous trustee of the rights and
interests of the Empire" (Worsfold, 1906: 560), "and
so as to make the new order safe for the empire, he
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conceived that he needed two things - money and
British settlers" (Pyrah, 1955: 185/6). To advance the
English influence in the rural areas, he tried to settle
British immigrants among the Afrikaner farming
population. In this he was not particularly successful,
the flow of willing participants having soon petered out.
An estimate of the volume of immigration into South
Africa during 1880-1911 can be proffered by taking our
cue from the number of Dutch/Afrikaans speakers and
the total European population at various (census)
dates, and by assuming that the total fertility rate of
non-Afrikaners, relative to that of Afrikaners, was
similar to that computed for the period 1921-26 (as
permitted by the earliest available vital statistics
officially released). The pre-1936 Afrikaner population
was estimated by means of reverse extrapolation. The
results are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
EUROPEAN POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
1880-1911
1880 1891 1899 1904 1911
Total 413000 634 000 896 000 1117000 1276000
Afrikaners 330000 454 000 533000 556000 662000
Others 83000 180000 363000 561000 614000
(Immigrants 77 000 155 000 198 000 -22 000)
Sources: Adapted from Sadie, 1978: 16; Schumann, 1938: 38.
The contribution of immigration to population growth
rose from 35% during 1880-1891 to 59% in 1891-1894
and to 90% during 1904-1911 (of which about one-
ninth could have been of a temporary nature, to judge
by the negative magnitude for 1904-1911 of 22 000). In
consequence, and in combination with the Boer War
losses on the battlefield and in the concentration
camps, the Afrikaners' share in the total population of
South Africa was, for a brief period after the war,
depressed to slightly less than one-half.
The United Kingdom remained the main source of
immigration into South Africa ever since, which helped
to maintain the English-speaking community's numbers
stable at around 44% (with slight fluctuations) of the
total White population, even while their reproductive
fertility was lower than that of Afrikaners. After the
Second World War ministers in the Smuts cabinet
hinted at flooding the country with immigrants to pre-
empt the National Party opposition from ever winning
an election. And, indeed, the number of immigrants
surged to 66560 during 1947-48 (CSS, 1988: 2.7). It
did not, however, prevent the defeat of the Smuts
government at the polls in 1948.
The second constituent of the Anglicisation policy
consisted of the enforcement of English as the only
official-later dominant - medium of communication.
In the treaty signed after the occupation of the
Cape in 1806 the Burghers were promised that their
rights and privileges would be preserved. But four
months later a proclamation required that all
documents addressed to the State had to be in
English. A proclamation of 1822 decreed English to
be the only medium of courts and the public service,
while fewer than one-tenth of the Burghers had any
knowledge of the language. The 1865 Education Act
proclaimed English as the only medium of institution
in first and second class schools (Steyn, 1996: 279).
Although the Act was repealed in 1882, English
remained the only medium in practice, since the
examining body acknowledged no other language in
the higher school standards. No effort was spared in
the thoroughgoing process of anglicisation (Wilson &
Thompson, 1969: 272-285). English teachers were
imported, some religious services of the Dutch
Reformed Church were conducted in English, and
ministers of religion were imported from Scotland.
Communication in Dutch/Afrikaans at school was a
culpable offence. English became the language of
jobs and careers.
The policy met with some success in that a con-
siderable number of Afrikaners in the Cape Colony
became anglicised. It is conceivable that the anglici-
sation policy might have achieved greater success if
Britain had not engineered and waged the war
against the two republics. The peaceful pervasion
seemed to have ground to a halt when ex-Burghers
and Cape Colonial Afrikaners alike came to regard
Imperial Britain and its South African appendage as
the enemy whose war atrocities were an unfor-
gettable traumatic experience, and acted as a cohe-
sion-conducing force among the victims and kindred
spirits.
In the run-up to the Anglo-Boer War, when the
Transvaal was still an independent Zuid-Afrikaansche
Republiek (ZAR), English speakers, first generation
immigrants, thought they were done an injustice and
were up in arms when their children were required to
learn the language of their host country at school
(Malherbe, 1925: 289). Because of their large
numbers and their influence in the business world,
their language thrived in the newspapers the
Transvaal Leader, Transvaal Critic, The Star and
Rand Daily Mail, while of the three Dutch/Afrikaans
newspapers Land en Volk, De Transvaler and the
Volkstem, only the latter survived after 1903. These
English newspapers enabled "the fanatical racialists
of the South African League" to let loose "against the
South African Republic a propagandist war of
virulence hitherto unknown in modern history; nor
was it approached, at any rate, until Hitler let the Nazi
propaganda loose against Czechoslovakia" (Keith
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Hancock, Biographer of Genl. Smuts, cited by Van
Jaarsveld, 1971: 82).
After the ZAR and the OFS had been turned into
British colonies by conquest, Milner attempted to
complete the anglicisation process initiated by Somer-
set in 1822. In a letter he expressed his intention of
"absorbing and ultimately getting rid of them [the
Burghers] as a separate, exclusive caste" (Joubert,
1997: 10; Weideman, 1954: 166). Already during the
war the 17 000 children in the concentration camps
were indoctrinated in the tradition of English education,
and this was followed up after the war by the staffing of
public schools with teachers imported from the Cape
Colony and England (Esterhuizen, 1965: 103). English
superseded Dutch as the official language.
The process was accompanied by the pouring of
vituperation upon Afrikaans and its speakers. In 1857,
September 19, The Cape Argus' leading article referred to
Afrikaans (the everyday spoken version of Dutch) as "the
miserable bastard jargon" not worthy of the appellation of
a language (Joubert, 1997: 10). The editor of the
Colesberg Advertiser of April 20, 1901, thought that "to
nurse it [Afrikaans] is to cherish a viper". In the Cape
Times of May 4, 1901, a writer wanted to know "why
forego it [English] its glorious privilege for the sake of
kitchen Dutch, an ungrammatical taal which are only fit for
peasants and up-country kraals". The editor of the Albert
Times (27 June 1900) opined that as a member of the
"working class the Afrikaner would be in his proper place
viz. a rough and ready servant, well adapted to the
country and fit for hard manual labour and exposure, and
adverse to using his brains" and the Boers would
"represent the great unwashed of all the White races",
reminiscent of the "lesser breed beyond the Pale". The
leading article of the Cape Times of May 10, 1902
referred to Afrikaans as a "half-bred and illiterate
language", "miserable taal", "mongrel language" and
"hotchpotch taal" (cited by Snyman, 1973: 239). A few
more epithets have been identified: "awkward unidiomatic
speech", "ox-wagon vernacular", "cacophonous jumble",
"undignified gabble", "a dialect degenerate and decaying",
"mongrel patois" (Scholtz, 1999: 10).
An English authoress vaunted her superiority
complex as follows: "No English person in any part of
the world finds it necessary to assert his belief in the
English language and the importance of the English
ideals - and so viewed there is something not a little
pathetic in the racial assertions of the South African
Dutch ... in the long run there can only be one outcome
of any sort of free and even competition between the
races. English methods and the English language are
bound increasingly to win their way and permeate the
whole structure of society. It cannot be otherwise
because business and commercial development in the
country are bound to follow English lines" (Markham,
1913: 184). According to the historian Walker, the 1910
constitutional provision of the equality of English and
Dutch was not taken seriously by the English. They
regarded it as a simple courteous gesture, no more
and no less (1925:492).
In 1926 a member of the Natal Teachers Asso-
ciation asseverated at their annual conference that
"when the Afrikaans speaking South African learns
English he does so out of necessity, but when the
English speaking South African learns Afrikaans, he
does so out of courtesy" (Malherbe, 1926). A belief
was bruited abroad that "since the educated
Dutchman necessarily knows English, there was no
necessity for educated Englishmen to know Dutch",
and to use a language other than English in public was
labelled racialism and a disturbance of the peace (Van
den Heever, 1943: 35). As late as 1979 an American
scholar, who experimented with his limited Afrikaans
vocabulary, elicited the retort from a first lady of the
Natal establishment that he "was never to use that
crude language in her home" (Munger, 1979: 4). In
1975 Nancy Charton listed some thirty pejoratives
used by English speakers to denote Afrikaners (pp.
45/6). The boast of "I don't speak that language",
uttered with pride in response to a question in
Afrikaans, used to be a common experience of the
author's, and the preceding, generation.
For economic and social life to function with a
minimum of friction in the circumstances, and in a
country which was supposed to have two official
languages (after 1910), the Afrikaner had to
engender the modus vivendi by deferring to the
English speaker; which means that the Afrikaner
addresses the English speaker in English and the
latter speaks English to the Afrikaner. Eventually it
would redound to his advantage in that he was the
bilingualist when unilingualism became an
impediment to some occupations. But in the mean-
time, to procure employment, he had to be better
qualified than his potential English-speaking com-
petitor, since he had to be proficient in a foreign
language in addition to his mother tongue. "Insuffi-
cient acquaintance with English, which became the
language of the town, of commerce and industry" the
Carnegie Commission on the Poor White Problem
found, in 1932, "was also an important factor in
barring a considerable part of the rural population
from profitable employment in non-agricultural occu-
pations. Even today this is to some extent the case."
For more than a century and a half (after 1806
that is) the English would not become Africanised in
the sense that the Afrikaners had. They remained an
appendage of the British Empire in an era when
political empires were still in vogue. In 1941, Calpin,
author of There are no South Africans, could still
testify that they were "more British than the English
... English-speaking South Africans, even of the
fourth generation, still speak of going 'home' when
they plan a visit to a Britain they have never seen.
When they have taken it, they 'come back', they do
not come 'home' ... It may not strike the imagination
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of the 'Britisher' for instance, that his refusal to learn a
language, Afrikaans, is a matter of any importance. To
the Afrikaner it is ... " (pp. 12-14). The virulence of
British jingoism - particularly as reflected in the English
press - gradually waned to the extent of eliciting
laudatory appreciation of the contribution of Afrikaners
to the indigenous literacy and intellectual culture.
One cannot, of course, put a specific date to the
conversion of the English to the primary status of South
Africans, since it was a process which evolved over
time. But, perhaps, the 1970s could be considered the
period of greatest significance in this regard, in
concomitance with the government's attempts to
secure their co-operation in finding a solution to, or
amelioration of, the BlacklWhite political issue which
might have inspired a sense of common destiny.
Forthe Afrikaners the above mise-en-scene had the
seminal economic outcome portrayed by the adage:
give a dog a bad name, and hang him: (i) The market
value of Dutch/Afrikaans was destroyed, and thereby
the economic value of the speakers, in the public
service; (ii) There was little or no empathy in the private
sector with the Afrikaner and no feeling of responsibility
or compunction towards him. Jobs were allegedly
deliberately withheld from them as revealed in a
petition which stated that the "Jingo's do not want to
give jobs to Boers" (Peiser, 1941: 184). Since the
English dominated the non-agricultural sectors of the
economy, they could indulge their "taste for
discrimination" with impunity; (iii) For more than half a
century (after 1902) energy was going to be wasted on
English/Afrikaner political conflict which could have
been spent economically more constructively; (iv) The
ignominy suffered atthe hands of the British conqueror
and his representatives in South Africa induced a
feeling of inferiority. "Their language, culture and sense
of belonging fractured, they began to suffer an
inferiority complex" (Leach, 1989: 28; Van Jaarsveld,
1985: 20). OF Malan wrote in 1917: "Van .jaar tot jaar
en van geslacht tot geslacht is de Afrikaner beschouwd
geworden, en behandeld geworden, als een minder-
waardige. Dit is hem op aanschouwelijke wijse ...
gepredikt geworden door de civiele dienst, door de
school, door ieder klein amptelike kennisgewing langs
de weg, door de gehele inrichting en toon van de
maatschappij. En waar anderen hem beschouwden en
behandelden als een minderwaardige, daar begon hij
zichself ook zo te beschouwen" (p. 15).
The situation could conceivably have been analo-
gous to that depicted by the late Black Consciousness
leader, Steve Biko, who contended that the political
oppression to which the Black community had been
subjected eroded its soul to the extent that its members
could not conceive of a realistic alternative, thus
creating an inferiority complex and a dependency
mood (Lotter, 1992). It was a mindset most unlikely to
conduce to the engendering of the creative factor of
production, entrepreneurship. The latter was supplied,
for the most part, by the English community and in
this role they would eventually make a significant
contribution to the Afrikaners' economic oppor-
tunities.
While the latter had been cut off from its Dutch
source of growth and renewal after 1806, the English
community had its ranks frequently infused with new
blood from the mother country, Le. immigrants who
brought with them knowledge of new European
developments, as well as economic, financial and
business acumen, which stood the South African
economy in good stead. From the very beginning they
congregated preponderantly in urban areas and
remained in contact with the outside world through the
proximity to the ports. The influx of immigrants occa-
sioned by the discovery of diamonds and gold was
followed by substantial inflows of foreign capital which
capacitated the floatation of 270 companies, with a
nominal capital of £50 157 000 for the exploitation of
gold within one year after 1886 (Schumann, 1938: 91).
The wealth derived from diamond mining was used in
the development of the gold mining industry, whose
profits, in turn, could be invested in manufacturing
industries induced by the backward linkages of mining
activities and rising personal income. The non-Afrikaner
participants came in on the ground floor of develop-
ments in mining, finance, commerce and manufac-
turing, and reaped the benefits of being first in the field.
A simple example will suffice. A businessman who was
able to save and invest £1 000 each year since the year
1900, at a rate of return of 12,5% (in terms of the
appropriate national accounts magnitudes) per annum,
would have amassed a small fortune of £3 241 000 by
1950 (at constant prices). He would have been that
much ahead of an Afrikaner starting a venture in the
latter year, and he would, in all probability, have been
able to finance a maximum education and training
opportunities for his descendants, according them a
head start over contemporary Afrikaner generations.
13
Personal income differentials will be boosted in his favour
because of the contributions of "income from
property" (interest, dividends, rent receipts, etc.). In 1999,
for example, the latter item in the national accounts
showed an amount equal to 43% of that recorded under
"compensation for employees" and represented 29% of
the total current income of households (SARB, June
2000: S-131). It is a significant source of income
inequality, and it will be reflected in English/Afrikaner
personal income differentials.
It is worthy of note that the majority of persons in
the vanguard of the transformation of the South African
economy from the agricultural/pastoral to the industrial
stage, and particularly the mining pioneers, were not
pukka Englishmen but people of Jewish extraction:
George Albu, Barney Barnato, Alfred Beit, David
Harris, Solly Joel, Sammy Marks, Harry Mosenthal,
Lionel Phillips, Ernest Oppenheimer (RGN, 1976). The
Oppenheimer economic empire is still rated first in
terms of market capitalisation on the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange (McGregor, 2000), and the small
Jewish section of the English-speaking community has
remained a major force in the South African world of
business. They have to be credited also with a very
significant contribution to the economic development
which burgeoned in the auspicious post-World War II
conditions and under the aegis of an entrepreneur-
benevolent government after 1948. The economic
growth redounded to the benefit of the Afrikaners who
profited from the income tax revenue contributed to the
fiscus by the economically more advanced component
of the population, which could be used for the financing
of education, aid to the farming community and welfare
services. And, when the growth created a demand in
the private sector for skilled workers and professionals
which could no longer be satisfied from the ranks of the
English-speaking labour force, Afrikaners became
acceptable candidates.
CHAPTER 3
IMPOVERISHMENT AND
PAUPERIZATION
3.1 Fragility of the frontier economy
Impoverishment and the attendant economic decline
of the Afrikaner people - which did not, of course,
apply to all members of the population - was the fate
of many of those who participated in the trekboer
movement and were unable to obtain land, or lost their
livestock as a basis for the earning of a living, and
those who took part in the Great Trek to become
Burghers of the ZAR and OFS republics.
These Afrikaners' almost exclusive dependence on
only one of the three non-human factors of production,
natural resources, to co-operate with human labour in
the production process - typical of economically
underdeveloped people - contained the seeds of im-
poverishment by reason of their great vulnerability to
adverse conditions over which the pastoralists had
little or no control. They did not qualify as entre-
preneurs who are presumed to be imbued with a spirit
of enterprise and creative innovation. Theirs was
rather an adventurous spirit, and their function could
perhaps have been equated with that of an overseer
who also performed necessary tasks requiring some
degree of skill while their slaves, or servants, did the
rest. Technology was negligible in quantity and
stagnant in character. Their capital, apart from their ox
wagons, consisted of their breeding stock whose
accumulation depended upon the vicissitudes of
nature and the inclinations of human adversaries who
were given to marauding. Which meant that, in the last
resort, the economic status of the Trekboers and their
descendants depended on the benignancy or other-
wise of nature. In the absence of other forms of
capital, nature had to provide it. They had little or no
control over their own fortunes. Facilities for the
formation of human capital were lacking, and so were
opportunities for the acquisition of experience and
knowledge of business. Stock-farming was a way of
life rather than a business undertaking. The natural re-
source endowment had not been used productively
either. Of many of them it was said that their farming
activities were "unsystematic, primitive and wasteful. It
consists mainly in tending a few cattle and a flock of
sheep and goats. The principles of scientific stock-
breeding are not understood and their importance is
not understood" (cited by Esterhuizen, 1965: 226).
The above characteristics mark those involved as an
economically underdeveloped people.
Such economic life style was sustainable as long
as there was sufficient land and accompanying
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renewable natural resources to accommodate the
increase in population, in the tradition of each son
having a claim to a farming unit. (In the OFS until
1866 each trekker was entitled to two farms.) But
there came a time when there was no more vacant or
unsold land - some of it bought by absentee
landowners and companies for speculative purposes-
and trekking had to come to a stop, while population
continued to grow. By the end of the nineteenth
century some one-half of the Burgher population were
landless (Giliomee, 2000: ch. 5, p 41).
The inexorable pressure of a growing population
on the limited supply of natural resources was
accommodated in two ways: (i) Farmers who felt
obliged to provide land for each son, having had no
alternative means of providing for them, would, in their
testamentary disposal parcel out their land in equal
portions among the sons (which was also congruous
with Roman-Dutch law in the event of a father dying
intestate, in which case, however, all the children and
not only sons would have been the beneficiaries).
After several generations of such sub-division many
farming units had become uneconomically small,
which spelled poverty for those who had to eke out an
existence on such units. (ii) A share tenancy or
squatter system came into existence, the participants
in which became known as 'bywoners.' Owners of
large landholdings would allow the latter to live on a
part of their land not fully exploited by themselves, and
in return would require the bywoners to do some work
for them or to share with them a portion of the crops
raised and/or of the increase in their livestock for
which they had received grazing rights. Usually the
system suited both landlord and share tenant, and the
position of the 'bywoner' was quite secure in the early
stages, but its basic characteristic was the
indefiniteness and insecurity of such tenure (De Kock,
1924: 465; Goodfellow, 1931: 34), since the economic
circumstances of the landowner could change as the
pressure of population mounted.
A third potential accommodating course of action
would obviously have been the genesis of a category
of White farm employees. This did not come to pass,
however, and not because farmers' sons were averse
to performing the type of manual labour involved. The
reason proffered for this state of affairs was that while
it was acceptable to employ the skills in question for
oneself or for one's family, it was infra dig to par-
ticipate in such activity as a wage labourer. The latter
status was reserved for slaves - before their
emancipation - the Khoisan and members of the
Black tribes, and it would have been demeaning for a
European (or White) to offer his services in such
capacity (Van der Merwe, 1938: 186; Goodfellow,
1931: 62 and Wilson & Thompson, 1969: 407). But
there was also some rationale to this attitude: a visitor
to the north-western border of the Cape Colony in
1834 reported as follows on responses to his
questions in conversation with frontiersmen: "Tell me,
who will employ our children if we teach them trades?
Not the Boers, for they are Jacks of all trades ... we
must keep sheep and seek pasture as far as the
government will allow - or starve ... and in what
country will people serve for hire, if they can live their
own masters" (cited by Le Roux, 1977: 13). Actually,
when eventually pauperisation compelled them to
seek employment in the non-agricultural sector, they
accepted extensively unskilled manual jobs. When, in
the twentieth century, a class of White farm workers
did come into existence, the participants entered the
occupation mostly as skilled workers, supervisors and
farm managers.
3.2 Destruction of wealth
The accumulation of wealth, ever since the beginning
of the inland migration, was impeded by the form in
which it was held, viz. livestock. It was vulnerable to
disease, climatic conditions, animal and human
predators, destructive wars and eventually - when
pastoralists had become stockbreeders and crop
producers for the market - unpropitious market
conditions. In the course of the eastward movement
the trekboers were being harassed by the Khoisan. A
historiographer reported the following losses of
animals suffered by them as a result of raids during
1785 to 1795: horses 617, head of cattle 18 633 and
sheep 77 196 (Cory, 1965: 19). Their meeting up with
the Xhosa on the eastern frontier at the end of the
eighth decade of the eighteenth century ushered in an
era of looting and armed conflict in which great losses
of livestock were sustained. It is not known how much
of the loot might have been retrieved in counter-
attacks. In 1834, in one of a number of Xhosa marau-
ding expeditions the colonists had to brave, 456 of
their homes were burnt down, while 5 700 horses, 111
400 head of cattle and 156 900 sheep were rustled,
ruining thousands who "from a state of moderate
competency, were in a few days reduced to a mise-
rable dependence upon the charity of the colonial
government for daily bread" (cited by Thom, 1936: 73;
Du Plessis, 1964: 3).
Those who took part in the Great Trek continued to
suffer losses of wealth in their northward movement,
as a result of conflicts with the Zulu, Matabele and
others: In one encounter, for example, the members of
the Trichardt-Van Rensburg Trek lost everything they
possessed, eliciting the comment from one of them
that while he had 7 000 head of sheep and a good
deal of money before, he had nothing left but his pair
of trousers and a shirt (Coetzee 1942:72 ). In the ZAR
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Burghers had to fend off attacks by the Pedi. To add
to their woes the 1895-6 Rinderpest epidemic, accom-
panied by a serious drought, wiped out a large
percentage of cattle and sheep, ruining thousands of
farmers (De Swardt, 1983: 3; Du Plessis, 1964: 15).
And in the north-eastern Transvaal the tsetse fly
threatened animal and human life. Locusts were not
infrequent destroyers of crops and veld.
But there was still worse to come in the form of the
Anglo-Boer War which transmitted both poverty and
affluence into pauperism. When the Boer commandos
resorted to guerrilla tactics, because they were vastly
outnumbered and outgunned in conventional warfare
situations, Lord Roberts decided to "treat the
remnants of the burgher forces as brigands and to
devastate the country of supplies and to use the
consequent starvation as a lever to bring the
recalcitrant fanatics to their senses" (Spies, 1977:
122). The military command to "lay waste" was
interpreted (in a telegram) to mean: "Gather all food,
wagons, Cape carts, sheep, oxen, goats, cows,
calves, horses, mares, foals, forage poultry. Destroy
what you cannot eat or remove ... burn all houses and
explain the reason is that they have harboured enemy,
and not reported to British authorities as required.
Give no receipts ... " (Ibid: 122). When the Boer
commandos disrupted the communications of the
British army, the director of Military Railways was
authorised to order civilians to travel by train as a
means of inhibiting Boer attacks on the railways.
Where such attacks did occur the nearest farm would
be burnt to the ground.
The actions involved were graphically portrayed by
an investigative (mother tongue English) joumalist: "Boer
farms were dynamited and burnt, livestock was
mercilessly slaughtered. Pigs were hacked to pieces.
Chickens were speared by lances and swords. Sheep
and goats were shot by phalanxes of gleeful Tommies.
Crops were destroyed, grain bags were cut open and the
contents flung to the wind. Women, many pregnant, and
children, many ill, were given ten minutes to collect their
goods and clear out before their possessions were
looted and smashed in orgies of destruction. And then
the farmhouses were set alight and blown up ... at least
30 000 farms were destroyed in the Orange Free State
and Transvaal in huge sweeping military manoeuvres
... " (Coetzer, 1998: 25). Some of the rural towns were
razed to the ground as well. This journalist also
maintained that the concentration camps into which the
women and children had been rounded up "would
ultimately lead to the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, and, in
turn, the abhorrent policy of apartheid - for never again
would the Afrikaner people become prisoners of any
nation" (Ibid).
In a debate in the British Houses of Parliament in
1902 Sir Campbell-Bannerman remarked: "The whole
country in the two belligerent states outside the mining
towns is a howling wilderness. The flocks and herds
are either butchered or driven off; the mills are
destroyed; furniture and instruments of agriculture
smashed" (cited in Esterhuizen, 1965: 46). Of the OFS
(which became the Orange River Colony in 1901)
Milner reported that it was "virtually a desert, almost
the whole population living in refugee camps along the
railway line. The country is a wilderness, without
inhabitants and almost without cultivation. Everything
is at famine prices and will be worse" (Coetzee, 1942:
74). According to estimates livestock losses were as
follows:
Transvaal OFS
Cattle 80% 59,4%
Horses 75%
Sheep 73% 54,7%
Weighted Average 77% 58,5%
Sources: Du Plessis, 1964: 16; Es!erhuizen, 1965: 45; Sadie, 1956: 44.
If we may assume that the percentage of horses
destroyed in the OFS was no higher than 58,5% the
losses in the form of livestock only sustained by the
ex-republics through enemy action equalled 61%.
The Cape Colonial Afrikaners did not get off
unscathed either. Under martial law those who were
suspected of harbouring sympathy with the re-
publicans had, on the slightest pretexts, been
arrested, detained and/or banished from their places
of residence. Snyman, who investigated the Cape
Afrikaners' experiences during 1899-1902 concluded
(freely translated) that many of them "had been
pauperised and on the verge of starvation ... and
perhaps, had made as many sacrifices as their
northern brothers on the battlefield" (1973: 253).
Farming activities, which had almost ground to a
halt during the war - those of collaborators excepted -
could not be resumed for two seasons after the war
because of the drought during 1903-1904, and the
lack of draught animals. In addition agriculture was
hamstrung by the long 1903-1909 depression, which
was described by Schumann (1938) as "one of the
severest and undoubtedly the most prolonged South
Africa had experienced during the past hundred years.
The explanation lies in the destruction of the interior
caused by the war" (93-94). All the reports on the
state of the rural population reaching the newspaper
Land en Volk and the organ of the Nederduitse
Hervormde or Gereformeerde Kerk testified to misery,
poverty, hardship and destitution. One from the
Western Transvaal read: "Die nood en ellende onder
onze plattelandsbevolking is onbeschrijflik groot ...
vele vroeger welgestelde Boeren hebben zich moeten
gaan verhuuren om voor't dagelijksbrood en eenige
shillings per dag te arbeiden - een arbeid waarbij de
arme ziel nog onverzadigd blijft, helaas" (Esterhuizen,
1965: 95-97).
In accordance with the 1902 Peace Treaty the
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British government put £3 million at the disposal of a
Commission - only one member of which represented
the ex-Burghers - which had to distribute the amount
as compensation to those ex-republicans who could
not provide themselves with food and accommodation
in the aftermath of the destruction by the military.
Another £3 million was made available as loans free
of interest for two years, and thereafter repayable at
3% interest. The way in which the matter of
compensation was handled by the Commission gave
rise to great dissatisfaction and chagrin. Claims for
compensation submitted amounted to £17 648 507,
but the Commission reckoned that the appropriate
amount should be £7 621 321, which was, of course,
still in excess of the sum of money available. So, it
resolved that each claimant, regardless of the amount
claimed, should receive £25 and whatever was left of
the £3 million after this distribution could be paid out at
a rate of two shillings in the pound (Esterhuizen, 1965:
71-76). Amongst others, Genl. Louis Botha, who was
offered £900 as compensation for war damages of
£20 000, returned the cheque.
So, a new Trek began; this time from the rural to the
urban areas, to the economic life of which those raised in
the farming tradition were not attuned. The few thousand
who had made a reasonable living in towns as civil
servants in the ZAR had been laid off - unless they were
protected Burghers or "national scouts" (collaborators
during the war, in other words) - to create vacancies in
the new colonial service to be filled by English officials.
By 1909, of the 3 026 officials in office, only 383 had Afri-
kaans names, and in that year 3 068 ex-officials had
their contributions to the ZAR pension scheme returned
to them, but they were not re-instated (Ibid: 150). Thus,
the few opportunities for jobs outside the agricultural
sector were closed to Afrikaners in the new British
colony, the Transvaal (ex-ZAR).
The catastrophic dimensions of the destruction of
the two republics' assets by the British army must rank
as the major determinant of pauperisation and,
accordingly, the dimensions of the poor white
problem. However, the structural poverty-inducing
forces had already been in operation for a long time
before the Anglo-Boer War, concomitant with the
diminishing endowment of land per capita, not only in
the two republics, but in the Cape Colony as well.
(Natal, which became known as the last outpost ofthe
British Empire, remained very much of marginal
significance in Afrikaner economic life.)
Those who did not participate in the northward trek
of the 1830s settled down to a more peaceful and
somewhat more prosperous life. But agriculture re-
mained the mainstay of their economy, the first Cape
census (of 1865) revealing that 79% of the population
were associated with this economic sector (Schu-
mann, 1938: 36). Those who lived in the outlying
districts, on or around the eastern frontier, continued
to engage in pastoralism or extensive farming, but it
would appear that the market was increasingly
exerting its influence. Before the middle of the
nineteenth century hides and skins had become a
second major export. The closer the farms were to
Cape Town or the adjacent area, the greater was the
influence of the market, to which the production of
particularly wine, wheat and fruit responded. Since the
middle of that century woolfarming showed good
progress with the Spanish merino taking over from the
indigenous fat-tailed sheep, so that wool became the
prime earner of foreign exchange (Schumann, 1938:
44). For a time, while the fashions favoured ostrich
feathers, ostrich farming became a source of
affluence. Some of the town dwellers ventured into the
banking business during the period of 1836-1863 by
initiating, or participating in, the establishment of a
District Bank in just about every one of the Cape
Magisterial districts. But because of unwise extension
of credit and lack of knowledge of banking practices,
in the end only one survived, the Stellenbosch District
Bank, the others having either been liquidated or
incorporated into the financially more powerful
Imperial Banks. At the turn of the century a number of
Boards of Executors and Trust Companies were
founded by Afrikaners.
Though not without their share of poverty (Tini
Vorster, 1979: 78), the Cape Colonial Afrikaners as a
whole were economically somewhat more advanced
than their northern neighbours and did not experience
pauperdom to the same extent. They made conside-
rable headway in the legal and teaching professions
and served, in fact, as a source of supply of pro-
fessionals for the public service in the two republics.
Come a time when they could extend a hand, or take
a lead, in changing the economic fortunes of their less
fortunate fellowmen.
Already in 1886 the Synod of the Dutch Reformed
Church in the Cape devoted attention to the pheno-
menon of impoverishment, followed up by a dis-
cussion of the same problem at Stellenbosch in 1893,
at Cradock in 1916 and at a conference of the Dutch
Reformed Churches of the four provinces in 1923. In
1934 a Peoples Congress was convened to discuss
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the poor White problem which was highlighted by the
findings of the Carnegie Commission. It estimated the
possible number answering to the description of poor
White at 300 000. If 280 000 of this number were
Afrikaners they would have represented 27% of this
population group. In the eyes of the leaders in the
Afrikaner community this was an intolerable situation.
The first of poor relief projects was the Kakamas
Labour Colony which was established by the Dutch
Reformed Church in 1897. The qualifying indigent was
allotted 6 morgen of land which could be irrigated by
way of canals bringing water from the Orange River,
and, in addition, was granted grazing rights for 25
head of small or 20 head of large stock (De Kock,
1924: 466). Similar colonies were established later in
the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. This kind of
poor relief was congruous with a prevailing 'back-to-
the-land' tradition while the movement of people was
urbanwards. The tradition appeared to have survived
for a long time. In 1934 - when the depopulation of
the rural areas had begun (an absolute decline in
numbers) after the Great Depression of 1929-1933
and the Great Drought of 1933-34, the government
announced seven grand projects for the combating of
unemployment: the rural rehabilitation and housing
scheme; the control of soil erosion; new forestry
settlements; new irrigation schemes; subsidies for the
building of dams; employment of boys at agricultural
schools; and the model towns of the Railways (Pauw,
1945: 197). Still, they provided people with oppor-
tunities to earn a living in a manner with which they
were familiar. The economic accommodation of the
increase in the population on these colonies, however,
was not provided for by means of education and
training for non-agricultural pursuits, or by extensions
to the arable land, so that in the early phase some
squatting made its appearance on some of these
projects. In later years there were not enough candi-
dates to take advantage of all the rural opportunities
offered. Poor relief was, in any case, not going to put
the community on the road to economic development
and prosperity.
CHAPTER 4
ECONOMIC AWAKENING
4.1 The first generation
One of the outcomes of the conflict in the Cape Colony,
between the English supporting Britain's war against the
two republics and the Afrikaners sympathetic to the Boer
cause, was a kindling of an awareness among the latter
that they had hardly any share in urban commercial
enterprise. The actions and attitudes of the general
dealers and traders during the Anglo-Boer War so
enraged them that they withheld their custom, putting
some of the dealers out of business. The feeling was
that these men used the money arising from Afrikaners'
support to serve the interests of the enemy (Britain). In
the process the idea germinated that they might muster
consumer power for the purpose of their own com-
mercial enterprises. In Cradock, Adelaide, Britstown,
Graaff-Reinet and Aberdeen shares for the establish-
ment of new businesses were readily sold and shops set
up (Snyman, 1973: 357-364). Over time many more
general dealer businesses were established in towns
country-wide, but the scope of this activity cannot be
probed quantitatively.
At a conference convened in Graaff-Reinet in June
1900 to discuss the position of Afrikaners in the
business world, a motion was passed to the effect that
the time had come for people to act in self-reliant
manner in all spheres of the economy and that
existing Afrikaner business undertakings had to be
supported whenever possible (Ibid: 362). These
initiatives were interpreted by the English press as a
plot against small shopkeepers "who might bear
English names" and could lead to their ruin; and it was
tantamount to a manifestation of disloyalty to the
British queen and could engender racial hatred. On
his way to secure a foothold in the non-agricultural
sectors the Afrikaner would experience that he had
not only to contend with his own inexperience in such
economic activity, but also with the vested interests of
the English community backed by a belligerent
English press which invariably resorted to the political
slant. By inference, urban business was the preserve
of the English, while the Afrikaner had to confine
himself to his farm or perhaps to (as cited in chapter
3) "his proper place viz. a rough and ready servant ...
fit for hard manual labour. .. "
But the event which ushered in the meaningful
economic awakening - and came to be known as the
First Economic Movement - was the founding of De
(later Die) Burger, a Dutch (soon afterwards, Afri-
kaans) medium newspaper in 1915. It was not,
primarily, a commercial venture for the sake of profit,
and only turned into a profitable enterprise during the
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1950's. The editor (DF Malan) in his first leading
article wrote: "De Burger is een kind van de smart en
de hoop. Hij is geboren uit de ween van ons volk.
Indien zware rampen niet ons volksbestaan hadden
getroffen hij zou er zeker niet geweest zijn." Its
founding testified to a close relationship in Afrikaner
life between language, economics and politics. It
espoused the cause of Genl. JBM Hertzog, founder of
the National Party, after he was manoeuvred out of
the Botha government cabinet. His political agenda
emphasised equality of the two official languages, a
common loyalty and the principle of "South Africa first
and foremost" at a time when the interests of Britain,
not those of South Africa, were accorded paramountcy
in South Africa.
Creative innovation revolves around individuals
who take the lead as entrepreneur, and in the case of
De Burger it was WA Hofmeyr, while the initial source
of finance was a wealthy Afrikaner, Jannie Marais,
who, each time he was approached he responded un-
stintingly, promising that while he was alive he would
see to it that the newspaper would not fold. The
directors themselves took up shares in the company
and persuaded others to do likewise.
The first years of its existence were very difficult
ones, starting as it did during the first world war when
jingo sentiments ran high among the English. Its
English counterpart, The Cape Times, began a cam-
paign of vituperation against Die Burger and alleged
that it was coercing advertisers into supporting it by
threatening businesses, which refused to do so, with
boycotts by supporters of the National Party. Actually
the boot was on the other foot: pressure was brought
upon businesses, overwhelmingly in English hands, to
boycott Die Burger, which obliged the latter to reduce
its number of pages and its personnel. When its
building had to be guarded by volunteers to prevent
mobs from putting their threats into practice, the paper
wrote: "The Jingo persecution will not exterminate the
Afrikaner, but will act as a spur to develop himself to a
position of independence in the economic and com-
mercial fields as in all others" (Crafford, 1965: 3). The
attacks on Die Burger aroused resentment among the
readers, inciting some of them to buy only from those
businesses which used it as advertising medium; but
such outcome did not arise as a result of a campaign
on the part of Die Burger.
The publishing company, Nasionale Pers Bpk.
(renamed Naspers in 1998) has, over the years,
extended its commercial activities by founding new
publications, taking over existing ones, publishing
journals in both Afrikaans and English, operating in
the book trade, undertaking commercial printing and
branching out into the electronic media. At the turn of
the twentieth century it was responsible for the
publication of 18 newspapers and journals (Stock
Exchange Handbook 1999:314). Said Ton Vosloo,
MD, in the year 2000: "Naspers is now light years
away from what it was, having grown from a traditional
publisher to a diversified media group with a strong
thrust in electronic media" (Harris, 2000: 14). It was
listed on the JSE in 1994 where it was rated 15th (in
1999), its relative market capitalisation control having
quadrupled in three years' time (McGregor, 2000).
Apart from 26 rural Trust Companies and Boards
of Directors that came into being during the period
1914 to 1922 (Giliomee, 1999: 20), the major venture
into the field of finance was the establishment of the
SA National Trust and Assurance Co. Ltd. (SANTAM).
It is generally believed to have sprung from an
approach to WA Hofmeyr and Nasionale Pers by
Alfred McDowall, who was experienced in banking
and insurance, but could equally well have been the
brainchild of the manager of Nasionale Pers, Fred
Dormehl. The directors of SANTAM, in their turn,
founded the SA National Life Assurance Co.
(SAN LAM) to handle the life insurance business, and
bought the shares of African Homes Trust and
Assurance Co. Ltd whose field of operation was
industrial insurance. When WA Hofmeyr retired as MD
of SANT AM and SAN LAM he was succeeded by
another well-known personality in business circles, CR
Louw. SANT AM became the target of an attack by a
competitor and of the English newspapers. A weekly,
The Cape, (August 2, 1919) thought that "it is difficult
to regard the SANT AM apart from its Hertzogite and
Nationalist associations - all the directors of the
company are tried and true Hertzogites, steeped up to
the neck in Nationalist policy" (cited by Le Roux, 1953:
131.) To prevent the competitor from securing a
monopoly in the Trust business of the OFS, SANTAM
over-extended itself and faced liquidation. It was
saved by the general manager of the Standard Bank
who extended the necessary credit since he knew the
directors to be "honourable men".
The two companies benefited from the fact that (i)
their prospective clients, though not very knowledge-
able about finance and business, understood and
appreciated the importance of insurance; (ii) they put
representatives on the road who canvassed business
to induce and attract savings which might not otherwise
have materialised or have been entrusted to banks or
held in cash; and (iii) as a mutual institution SANLAM
could argue that the company belonged to its clients
(policyholders) who enjoyed the benefits or profits (or
surpluses) generated by the company. By the year
2000 SANLAM (now controlling SANTAM and a
number of other companies) had grown into a financial
giant. After its demutualisation in 1998 and its stock
exchange listing it was rated second (after the Oppen-
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heimer empire) in terms of JSE market capitalisation
control (McGregor, 2000). Prominent among the
second generation chief executive officers of SAN LAM
were MS Louw, AD Wassenaar and Fred du Plessis.
The field of funeral insurance and undertakers was
entered with the formation of AVBOB in 1921. The
modus operandi of the business was simple, with
clients contributing a monthly premium to obtain
coverage of their funeral expenses, which made for
rapid expansion. Afrikaners have become the
dominant operators in the field. Around this time
Sasbank and Spoorbondkas were established, which
mustered small savings which were made available as
credit to customers who needed small loans. These
institutions fulfilled a real need since thousands of low-
income individuals had no alternative ways of
obtaining credit. After registering as a loan bank in
1942, Sasbank made rapid progress. Volkskas was
founded as a co-operative bank in 1934. JJ Bosman
was the first chief executive whose primary aim, at
least at the start, was not the attainment of maximum
profits but to serve the needs of the Afrikaner by
channelling savings to persons and small businesses
in need of financial aid on a small scale. Bosman was
also instrumental in the founding of Uniewinkels, a
retail chain store co-operative which eventually had
seventeen branches in various towns. It was followed
by Voortrekkerwinkels Kooperatief Bpk, and one year
later by another co-operative retail business, Sonop.
In 1940 Volkskas was registered as an ordinary
commercial bank and made fairly rapid progress. After
mergers and take-overs and changes of name it
emerged as the ABSA group in 1986, and in 1998
earned the highest gross income of all the banking
groups (JSE, 1999).
The first significant entry by an Afrikaner into the
gold mining industry occurred during the 1930s. The
speciality of the pioneer, WP Boshoff, was the re-
covering of gold dust which was left in the crevices of
old abandoned mines using methods much more
economical than the conventional ones. To this end
he bought and re-opened some eight old mines, and
floated two companies to extract the gold left in the
mine dumps, and probably became the first Afrikaner
millionaire (RGN, 1987: 69).
The names of two Afrikaners need to be mentioned
who do not feature in the context of the struggle
economics, but whose initiatives created employment
and empowering opportunities for Afrikaners: Hendrik
Johannes van der Bijl, and Hendrik Johannes van
Eck, the former (in life) a brilliant electro-technical
engineer and the latter a brilliant chemical engineer.
Both of them became pioneering entrepreneurs. Van
der Bijl became the chairman of the Electricity Supply
Commission when it was established in 1923, of the
Iron and Steel Corporation in 1925, whose founding
was his brainchild, and of the Industrial Development
Corporation (IDC) in 1940. He realised his ideals:
inexpensive steel and inexpensive electricity as the
basis for industrial development. Van Eck became the
MD of the IDC since its inception and four years later
also the chairman of its Board of Directors. During his
term of office many very significant enterprises came
into being as a result of his initiative and financial
facilitation: SASOL, FOSKOR, SAICCOR, SAFMARINE,
SWAWEK, ALUSAF and others. Sir De Villiers Graaff
portrayed him as "the father of our industrial
revolution, the master builder who evolved our whole
economic structure" (RGN, vol. IV: 736).
4.2 Action in concert
The People's Economic Conference of 1939 was the
main spring of the accession of some Afrikaner
entrepreneurs to the non-agricultural sectors of the
economy, while others might have been inspired by
the adjurations emanating from that conference, which
dates the Second Economic Movement. The
Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK),
realising the importance of the economic factor in a
people's cultural life, and acutely aware of the
miserable conditions in which a sizeable portion of the
population were living, as revealed by the Carnegie
Commission - which seemed to have triggered an
awareness of the inferior economic position of the
Afrikaner - convened the conference to mobilise
forces for a reddingsdaad (rescue action or deed of
deliverance). Such action had to save from dege-
neracy the poor Whites who were demoralised by
poverty and malnutrition, were reduced to a state of
apathy and had lost their feeling of self-reliance. The
community was balanced on the edge of an abyss, it
was thought. While the Carnegie-defined IpoorWhite"
problem might no longer have been the major issue,
poverty was still rife, which meant that large numbers
were not able to enjoy living standards considered
appropriate for a White person. The situation required
the assumption of collective responsibility for a self-
help, self-empowerment crusade. "A people is an
integrated whole - the poor and the rich", asseverated
Dr JD Kestell, the father of the reddingsdaad notion;
"there is no unbridgeable gap between them. If
pauperism were not curtailed it will mean the ruination
of the entire nation. A people rescues itself!" (translated
from FAK, 1939: 5). This imperative was underscored
by another writer: "There has been enough talk about
the retrogression of our people. Now it is time for
action. If we don't rescue ourselves, nobody else will"
(translated from Viljoen, 1945: 8). For centuries a
predominantly agrarian and underdeveloped popu-
lation, the Afrikaners now needed to conquer occu-
pationally and businesswise, the towns and cities
where they were for the most part under-represented
in all but the ranks of the unskilled. The nation had to
be alerted to their economic under-development and
inferior status in the South African economy. The
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arousal of the pertinent economic consciousness
among Afrikaners would have to be a central theme of
a programme of action, backed by the mobilisation of
purchasing power and capital. It was a rousing call to
action in concert. A national effort was required,
vigorously pursued with determination and
perseverance. (Sadie 1966:5.) But the economic
struggle was not to be an end in itself but "to free
compatriots from the gnawing distress and fear
induced by the lack of material welfare, to enable
them to enrich their own lives and to contribute to the
development of the nation to which they belong"
(Donges, 1945: 11.) The adjurations had the flavour of
an appeal to national pride, which could promote
purposeful joint action and presumably inspire
individuals to assume the role of entrepreneurs.
Exercising the minds of some speakers at the
conference was the question of the operational
economic system or organisational form in, or
according to, which the struggle economics was to be
conducted. LJ (Wicus) du Plessis argued that a
People's Economic Movement had as its goal the
enhancement of national welfare and not simply
personal enrichment or sectional privilege. Accor-
dingly, it was not adaptation to the foreign capitalist
system that was sought, but the mobilisation of the
community to conquer this system and to transform
and adapt it to the national character (Du Plessis,
1964: 104). Admittedly, the capitalist company struc-
ture was more appropriate than the co-operative
organisation for some purposes, but if recourse was to
be had, it had to be in the spirit of co-operation and
mutuality (Ibid: 106). Delegates had great praise for
the co-operative system which was considered to
accord with the national character, and resolved that it
was indispensable to the economic development of
South Africa. There were also financial benefits arising
from its application: exemption from tax on capital and
from tax on profits arising from trade with members;
the latter could join, or sever their relations, at their
own discretion; it was a democratic way of doing
business; co-operative institutions were not profit-
seeking as an entity separate from their customers,
and could mobilise small amounts of savings' (FAK,
1939: 72-83).
However, as the economic movement after the
conference gathered momentum, experience intima-
ted that whatever merit it might have had in
agriculture, the co-operative form of business orga-
nisation in other spheres did not meet with the
expected success. The profit motive appeared to
provide a stronger incentive than mutual welfare to
enhance efficiency and quality of service to the public.
Came a time when Afrikaner businessmen were
viewing the special concessions enjoyed by co-
operatives with disapproval. Thirty-six years after the
conference, at the opening of the academic year of
the University of Stellenbosch, the prominent
businessman, Albert Wessels, "delivered a passionate
plea for the full expression of free enterprise.
"Afrikaners, too," he said, "needed to be especially on
their guard against creeping socialism" (Munger,
1979: 67). Already at the conference the business
proposal of the Donges-Schumann-Louw trio was not
conceived in the spirit of the co-operative orga-
nisational paradigm.
CGW Schumann questioned the wisdom of
concentrating on the poor White problem, and won-
dered whether as much attention should not be
directed to the strengthening of the ranks of the major
healthier component of the community to empower
them to enhance the economic position of the poorer
section (FAK, 1939: 41). TE Donges emphasised that
the adverse attitude towards the capitalist system did
not signify opposition to the use and accumulation of
capital but to its concentration in the hands of a few.
He espoused the formation of a finance house which
would mobilise the available Afrikaner capital to act as
a source of financing all kinds of Afrikaner enterprises
in the non-agricultural sectors, thus providing savers
with an investment instrument whose risks would be
spread over large numbers of businesses. "Its goal
had to be not only to Afrikanerise commerce and
industry to a greater extent, and not only to have more
Afrikaners engaged as employees, but to increase
tenfold the number of Afrikaner employers in these
sectors" (FAK, 1939: 60). MS Louw, actuary and co-
director in chief of SAN LAM, argued that if success
was to be achieved, recourse was to be had to the
modus operandi of capitalism as applied in the gold
mining industry.
A financial company had to be floated which would
operate in the same manner as the Johannesburg
finance houses. It would act as spearhead in the
struggle of the Afrikaner to attain his legitimate share
in commerce and industry. Opportunities would be
created for practical training and employment of
Afrikaner boys and girls who should be able to aspire
to the most senior posts. To this end they now had to
proceed to the floating of a company, the provisional
procedures for which had already been completed
prior to the conference. The share capital was planned
to be £300 000 divided into 200 000 ordinary and 100
000 5Y2 per cent cumulative preference shares (FAK,
1939: 67 et seq). The to-be-incorporated Sentrate
(later Federate) Votksbeteggings Beperk (FVB) would
for a start finance ventures in the following business
sectors: one or more Afrikaner wholesale under-
takings, a central purchasing organisation, retail trade,
a building society, the cinema industry, and the
manufacturing of articles which had a ready market in
Afrikaner-owned shops. It would act as a link between
the farmer, the investor, the consumer and the
employee on the one hand, and the retail trader, the
wholesaler, the credit institutions and the
manufacturer on the other.
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By means of risk-spreading, the finance house would
provide reasonable security to the investor who sought
such security, but traditionally channelled his savings
into 'safe' avenues such as banks, building societies, the
post office, boards of executors and insurance
companies. Such savings could, by way of the finance
house, become available for risk bearing investment,
thus stimulating economic development which would
otherwise not materialise. People who were, for the most
part, risk-aversive and unaccustomed to, and/or unaware
of, investment in equity shares might thus be persuaded
to change their attitudes. And small Afrikaner business-
men who had to depend on their own resources or credit
obtainable from well-to-do individuals would have a new
source of capital.
The conference gave the proposal its stamp of
approval. In 1940, after the incorporation of the FVB,
the management stated that while it was founded as a
national institution to promote the Afrikaners' pursuit of
economic self-reliance, it was also a business venture
whose goal it was to pay its shareholders dividends in
hard cash and not by the proffering of pious senti-
ments. It did not want to be a prosperous corporation
divorced from the ideals of the people it wished to
serve, but neither did it want to muddle along as a
veritable Afrikaner business on the verge of bankrupt-
cy (Du Plessis, 1964: 141).
One of the offshoots of the conference was the
founding of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI) to
promote the interests of existing and newly-emerging
Afrikaner businessmen/entrepreneurs. It proffered
guidance in business management; fostered closer co-
operation among Afrikaner firms; researched business
problems and informed members of its conclusions;
passed on information on official measures and legis-
lation affecting business and liaised with government in
this regard; promoted the training and employment of
young men and women in commerce and industry; and
sought harmonious relationships between employer and
employee and with other organisations and associations
with similar objectives, etc. The AHI was registered as a
non-profit organisation after the Minister of Justice at the
time had been satisfied that its membership would be
confined to Afrikaners, and that it would not require that
Afrikaner members of the Association of Chambers of
Commerce should sever their ties with the latter. A
committee to liaise between the two organisations was
established.
Established during the war, when supplies of
imports were limited and were allocated by means of
import permits based on past performance in this
regard, the AHI had to sue for better treatment of
emerging entrepreneurs who, in the nature of the
situation, had no record of importation, and the direc-
tor-general of supplies lent a sympathetic ear. It
persuaded government to abolish price control over
certain imports and to raise the profit margin allowed
on certain products subject to price control. Over the
years the AHI has made numerous representations to
the political authorities on behalf of business and often
met with success. Among others it was instrumental in
the establishment of a Social and Economic Planning
Council, it advocated a Bureau of Standards in 1944
already, and requested tax relief for companies to
enable them to build up reserves. Its representations
led to the formation of the pre-1994 Prime Minister's
Economic Advisory Council. It was increasingly
recognised by government which allowed it represen-
tation in the Maize Board, the Wheat Board and
various parastatals (such as the IDC, Eskom, Iscar,
Bureau of Standards, the Railways, etc.). The journal
Volkshandel, now defunct, became its official organ.
AHI's contact with its members at the local level
was, and is, by way of 'sakekamers' (business cham-
bers). Their numbers increased regularly and seemed
to have experienced a spurt in the post-1994 era,
having risen from 74 in 1995 to 136 in 1999. Among
its 17 corporate, 219 business and 32 affiliate
members there are very considerable numbers who
do not qualify as Afrikaner-controlled (De Villiers,
1999). "By growing while most shrank, and by
reaching out with practical programmes, theAHI, of all
business organisations, has made its mark" (Finance
Week, 1999(c): 9). These programmes included the
training - with the aid of the International Labour
Office - of 95 000 businessmen in 120 centres to
cope with new labour legislation, and co-operation
with the Black business organisation, NAFCOC, in
matters of mutual interest. At the turn of the century it
gave every indication that it desired a maximum of co-
operation without actually merging with other business
organisations. From an institution nurturing fledgling
Afrikaner businesses it grew into a champion of the
cause of mature and immature South African business
ventures.
Arising from the wish that the many propositions
aired at the 1939 Conference should be commu-
nicated to the public at large, it was resolved that the
Ekonomiese Instituut of the FAK be founded. This
institute had to collect and accumulate funds in the
Reddingsdaadfonds to translate Dr Kestell's appeal
into appropriate action, by using the interest earned
on the monies invested for the encouragement of
training in commercial practice, economic research,
the organisation of Afrikaner manpower and for loans
to students, Afrikaner enterprises and the Reddings-
daadbond (RDB). This 'rescue action league' came
into being in 1940 as the institution to organise
Afrikaner economic muscle for the promotion of
Afrikaner participation in the South African economy.
The Ekonomiese lnstituut (FAK) soon turned over
most of its functions to the RDB and became in the
main an advisory council and policy-making body. It
functioned as a centre for research and exploration
into all matters that affected the interests of Afrikaner
business, and acted as a forum for discussions of
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such matters at its annual meetings or within smaller
circles of interested parties. Conclusions arising from
such deliberations were brought to the attention of the
RDB in cases where its programmes were at issue,
while others were conveyed to the political authorities
when government action was implied or considered
desirable.
The institute accorded recognition by way of the
press or circulars to those enterprises considered to
be promoting the Afrikaners' pursuit of economic
emancipation, but without thereby signalling that the
institute accepted responsibility for the success of
such enterprises or endorsing them as investment
opportunities (with the FVB as sole exception). Such
firms could make use of the recognition, if they so
wished, to canvas the support of the public. The
procedure had to be discontinued when itwas brought
to the institute's attention that recognition lent itself to
abuse, since it offered an opportunity for the
exploitation of the gullible by the incompetent.
The RDB was the organisation on the ground which
had to convey the message of struggle economics to the
populace. "Economic Consciousness" was the central
theme of the campaign and the RDB had to
'conscientize' the Afrikaner population to its subordinate
position in the South African economy, and thus
engender support far efforts to redress the arrearage. By
1945, within five years of its formation, it had enrolled 70
000 members in 400 branches throughout the country
whose contributions were paid into the RDB, to be used
for their campaign. The leader (Dr N Diederichs)
reported that it could boast of many achievements:
hundreds of enterprises came into being as a direct or
indirect result of its intervention; thousands of job
opportunities were created in the process; hundreds of
businessmen have been given advice and guidance;
and hundreds of youths received financial aid for studies
to prepare them for opportunities in commerce and
industry; and it founded a medical fund, a finance
company, a savings organisation and an association of
executives (RDB, 1945: 3). It paid particular attention to
matters affecting the welfare of the youth such as
occupational guidance, occupational problems
(published in its organ Inspan), industrial training,
apprenticeships, commercial schools, correspondence
courses, study aids for junior officials, employment,
holiday facilities for needy youth and courses in
leadership (Ibid: 43/44).
4.3 Assessing the economic consciousness
movement
At the practical level, as shown above, the RDB
rendered yeoman service and already in 1943 one of
the leading personalities (Dr Dbnges) was convinced
that the Rescue Action engendered economic
consciousness among the Afrikaners (Du Plessis,
1964: 142). The moot question is whether this con-
sciousness found expression in the mobilisation of
(i) purchasing power; (ii) savings; (iii) and entrepre-
neurial initiative, for the economic advancement of the
Afrikaner.
(i) The various branches of the RDB were responsible
for propaganda among Afrikaners for the employ-
ment of their purchasing power in Afrikaner
concerns to which end information on enterprises
under Afrikaner control or sympathetic to their
cause was given out. It was necessary at times to
combat malicious gossip damaging to the interests
of these firms, some of it emanating from their own
ranks. A shoppers' guide directing attention to
Afrikaner businesses as sources of supply was not
the work of the RDB but of a private company.
When a few branches adopted the negative ap-
proach of naming businesses from which custom
had to be withheld, it was unconditionally con-
demned by the Ekonomiese Instituut. There was,
at one stage, an attempt at forming a countrywide
consumer organisation, but it was frustrated by the
supply scarcities occasioned by World War II.
Two factors that militated against the 'buy
Afrikaans' campaign were its dependence, to a
considerable extent, on an appeal to sentiment, and
the need to break down prejudice. At the beginning
the wave of emotionalism stirred up by South Africa's
entry into the war on the side of the Afrikaners'
traditional adversary, Britain, rekindled the feeling
that the best interests of Britain, not of South Africa,
were paramount and this was conducive to a closing
of ranks which served as a source of strength for the
economic struggle. Sentiment served as an aid and
large numbers were responsive to persuasion. But
this did not endure. At the 1939 conference it was
declared that "there was an unfortunate tendency
among Afrikaners to be more critical, and more
demanding, of Afrikaners in business than of others.
Sometimes an Afrikaans firm would be unreasonably
accused of all kinds of failings and virtually
calumniated into its ruination." (translated from
Verwoerd in FAK, 1939: 174). Afrikaners, it was said,
were prepared to entrust their political future to their
compatriots, but could not be weaned from the
perception that a business was doomed if it was
headed by a person with an Afrikaans name (Sadie
1966:5). (Whether it had a factual basis in the guise
of a higher than average incidence of failures cannot
be known.) Twenty-five years later this was
underscored by a company director who asserted
that Afrikaners demanded perfection from their fellow
Afrikaners while acquiescing in lower standards
manifested by others. Sentiment would lure them no
further than the counter (Marais, 1964). Entrepreneur
Anton Rupert believed that after he had achieved
success among Afrikaner consumers he was
equipped to take on the world at large.
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Research into the buying habits of Afrikaners in
greater Cape Town revealed that the more affluent
among them would go out of their way to support
Afrikaner retailers and products of Afrikaner-
controlled factories. The rank-and-file, however,
manifested greater interests in prices, quality,
design, credit terms and the location of the busi-
ness, and tended to drift towards shops closest to
their homes (Van der Merwe, 1963). Of consi-
derable significance in this regard was the fact that
in competition with the long-established well-
funded English firms, the new entrants were at a
disadvantage because of the small scale of
operations of most of them, and accordingly the
limited selections of merchandise, which rendered
them less attractive as shopping centres.
Inasmuch as service in the mother tongue of
the customer could be considered a plus-factor in
business strategy, it could be expected that the
struggle economics had an ally in the language
medium. The FAK and the RDB had been
exhorting Afrikaans-speaking customers to insist
on service in their own language. Were this
campaign successful, either the Afrikaner enter-
prises or Afrikaans-speaking employees or both
would have benefited, since firms under English
control had at the time not made serious attempts
at providing service in both official languages.
Neither did they show interest in pushing locally
manufactured goods, preferring instead the
imported articles. In practice, the language
medium seemed never to have been a real issue.
The Afrikaners, by and large, were bilingual; the
English were not. And the former readily accepted
service through the medium of English. The
majority could not be bothered to insist on being
served in Afrikaans, since it usually involved a
cumbersome process offinding a bilingual member
of the personnel who might or might not be
available. This laissez faire stance did the
Afrikaans language a disservice while the need to
employ Afrikaans speakers was inhibited. During
1965 the Federal Council of Afrikaans Liaison
Committees conducted a sample survey among
Afrikaans-speaking Johannesburg women, which
revealed that 92,5 per cent preferred to use
English when shopping; 47 per cent doing so
because Afrikaans was not understood in the
shops frequented, 25 per cent because they found
it inconvenient and the remaining 20,5 per cent
from force of habit or because they liked it. The
results were interpreted as a demonstration of an
inferiority complex. The small minority of 7,5 per
cent who did not conform to the pattern were the
better educated and the well-off (Sadie, 1966: 60).
At variance with the above finding is the
assertion that most of the new class of wealthy
Afrikaners "came to wealth by exploiting Afri-
kaner sentiments ... (Patterson, 1957: 173). This
constituted a confusion of a simple concurrence
of events with a functional relationship. The
'conscientizing' of Afrikaners in their function as
consumers to counter their economic arrearage
did not meet with success of note. The appeal to
sentiment after an initial burst of enthusiasm was
ineffective, and the AHI had been entreating its
members scrupulously to desist from enlisting
sentiment as a ploy to solicit custom.
At the Second Economic Conference in 1950 the
co-chairman expressed the opinion that the ROB had
not produced the very favourable results expected of
it. It was experiencing financial difficulties and its
membership was shrinking rapidly. Its journal/nspan,
was withdrawn from circulation and the ROB itself
was officially disbanded in 1957.
(ii) The mobilisation of savings for investment in
commercial and industrial enterprise faced a
threefold problem: (a) the average low level of
Afrikaner income did not permit of a significant
ability to save; (b) funds that were available were
risk-aversive for the most part. To Volkskas the
latter did not present a problem and its manage-
ment could successfully appeal to Afrikaner
solidarity in their economic struggle. At the Second
Economic Conference under the auspices of the
FAK, the ROB, the Ekonomiese Instituut and the
AHI, MS Louw reported that Afrikaners' deposits at
various credit institutions amounted to some £300
million, but only £60 million of this was channelled
to Afrikaner-controlled institutions (Du Plessis,
1964: 179). Volkskas could benefit from a redis-
tribution of the residual £235 million. Apart from
attracting the savings and cheque accounts of
individuals, it was not too difficult to acquire the
custom of some municipalities, church councils
and Afrikaner firms. There was, moreover, the not
invalid argument that commercial banking was a
strategic force in the South African economy, and
that it was inadvisable to have foreign-controlled
banks monopolising the banking business,
particularly after they refused (initially) clearing
house facilities to Volkskas. Barclay's and Stan-
dard countered by having local boards of directors
appointed in which Afrikaans names figured
noticeably, while the Netherlands Bank was
converted into a South African company. By this
time Volkskas had already been firmly and
competitively established. (c) There were no large
Afrikaans firms with records of profits and growth
over long periods and listed on the JSE which would,
in consequence, provide liquidity to the investor. The
absence of such attributes is the problem of the
newcomer who is thus in the throes of the vicious
circle: he cannot attract capital because he has no
record of financial success, and he cannot achieve
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such success because he cannot obtain capital.
When, at the outset, the prospective Afrikaner entre-
preneurs could not guarantee security and
acceptable retums to investment, what could the self-
empowerment campaign do but appeal to team spirit
and, perhaps, tender the names of confidence-
inspiring directors and chief executive officers. The
FAK-endorsed financial intermediary, FVB, offered
some security by way of its risk-spreading activities
and the names of well-known personalities on the
Board of Directors, but even it initially experienced
difficulty in attracting sufficient capital.
The problem of illiquidity was mitigated by the
establishment of a Stocks and Shares Bureau for
the purpose of the sale and transfer of shares in
Afrikaner businesses in the absence of stock ex-
change listings. At its second conference the ROB
maintained that it had broken down the Afrikaners'
prejudice against investment in commercial and in-
dustrial companies.
Among the prospective entrepreneurs there
were evidently some who had more enthusiasm
than business sense or who were not above
abusing the economic consciousness movement
and did not balk at share pushing. As one writer
would have it: "It can be laid down almost as an
axiom that those who appealed most strongly to
Afrikaner sentiment were the poorest in business
skills and in sincerity of purpose" (Schumann,
1955). As Afrikaners became more experienced
and competent in initiating and conducting com-
mercial, financial and industrial enterprises, the
role of sentiment waned and eventually came to an
end. By 1964 a company director stated un-
equivocally that "it can only be expected of an
Afrikaner finance house or individual to invest in
Afrikaner concerns if the latter are competitive with
regard to security, future earning capacity and
yield" (Marais, 1964). However, the writer con-
sidered that the economic consciousness move-
ment did assist a number of large Afrikaner
enterprises to attract capital and support, e.g.
Sanlam, Santam, FVB, Volkskas, Bonuskor,
Saambou and Rembrandt (Meades, 1990: 18).
This finding is in congruence with MS Louw's
verdict in 1944 that the ROB had indeed created a
climate of sympathy among Afrikaners for
Afrikaner business which would have redounded to
the advantage of the latter (O'Meara, 1983: 142).
(iii) It is a moot question to what extent the call to
national pride and concerted action in the
economic struggle was responsible for the bur-
geoning supply of entrepreneurship that occurred
after 1939. Since significant entrepreneurship
represents the labours and talents of a few in the
community who have special traits, the appeal to
mass action does not have the relevance it has in
the case of purchasing power and savings. An
economic consciousness movement at this level
may presumably have a better chance of success.
Championing this factor of production successfully
is also the most direct way of enhancing the
participation of an underdeveloped component of a
population, constituting as it does the fons et origo
of economic growth and development.
The emergence of entrepreneurs can be related
to the sociologists and/or the psychologists'
interpretation of the motivational factor in human
activity. The former emphasises the socio-
economic environment: striving behaviour of the
individual rewarded by societal approbation, and
reinforced accordingly, would be the motive force
as depicted in the following citation: "An indi-
vidual's behaviour patterns are shaped ... after
they have been performed .. . By positively
reinforcing an activity after it has been performed
the probability of repetition is increased, and if
such reinforcement is frequent and intermittent the
probability approaches certainty" (Kunkel, 1971:
133/4). In congruence, the campaign and call to
action-in-concert could have created the nurturing
cultural environment for the advent of the second
generation of entrepreneurs, in that the community
provided the necessary supportive approval. Retail
trade had seemed to be the economic sector that
would provide the best opportunities for the
emergence of significant numbers of owners of
small businesses: profitability did not require too
large a scale of operations, capital requirements
were limited, while business transactions and
marketing did not demand too much sophistication.
But it was also the field where some cultural
prejudice existed. There was a certain degree of
aversion among the community to commerce and
trade, which was associated with characters who
were not above shady dealings. The fact that
wholesale and retail trade had been stressed at
the conference as an appropriate avenue for
Afrikaner ventures might have helped to break
down the prejudice abroad.
Still, entrepreneurial initiative orthe enterprising
spirit at the more exalted level at least, being an
individualistic attribute - which does not
materialise in mass volumes - there is yet the
need to recognise the importance of man's inner
concerns or internal state as posited by the
psychodynamic interpretation which identified a
number of motivational forces. "Chief among these
motives", McClelland found, "was what we called
the need for achievement (T]Ach): a desire to do
well, not so much for the sake of social recognition,
or prestige, but for the sake of an inner feeling of
accomplishment ... people who were "high" in this
motive tend to work harder at certain tasks, to
learn faster, to do their best work when it counts
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for the record and not when special incentives
such as money prizes are introduced, to choose
experts rather than friends as working partners"
(1971: 110; also 1987: 228). An achievement-
oriented ethic is an essential condition for, and a
precursor to, economic growth and development.
Persons with a strong need for affiliation (T]Aff), on
the other hand, are unlikely to succeed in the
entrepreneurial function. Preferring affective
relationships with others, they avoid conflict and
competition, and would rather have friends than
the best qualified outsiders as business col-
leagues. A strong need for power (T]Pow) may
make for managerial success when influencing
others is required, and not creative striving as at
the beginning of a new business venture. It can
develop into an imperial power motive syndrome
which characterises political kingdom seekers, and
is not likely to be channelled into entrepreneurial
initiatives (McClelland, 1987: 313,447).
For the purpose of his dissertation a researcher
hypothesised that the above three needs or
motivations would reveal a relationship with the
socio-economic development of the Afrikaner. To
this end a random sample of short stories which
appeared in Die Huisgenoot during the period
1922-1966 was used, on the assumption that the
authors would subconsciously reflect the needs of
the nation in their stories. Time lags between
needs and socio-economic variables of 2, 4, 6, 8
and 10 years were allowed for. It was not possible
to determine which of the three needs, among
which there is interaction, manifested the strongest
relationship with socio-economic variable during
any specific period. The study led to the conclusion
that T]Aff featured strongly among Afrikaners while
this need was at various times correlated with
T]Ach. It was suggested that out of the miserable
economic conditions experienced by many Afrika-
ners a great concern about the welfare of com-
patriots developed which could have become a
mainspring for economic achievements. T]POW
showed, as a rule, a negative relationship with
socio-economic variables of some years later. It
was deduced that T]POWmeasured a need for
prestige rather than for power, since it was related
in the main to studies of a prestigious nature
among Afrikaners (van der Westhuizen, 1973).
Arising from this analysis, and a personal
knowledge of many past and present achievers in
the business world, it is submitted that an
inference of greatest likelihood would be that T]Aff
provided a supporting base for entrepreneurship,
but that the driving force in the case of the
individuals concerned would have been T]Ach. The
era of T]Aff dominance, in any case, has long past.
CHAPTER 5
THE ENTREPRENEURS
5.1 Some second- and third-generation
entrepreneurs
MS Louw - architect of the 1939 Conference - led
San lam to greater heights. He devoted his life to the
furtherance of Afrikaner economic interests and
served as a member of the management committee of
the Ekonomiese Instituut (FAK) and the RDB. He
mobilised capital in an innovative manner by persua-
ding San lam's Board of Directors to allow policy
holders to convert the surplus earnings allocable to
them into cash bonuses which could be used to buy
shares in Bonuskor, a company founded by him. He
was instrumental, or assisted, in the establishment or
development of various companies and served on
their boards of directors. Examples are Saambou
Building Society, the National Finance Corporation,
Terra Marina Mining Company, Central Acceptances,
Central Merchant Bank, SA Financial Gazette, and
Winkelhaak Mining (RGN, 1987, VoI.V: 503).
The establishment of FVB heralded the birth of a
venture which grew into a business empire of very
considerable dimensions encompassing such affiliates
as Federale Kunsmis, Federale Mynbou, Federale
Nywerhede, Federale Beleggingskorporasie, Federale
Trust (Trust Bank) and Sentrachem, before it
eventually passed into the control of San lam, and its
name disappeared from the JSE. Under the chair-
manship of CR Louw (of the First Economic Move-
ment) three men were appointed who became entre-
preneurs in their own right: CH Brink (secretary), WB
Coetzer (Commercial Advisor) and PE Rousseau
(industrial advisor). Hendrik Brink succeeded CR
Louw as chairman, to be succeeded in turn by Etienne
Rousseau (later MD of Sasol), while Willem Coetzer
became the driving force behind the founding of
Federale Mynbou, representing the major Afrikaner
entry into mining. After starting out in coal mining it
gained control over General Mining and Finance
Company (Genmin, later Gencor) with the co-
operation of Harry Oppenheimer. It branched out into
fisheries (where Gerrie van Zyl was the leading spirit),
agricultural implements, tobacco, organic products,
pharmaceuticals, car hire, china ware and food.
An outstanding success story is that of Anton Rupert
of the Rembrandt, or more correctly, the Rupert business
empire. From a modest beginning Rembrandt produced
its first cigarette in Paarl in 1948. Within seventeen
years, on an industrial partnership basis - according to
which participation of local interests was a prerequisite-
it was manufacturing cigarettes in 25 factories in 16
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countries and selling them in 160 countries (Sadie, 1966:
64). Intent on remaining ahead of competitors and the
anti-tobacco campaign through research, the company
established world leadership in the production and
marketing of various new varieties of cigarettes: king
size, king size filter, cigarettes with the menthol filter, the
multifilter, the super-porous multivent paper and the gold
band filter. During his career, with Dirk Hertzog at his
side, Rupert acquired Rothmans of Pall Mall, the fourth
largest cigarette company, the Swiss-based Richemont
(exercising control over companies dealing in tobacco
products and luxury goods), and in 1988 the second
largest, international cigarette firm, British American
Tobacco, merged with Rembrandt. The group's interests
include investments in banking, financial services, life
insurance, printing and packaging, engineering and
motor components, adhesives, medical services, mining,
petroleum products, pulp and paper, food, wine and
spirits (JSE, 1999: 374). Rembrandt also appeared to be
in effective control of Goldfields of SA. In terms of JSE
market capitalisation control the Rupert empire is placed
fourth on a list of 21 groups (McGregor, 2000). Rupert's
son, Johann, is following in his father's footsteps.
Albert Wessels, while involved in various financial
and industrial enterprises, was particularly known as
the founder of Toyota SA, which became the leading
automobile assembler, manufacturer and dealer in
South Africa for 18 out of 25 years. The lesser known,
but not less in stature, co-founder, Jan de Necker,
was a business partner in many other ventures in
which the two of them co-operated such as
Veka/Bertish - at one stage the second largest
clothing manufacturer in South Africa - a glass
factory, Sansficor (the first confirming house in the
country), Rand Bank, Rand Acceptance Bank and
Wesco.
Some of the well-known second- and third-gene-
ration names in the ranks of Afrikaner entrepreneurs,
and the institutions to which they are or were linked,
can be mentioned:
GSJ Kuschke (IDC), F Meyer (Iscor), SM Naude
(CSIR), Gerrie van Zyl (various companies), Albert
Marais (Nasionale Bouvereniging), pJ de W Tromp
(Nictus), Frikkie Neethling (Brown & Neethling), Phil
Morkel (Phil Morkel Group), Dawid de Villiers, Joe
Stegmann, Paul Kruger (Sasol), AM Jacobs, JJ Hattingh,
John Maree (Eskom), Jan Pickard (Picardi), Nallie
Bosman (ABSA), Werner Ackermann (Datsun-Nissan),
Piet Badenhorst (United Group), Jan S Marais (Trust
Bank), George Huysamer (Stockbroking), GT Ferreira
(RMB).
The omission of the names of their successors and
others does not imply a judgement on their distinction.
Two third-generation entrepreneurs who merit special
mention are Bill Venter and Christo Wiese. The former
is founder of Altron and an electronics and tech-
nological business empire of R10 000 million and
became chairman of USKO in the year 2000. The
group has been rated 19th on the JSE capitalisation
control list (Dommisse & De Vynck, 2000: 5.3;
McGregor, 2000). Christo Wiese is the founder of the
Pepkor Group, which in 1998 had a share of 42,6 per
cent in the food retail market (as constituted by
Shoprite/Checkers, Pick 'n Pay, Spar and
Woolworths) (Finance Week, 2000(a): 22). The Wiese
empire is ranked thirteenth in the McGregor JSE
capitalisation control stakes, its share having risen
from 1,3 to 2,4 per cent in four years' time.
There were, and are, also some prominent Afrika-
ners as chairmen and CEOs of firms not controlled by
Afrikaner capital.
While the events described above have been taking
place, the economic face of agriculture, in which Afrika-
ners predominate, has been changing markedly. After
the semi-nomadic pastoral component of farming made
way for sedentary agriculture, the more difficult
adaptation, that from farming as a way of life to
agriculture as a business proposition subject to the
discipline of the market, had to be faced up to. New
attitudes and aptitudes were demanded. The first four
decades of the twentieth century were very difficult ones
for farmers who had to contend sometimes with
enormous fluctuations in supplies on the market arising
from changing meteorological conditions, and in ever
rising prices of inputs, over which they had no control.
They sought relief and support by way of farmer
associations and co-operatives. Because of a lack of
business experience the latter were not very successful
until the 1937 Marketing Act made provision for
Agricultural Control Boards, which made for stability. By
branching out into processing and manufacturing, insu-
rance, crop spraying, credit provision, electricity supply,
etc. the co-operatives secured for farmers a foothold in
the business world.
But, most importantly, they provided a training
ground for many a prospective Afrikaner businessman
and entrepreneur in the non-agricultural sectors when
such opportunities have been denied them in the
mainstream (English) establishments.
Agriculture has been undergoing a metamor-
phosis. If it still be true that some half of producers
fail to make their own management decisions (Van
Zyl, 2000(b): 11), then half of the descendants and
successors of the overseers of yesteryear became
creative entrepreneurs of the twentieth century -
they came to regard farming as a business
proposition and not a way of life only. They make
use of the latest industrial and bio-technology to
raise productivity. They are keenly aware of market
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conditions, and switch crops in accordance with
changes in prices brought about by higher and
lower levels of production of specific crops. While
continuing to grow the traditional products such as
maize, wheat, grain, sorghum and oats, they have
greatly increased the plantings of sunflowers, citrus
trees, apple, pear, litchi, mango and avocado trees
and noble grape varieties. They cultivate or dis-
cover new varieties, grow rooibos and honeybush
tea, sow canola, harvest flowers in the wild and
cultivate fynbos commercially, and expand their
production of organically grown vegetables as the
health-conscious consumers, fearing the effects of
chemicals, increase in number. They explore
foreign markets and earn a net surplus of foreign
exchange, thus helping the net forex-consuming
manufacturing industry to import capital goods and
intermediate products required for its production
(CSS, 1988, 1995).
The number offarming units increased between 1921
and 1952 from 81 432 to 11 9556. The area did not
increase equiproportionally so that the average size
declined from 986 to 730 hectares. Thereafter the
number of units declined to reach 61 654 in 1992 while
the average size expanded to 1 320 hectares (CSS,
1988(b): 9.4; 1995: 9.2). Tractors multiplied from 6 per 1
000 farms in 1921 to 2846 on average per 1000 units
during the 1980s (CSS, 1988(b): 9.4). It would seem that
the economies of scale were being pursued
energetically.
5.2 Contribution to the GOP in the
entrepreneurial function
With regard to the Afrikaners' contribution to, or share
in, the generation of the GOP of the country, one can
distinguish between two magnitudes: (i) that
generated by enterprises under the control of
Afrikaners by way of simple ownership, or
shareholding or majority in boards of directors, and (ii)
the broader concept which includes contributions by
chief executive officers operating in other than
Afrikaner-controlled establishments. In the latter case
it would be difficult to know the specific quantities to
be attributed to the Afrikaner initiative. To discover a
figure answering to the first concept we can have
recourse to the information on companies listed on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). But we have to
bear in mind that there are many thousands of
unlisted firms responsible for contributions about
which the necessary details are not available.
Estimates in this regard represent orders of magnitude
and cannot aspire to preciseness. Probably the only
appropriate field research ever undertaken which
produced results for four economic sectors was that
by the Ekonomiese Instituut (FAK) in 1949. The
outcomes are summarised in Table 5.1.
TABLE 5.1
AFRIKANER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
Number Turnover
as % of
SA total
Commerce 1938/9 2426 8%
1948/9 9585 25%
Manufacturing 1938/9 1239 3%
1948/9 3385 6%
Finance 1938/9 40 5%
1948/9 68 6%
Mining 1938/9 3 1%
1948/9 9 1%
Aggregate 1938/9 3710 5%
1948/9 13047 11%
Source: FAK, 1949.
It emerges that in terms of turnover in the private
sector the most headway was recorded in commerce,
followed by manufacturing. Overall Afrikaners' contri-
bution more than doubled during the ten years after
the 1939 Economic Conference, showing an increase
of some 55% in the turnover. The improvement was
noteworthy but the 11 per cent figure for the four
economic sectors in 1948/9 was, of course, still not
yet very impressive. But at least the groundwork had
been provided.
Some further estimates for 1948/9 and subsequent
years, which were somewhat more comprehensive to cover
the private sector in total, are presented in Table 5.2.
TABLE 5.2
THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
ECONOMY BY AFRIKANER-CONTROLLED
ENTERPRISES (IN PER CENT)
1948/9 1954/5 1964 1975
% % % %
Agriculture 85 84 83 82
Mining 1 1 10 18
Manufacturing and 6 6 10 15
Construction
Commerce 25 26 24 16
Transportation 9 14 14 15
Liquor and 20 30 30 35
Catering
Professions 16 20 27 38
Finance 6 10 21 25
Miscellaneous 27 35 36 45
Aggregate 24,8 25,4 26,9 27,5
Aggregate ex. 9,6 13,4 18,0 20,8
Agriculture
Sources: FAK, 1949; Sadie, 1957; 1966; AHI, 1966, 1999; Population
Censuses; Censuses of Distribution and Service Establishments.
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When the Afrikaners' relative contribution to the
private sector economy as a whole is examined, it
does not appear as if the progress was very
substantial. It is, however, the result of the declining
importance of the agricultural sector - the Afrikaners'
traditional economic bastion - in the generation of the
GDP, its share having been halved between 1949 and
1975, from 14,5 per cent to 7,2 per cent (Department
of Statistics, 1975: 9.16 and 21.9). Its exclusion from
the aggregate reveals a doubling of the Afrikaners'
share during the period, Le. from 9,6 to 20,8 per cent,
which means that they have demonstrated much
faster economic growth than the rest of the population.
The most spectacular progress was achieved in the
Mining sector whose percentage rose from 1 in 1948/9
to 18 in 1975, largely due to the activities of Federale
Mynbou (offshoot of FVB). By 1970 Afrikaner control
extended to 10, 28 and 18 per cent respectively of
gold, uranium and coal output. Second in terms of rate
of increase was Finance where the relative
contribution rose from 6 to 25 per cent (1949 to 1975)
mainly as a result of the progress of Volkskas, Trust
Bank, Rand Bank, Rand Acceptances and Sanlam.
Already in 1964 Volkskas was responsible for 21 per
cent of commercial banking business (Sadie, 1966:
76). Registering a share of only 15 per cent in 1975,
Manufacturing had nevertheless made considerable
headway since 1949, arising from the activities of the
FVB and similar institutions, agricultural co-operatives
and Rembrandt Corporation. The advance of the
liberal professions was associated with the spirited
exertions of Afrikaners in the province of education
and training. In Commerce the advance experienced
after 1939 occurred by way of the establishment of
thousands of small concerns in the general retail and
automobile trade, three-quarters of them one-man
enterprises. After 1949 progress was due mainly to
the activities of agricultural co-operatives whose share
in the Afrikaner participation rose from one-third to just
short of one-half. The retrogression registered after
1955 would have been the result of the emergence of
supermarkets and chain stores, in which the Afrikaner
had little or no share, and the decline of the smaller
towns' individually owned shops. The entry of Pepkor
(of the Wiese empire) into this field has raised the
relevant share from 16 per cent in 1975 to an
estimated 30 per cent by the turn of the century.
If the totality of the public sector's share in the
aggregate 1975 South African economy were attri-
buted to Afrikaners, having in mind their government's
role in the founding of parastatals and other public
sector activity their contribution to the generation of
the GDP would have been put at 44,7 per cent.
Short of comprehensive field research it would not be
feasible to allocate percentages to all of the sectors in
Table 5.2 for a most recent year such as 2000 and a
somewhat less satisfactory approach will have to be
resorted to, to arrive at a global figure for the contribution
of Afrikaner-controlled businesses. The particulars of all
the companies listed on the JSE, as recorded in the JSE
1999 Handbook, have been examined to discover how
much of the gross turnover or gross income of the
companies could be allocated to the Afrikaner category.
The result was a share of 33,9 percent (Stock Exchange
Handbook Jan-Dec, 1999). The 1993 Input-Output tables
(CSS, 1993) permit us to determine the value of the ratio
Gross OutpuWalue Added and by applying this ratio we
can conclude that some 39 per cent of South Africa's
economic activities responsible for the generation of the
GOP are not captured in the details of the listed
companies. We do not know how many of the smaller
enterprises (SMMEs (Agriculture excluded)) are Afrikaner-
controlled. It would be reasonable to assume that the
percentage would be higher rather than lower than the
33,9 per cent found above in the case of the listed
companies. If the veracity of this assumption is not dis-
puted, it would seem that the Afrikaners' contribution to
the non-agricultural private sector economy has grown
from 20,8 per cent in 1975 to 34 per cent in 1999, or by
almost two-thirds. The rate of progress has slowed down
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since 1975. It still represents a minority share, but it has
at least progressed faster than that of the rest of the
business community. In view ofthe fairly stable proportion
of the Afrikaner labour force in Agriculture (1949-1980),
their contribution in this sector would not deviate much
from 82 per cent of the sector's share in the GOP. The
addition involved takes the contribution to 35,8 per cent of
the total private sector.
When the broader concept of contribution in the
entrepreneurial function, as formulated above, is
applied, the Afrikaners' share can be augmented by
some 4 to 5 percentage points to raise it to 40 per
cent.
The inference would seem to be that it may require
three-quarters of a century or longer for an econo-
mically retarded or underdeveloped component of a
population, which has decided upon a cultural/eco-
nomic metamorphosis, to catch up with the more
developed component. It implies a faster rate of
progress than that of the latter. And inasmuch as it
represents the fruits of creative entrepreneurship, it is
the work of a few, not of the many.
CHAPTER 6
THE DEMOGRAPHIC FACTOR
Demographic forces were due to have a significant
influence on the economic fortunes of the Afrikaners. In
the 1936 population census they were for the first time
distinguished as a group on their own and their numbers
and other demographic characteristics identified. On the
basis of some external evidence and appropriate
assumptions it was possible to extrapolate the
population in reverse to 1891 and infer the historic
course of the constituent elements of growth viz. fertility,
mortality and migration; the latter referring to the
numbers of other language groups (particularly the
English) who, in one way or another, such as the
outcome of inter-marriage, for example, acquired
Afrikaans as their mother tongue. (There were, of course
also Afrikaners who became anglicised.) The estimates
generated by the author in 1978 (S.E.E, 4: 4-15) and
1998 (S.E.E, 22(3): 17-24) have been checked and
revised to make provision, among others, for a net in-
migration of some 41 000 between 1951 and 1991
implied in the population growth which was not explained
by the changing levels of mortality and fertility. The
historic course of the population detailed by sex and age
is presented in Supplement A. Some salient features
displayed by these data can be singled out.
TABLE 6.1
AFRIKANER POPULATION SIZE
Date Number Growth %of Date Number Growth %of
p.a% While p.a White
Popu- Popu-
lation lalion
1899 532500 59,5 1970 2270300 2,2 58,8
1004 556 000 0,85 49,7 1980 2628500 1,5 58,1
1911 661700 2,5 51,8 1991 2915500 1,1 57,5
1921 830200 2,3 54,6 Projected
1926 925500 2,2 55,2 1996 3037000 0,8 59,3
1936 1121200 2,0 55,6 2001 3136000 0,7 59,0
1946 1:62400 2,2 57,3 2006 3207300 0,4 59,6
1951 1516300 2,2 57,2 2011 3248600 0,25 60,2
1000 18219:Xl 2,0 58,1 2016 3257700 0,05 61,2
Just before the end of the 19lh century the
Afrikaner population numbered 532500 of whom 278
500 lived in the Cape colony, 12 000 in the Natal
colony, 104 000 in the OFS and 139 000 in the
Transvaal. The twentieth century was ushered in with
a very slow rate of growth (0,85% p.a.) as a result of
an excess loss of lives in the concentration camps and
on the battlefield, and the averting of births
occasioned by the military situation. But for these
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casualties the projected population could have been
324 000 more by the year 1980 and 388 000 more at
the end of the century.
The numbers grew rapidly after 1904, at a rate of
2,4 per cent per annum during 1904-1921 after which,
until 1970, it settled down to a rate varying between
2,0 and 2,2 per cent. Thereafter the rate of growth
declined rapidly to reach 1,1 per cent during 1980-
1991 and to a projected 0,05 per cent by 2011-2016.
The share of the Afrikaners in the total White
population shrank precipitately between 1899 and
1904 (from 59,5 to 49,8 per cent) as a result of war
losses as well as a considerable volume of interna-
tional in-migration, some of it temporarily, which
strengthened the English community. Throughout the
twentieth century variation in the flow of such immi-
grants affected the relative strength of the Afrikaners,
but as can be seen from Table 6.1, this did not
prevent the latter from tracing out an upward trend, to
reach a pre-1994 maximum of 58,8 per cent in 1970,
and to end up at a projected level of 61 ,2 per cent by
the year 2016.
In the projection, loss of numbers through inter-
national emigration has not been allowed for.
Inclusion would reduce slightly the absolute num-
bers, but is unlikely to reduce their share in the total
White population, since many of their English
counterparts have equally participated in the outward
movement. It can be noted, however, that such
emigration has never been an issue of substance
among Afrikaners before 1994, but became one after
the new government had come into power and
systematically curtailed the employment opportu-
nities (in the employee status) of White males in the
public as well as the private sector. While the
emigration statistics do not differentiate between
language groups, it would be surprising - to judge by
news media reports, personal experience and some
sample surveys (see e.g. Van der Vyver, 1998) - if
Afrikaners were not commensurately represented
among the highly educated and highly skilled
category of economically active persons leaving
South Africa (2900 per annum during 1997-1998:
Statistics SA, 1999): artisans, teachers, business
executives, accountants, engineers and medical
practitioners and specialists. All these members of
the labour force tend to evince significant employ-
ment and income multipliers, their existence being a
prerequisite for the employment and income gene-
ration of those lower down in the occupational
hierarchy.
The role offertility in the population growth presented
above can be derived from the historic course of the TFR
(total fertility rate) or the average number of births per
woman, married and unmarried, during her childbearing
period (traditionally assumed to be between 15 and 50
years of age) as portrayed in Table 6.2.
TABLE 6.2
TOTAL FERTILITY RATES
Period Afrikaner All Period Afrikaner All
women White women White
women women
1891-96 5,17 1960-65 3,49 3,23
1906-11 5,13 1965-70 3,15 3,03
1911-16 5,15 1970-75 3,03 2,80
1916.21 4,66 1975-80 2,37 2,15
1921-26 4,59 3,56 1980-85 2,31 2,08
1926.31 4,42 3,20 1985-90 1,95 1,81
1931-36 3,95 3,00 Projected
1936-41 3,78 3,01 1991-96 1,86 1,73
1941.46 3,76 3,16 1996-2001 1,77 1,66
1946-51 3,80 3,38 2001-05 1,68 1,58
1951-56 3,81 3,38 2006-2011 1,59 1,50
1955-60 3,75 3,50 2011-2016 1,50 1,50
Source: Sadie, 1978, 1998.
Fertility among the pioneers of the OFS and the
Transvaal was probably not far removed from the
fecundity level during the 19th century. The 1921 and
1926 Population Census volumes on fertility of
marriage (Office of Census and Statistics, Vol. X)
allow us to determine the nuptial fertility of the total
White population during that century - i.e. the number
of children born to the average married woman whose
reproductive cycle has been completed.
TABLE 6.3
NUPTIAL FERTILITY OF ALL WHITE WOMEN
Cohort Number of births
1853/4 - 1874/5 8,12
1875/6 - 1879/80 8,13
1880/1 - 1884/5 7,53
1885/6 - 1889/90 6,90
1890/1 - 1894/5 6,23
Source: Franzsen & Sadie, 1950: 66.
The figures in Table 6.3 are representative of a
high, but, over time, declining fertility. They are higher
than the TFRs which refer to the performance of all
women, married and unmarried, during their repro-
ductive period. From a comparison of the nuptial
fertility of the 1890/1-1890/5 cohort (as in Table 6.3)
with the 1891-96 TFR of 5,17 (as in Table 6.2), and
with the 1891-96 estimated TFR of the Transvaal and
the OFS of 7,15 (Sadie, 1978: 11), it can be inferred
that the fertility of women in the Cape colony at the
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time was a good deal lower than that of the two
republics, and that the fertility of Afrikaner women (as
a whole) was higher than that of the English. That the
latter conclusion applies to the period 1921 onwards is
clear from the rates in Table 6.2. Over the period
1945-1990 Afrikaner women were responsible for 65
per cent of all births among White women, resulting
from a combination of the fertility differential and,
during more recent years, their numerical prepon-
derance in the 15-49 age group. The gap between the
two groups of White women has, however, been
closing steadily over the years, and is projected to
disappear within two decades, which means that the
two sections of the White community will experience
the same TFRs which had already fallen below
replacement level by 1985-90, after having remained
on a fairly even keel during the period 1936 to 1960.
Some of the effect of the declining fertility on
population growth has been compensated by declining
mortality, as reflected in the life expectancy at birth
from 52,3 years in 1891-96 to 73,0 years in 1991-96
(Sadie, 1978: 17; 1998: 18), incorporating a malel
female differential, in favour of the latter, of 1,6 years
at the beginning and 7,1 years at the end.
TABLE 6.4
AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION IN
PERCENTAGES
Age 1899 1936 1950 1970 1991 2016
Group
0-14 48,7 35,9 34,9 32,7 24,2 17,2
15-64 48,2 59,5 59,7 61,6 67,8 69,3
65+ 3,1 4,6 5,4 5,7 8,0 13,5
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Dependency ratio's per 100 persons aged 15-64
Children 101,0 60,2 58,5 53,2 35,7 24,8
Elderly 6,4 7,8 9,0 9,2 11,8 19,5
Total 107,4 68,0 67,5 62,4 47,5 44,3
The downward course of the TFR, coupled with the
lengthening of life, had the expected effect on the age
structure of the population, as can be seen in Table
6.4, with the 15-64 age group representing the
economically active ages. At the end of the 19th
century the Afrikaner population was demographically
very young, with a child dependency ratio of more
than 100 per cent; obviously an economically inimical
situation. The ratio gives quantitative content to the
pressure of expanding human numbers - as expoun-
ded in Chapter 1 - on the limited land area as main
co-operant factor of production. Economic retardation
could not but ensue. By 1936 the child population
constituted 35,9 per cent, down from 48,7 per cent in
1899, which implied a shrinking of the child
dependency ratio from 101 to 60,2. By 1991 -
resulting from urbanisation, education, occupational
advance and enhanced living standards, together with
appropriate family planning services - the proportion
of children in the population was one-half that of 1899.
This meant that towards the end of the twentieth
century the average parent had the responsibility of
nurturing only one-third of the number of children
his/her ancestor had to cope with a century ago.
Ceteris paribus he/she could lavish correspondingly
more care and attention upon each child, particularly
during the latter's crucial first three to five formative
years (White, et a/., 1974: 117, 138, 183), provide
him/her with more nutritious food and afford longer
and better education for the child; all of which
translate into human beings who are better economic
material capable of greater achievements.
The counterpart of this decline in the youthful
portion of the population is an increase in the elderly
dependency ratio. However, it can be argued that they
enter this period of life after they could have accu-
mulated the necessary assets to accommodate them
financially during post-retirement years. Moreover, by
the end of the twentieth century the ageing process
had not yet reduced the economically active age
group in relative size.
The economically beneficial effects of the process
quantified in Table 6.4 also show up in the indices of
potential manpower dynamics, in which the age group
15-64 serves as such manpower, with accessions
referring to the number reaching the age of 15, and
the departures (or exits) to those aged 15 to 64 who
die during a year and those 64 years old who retire by
virtue of turning 65. Some details for select periods
are presented in Table 6.5. The calculations are
based on data for the male population.
TABLE 6.5
THE COMPONENTS OF MANPOWER DYNAMICS
Period Acces- Exits % p.a. through Net Co-
sions Accre- efficient
%p.a. Death Retire- Total tion of
ment replace-
ment
1904-09 3.98% 0,80% 0,54% 1.34% 2,64% 295
1991-96 2,60% 0.59% 0,85% 1,44% 1,16"Ao 181
2001-06 2,04% 0,63% 1.02% 1,65% 0,39% 124
2011-16 1.97% 0,68% 1,27% 1,95% 0,02% 101
The rate of accession to manpower has been
declining monotonically as the population aged demo-
graphically, to reach a level in 1991-96 two-thirds of
that in 1904-09. It is expected to continue on its
downward course. Declining mortality at first reduced
the rate of exits through death, but in time augmented
the number of survivors who died at higher ages and,
in conjunction with declining fertility, raised the relative
number who could 'retire' at the age of 65. Thus the
total rate of exits was boosted from 1,34 per cent in
1904-09 to 1,44 in 1991-96, and may rise to 1,95 per
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cent during 2011-2016. As a result the net accretion to
the manpower age group has been declining from
2,64 per cent to 1,16 per cent over a period of 87
years. During the same period the co-efficient of
replacement - perhaps a more telling statistic than net
accretion - diminished from 295 to 181, and is due to
decline further to 101 in 2011-2016. This means that,
whereas at the beginning of the century, for each 100
persons leaving the manpower group 195 new jobs
had to be created to accommodate the increase -
apart from those who could fill the vacancies caused
by death and retirement - the relative number had
declined to 81 by 1991-96, and can be almost zero by
2011-2016. Accordingly, the probability of securing
employment in a stationary job market - where the
number of opportunities available to new entries into
the manpower age group equalled the vacancies
occasioned by death and retirement - rose from 33
per cent to 55 per cent and may end on 100 per cent
within two decades. (In the dynamic labour market
after World War II the probability was, of course, much
higher than 55 per cent.) The supply pressure on the
labour market eased, the probability of unemployment
diminished and better terms of employment could be
negotiated. Personal income would be boosted.
The beneficial effect of the ageing process,
coupled with the fact that their fertility surpassed that
of the English, extended to the political arena - by
way of the increase in the number of voters 21 years
and older and, after 1958, 18 years and older. Some
relevant data are provided in Table 6.6.
TABLE 6.6
POTENTIAL NUMBER OF VOTERS
21 Years and older 18 Years and older
Date
Afrikaner %of Afrikaner Afrikaner %of Afrika-
number total majority number total ner
Wh~es Whrtes majority
1889 249200 65,7
1904 273000 45,8
1911 330000 50,0
1921 411000 52,3
1936 584000 50,7
1946 732000 52,4
1948 763500 52,2 65300
1953 847300 52,8 90200
1958 937000 53,9 137100 1030700 54,3 165800
1960 1078100 55,1 199000
1970 1392800 56,3 313900
1980 1695200 55,6 343000
1991 2048500 55,6 414200
Of
total
voting
age
1994 2140000 9,4
1999 2372 000 8,6
2004 2367000 8,0
Given the cohesion-inducing forces such as
common language, culture, history and experience of
Afrikaners, in conjunction with the death and/or
waning influence of traditional Anglo Boer War leaders
who became politicians and manifested great
admiration for Britain after the ABW, demographic
factors had an overriding influence in South African
politics. The Afrikaner majority of potential voters
increased steadily over the years from a seemingly
precarious 65 300 in 1948 to 414 200 in 1991.
Assuming equal voter registration the electorate
majorities have, at least percentagewise, been larger
than shown in Table 6.6 since many of the immigrant
English residents did not apply for South African
citizenship and could, therefore, not participate in
elections.4 The National Party was able to mobilize
these majorities (and in later years even attracted
some English support) to remain in power for 45 years
despite breakaways and to provide the Afrikaner
community with a mechanism to promote their
economic and other interests.
The changing spatial distribution of the population
also favoured the Afrikaner electorate.
TABLE 6.7
RURAL-URBAN DISTRIBUTION OF THE
AFRIKANER
Rural Urban
Numbers % Numbers %
1904 450900 81.1 105100 18,9
1911 500000 75,6 161700 24,4
1921 530200 63,9 300000 36,1
1936 585000 52,2 536200 47,8
1946 538000 39,5 824300 60,5
1951 468500 30,9 1 047800 69,1
1960 422000 23,2 1 395900 76,8
1970 417000 18,4 1 853260 81,6
1980 404790 15,4 2223700 84,6
1991 344000 11,8 2571 500 88,2
1996 318500 10,5 2718500 89,5
Source: Population Censuses. Pre-1936 estimates were based
on the assumption that all rural Afrikaners were members of the
Dutch Reformed Churches (for which data were available). The
1996 estimates are projections.
While the English have been a predominantly
urban community from the beginning of their settle-
ment in South Africa (86 per cent in 1904), the
Afrikaners used to be an overwhelmingly rural people.
As can be seen in Table 6.7 the change-over for the
latter from a less than 50 to a more than 50 per cent
urban portion occurred during World War II. The rural
component shrank from 52,2 per cent in 1936 to 10,5
4. For a demographic analysis ofthe 1948, 1953 and 1958 election
results, see Sadie 1958.
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per cent in 1996, comprising a depopulation of the
rural areas from 585000 in 1936 to 318 500 in 1996.
The movement was given a boost by the 1930-33
Great Depression and exacerbated by the Great
Drought of 1933. Even so they remained the large
majority among the White rural inhabitants throughout
the century. In the urban areas they began to surpass
the English in number during 1946-1951, and steadily
increased their numerical predominance thereafter. To
the National Party it meant that it retained its rural
seats while gaining urban seats in elections after
1948. The party had already been wielding political
power over the period 1924-1939, by means of a pact
with the Labour Party in 1924 and a fusion with the
South African Party in 1934, but its undisputed power
dated from 1948 (with a very small majority of seats)
or 1953, when its majority bourgeoned. Even before
1924 they exerted some influence by way of their
representatives in parliament.
From the point of view of economic development
the most significant outcome of the urbanisation
process has been the mentally - if not culturally -
metamorphic influence of urban life. In contrast with
the socially unchallenging quietude of the pastoral or
agrarian life, urbanism, as effectuated in the hustle
and bustle of daily life, the mass media intruding upon
minds all the time, interpersonal contact, the clash of
minds, competitive life styles, the challenging of con-
ventional wisdom and innovative action, constitutes a
way of life conducive to secularisation (or eman-
cipation) and thus to change and development. It does
this "by attracting creative or innovative personalities
into the enclaves of accelerated change, by encoura-
ging the formation of new values, attributes and beha-
viour traits consistent with ... innovation by fomenting
a social environment favourable to innovative activity"
(Friedman, 1972: 82). The author of the Culture of
Cities would have it that "it is in the city, the city as
theatre, that man's more purposive activities are for-
mulated and worked at, through conflicting and co-
operating personalities, events, groups, into more
significant culminations" (Mumford, 1938: 480).
Compared to his predecessors, the post-World
War II Afrikaner is an economically different being.
Moreover, the economic growth that was conso-
nant with the increase in the White population as a
whole, required larger numbers of qualified workers
than the slower growing English population could
provide, so that the business sector of the latter had to
have recourse to the recruitment of members of the
Afrikaner labour force, which benefited the economic
position of both groups.
CHAPTER 7
POLITICAL POWER
Political power implies far-reaching economic power:
the capacity to intervene in economic processes by
way, for example, of government's function as em-
ployer, its control over government expenditure, its
authority to levy taxes, passing legislation which has
economic consequences and assuming the entrepre-
neurial function. Such power permits measures to be
taken, directly, in aid of political supporters where the
latter can be identified (as in the case of the National
Party whose majorities stemmed preponderantly from
support by Afrikaners, and of the ANC whose power is
derived from a Black electorate) or, indirectly, where
government policy promotes the interests of the whole
of the electorate of which its supporters constitute a
part.
7.1 The empowerment of Afrikaans
Inasmuch as, by definition, there would have been no
Afrikaners, if Afrikaans did not exist, or relatively
insignificant numbers of them if it was not a language
of status, the promotion and empowerment of Afri-
kaans, and thus. the re-establishment of its market
value, was probably the most important contribution of
political power to the Afrikaner cause. (In this context
the cold-comfort assertion, that Afrikaans will survive
until the last Afrikaner has died, is an irrelevancy.) In
her inaugural address as chancellor of the University
of Stellenbosch in 1998, Professor Elize Botha cited
the famous writer and poet, NP van Wyk Louw: "For
the unilingual Afrikaansspeakers at the end of the
nineteenth century in South Africa, to whom English
was incomprehensible and Dutch unwritable, the
transformation and growth of their vernacular into a
written language, a language of worship, a language
of culture, was a broodsaak (bread-and-butter
necessity). Without this transformation and growth of
the vernacular these people were powerless, of no
consequence, doomed to poverty and disadvantage-
ment - doomed, one might say, to forsakenness"
(Botha, 1998). As a matter of precedence, then, the
debt of gratitude is due, not to politicians in the first
place, but to the practitioners of belles lettres, the
human, the natural and the medical sciences for
complying with the conditions formulated above.
When Dutch, and not the spoken Afrikaans, was
formally one of the two official languages, a future
Prime Minister, OF Malan, declared in 1913: "Raise
the Afrikaans language to a written language, let it
become the vehicle of our culture, our history, our
national ideals, and you will raise the people who
speak it. The Afrikaans Language Movement is
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nothing less than an awakening of our nation to self-
awareness and to the vocation of adopting a more
worthy position in world civilization" (translated by
Giliomee, 1975: 21). When, before Malan, and in the
face of Milner's anglicization policy, ex-president MT
Steyn and General JBM Hertzog besought the British
to re-establish the status of Dutch as an official
language, they also argued that it was necessary for
the people, whose heritage it was, to regain their
national pride. Hertzog declared: "Wij willen onze taal,
omdat wij onze eer willen, wij zoeken onze taal te
hand haven omdat wij onze rechten willen gehand-
haafd zien; wij willen onze taal ge-eerbiedigd hebben,
opdat onze volk ge-eerbiedigd zal sijn" (Scholtz,
1999:10). Years later it was this national pride that
provoked the 1939 Economic Conference, and
heralded the economic awakening of the Afrikaner by
way of self-empowerment and thus move out of the rut
of economic underdevelopment.
In this regard we have the testimony of two African
intellectuals who stressed the importance of the home
tongue as vehicle of cultural and technological transfer
as means towards economic advancement. Omotoso
maintained that the Japanese, the Newly Indus-
trializing countries of the Pacific and the Egyptian
Arabs benefited from their encounter with the Western
culture by deliberately "rendering Western texts into
their own languages" while "there is no example ... of
Western culture and technology being absorbed
through an indigenous language in any country south
of the Sahara - apart from the Afrikaners in South
Africa" (1994: 117). Concurring, Prah added that
"mother tongue education is the missing link in our
development efforts on the African continent. It is the
enabling factor in the search for a workable paradigm
for African development" (1995: iii, 12). Afrikaans as
the language of economics, business economics and
the exact sciences allowed easy access to a multitude
of pupils and others to the determinants of economic
progress, and particularly to the latest developments
in the economic and scientific world, as a basis for
endogenously generated economic progress.
The protection of Afrikaans by Afrikaner controlled
governments, and particularly that of the 1949 to 1994
period, had a very salutary effect on the tenor of
national life in South Africa during the long period in
which most or many English regarded bilingualism
with aversion. Assured that there was a government
maintaining their language rights against the inter-
nationally more powerful English, Afrikaners were for
the most part prepared to concede, to be the lesser,
and use English in their conversation with, and
addresses to, unilinguists, while accepting the English
language when the English speaker was the initiator
of the communication, even in the overwhelmingly
Afrikaner institutions, towns and communities. This
was a modus vivendi conducive to peaceful co-
existence, which engendered a harmonious ambience
favourable to economic development. Some "gene-
rosity" was also extended to languages of the South
African Blacks so that South Africa was in the pre-
1994 days one of the few countries that published
official documents in African languages (Steyn, 1996:
278).
There were also many specific benefits to pro-
spective Afrikaner businessmen stemming from the
empowerment of Afrikaans (though there was no
reason why English businessmen could not equally
make use of the opportunities on offer): the publication
of newspapers, journals, textbooks, other books, jobs
for teachers and lecturers, mother tongue instruction
at school, university and technikons which could
produce better economically beneficial human mate-
rial because of language medium, etc. But the most
direct benefit conferred by political power was
obviously to be manifested within the public sector of
the economy.
Soon after the end of the Anglo-Boer War Gen.
Hertzog began his struggle against British imperialism
as represented in Milner's anglicisation policy. He
pleaded for equality between the English and Dutch
languages, for mother tongue education and obligatory
bilingualism. He never deviated from the stance after
he acquired political power at the national level. (For
him and his party afrikaansification, in contrast with
anglicisation, was never an option.) For this he was
reviled by a large part of the English press as anti-
British and a racialist (RGN, 1976, Vol. I: 385). The
resolution adopted at the 1908 National Convention,
where ex-president Steyn delivered a seminal speech
on language rights, was echoed in the language clause
no. 137 of the 1910 Union constitution: "De Engelse
alsmede de Hollandse talen zijn officiele talen van de
Unie. Sij word op een voet van gelijkheid behandeln en
bezitten en genieten gelijke vryheid, rechten en
voorrechten." The English did not take kindly to his
linguistic equality as reflected in their reaction to a 1912
Parliamentary Bill which required bilingualism within
five years' time as a condition for promotion in the civil
service. One Member of Parliament threatened that he
was prepared to take up arms to safeguard English
speakers from such "injustice" (Pauw, 1945: 187). Wary
of giving offence to the English, the first Prime Minister
of the Union, Gen. Louis Botha, refrained from active
support for language equality. His successor, another
Anglo-Boer War general, JC Smuts, privately ex-
pressed the view that English should be the official
language of the country, and believed at the end of his
political career that he had so many things to do that he
did not have time to promote Afrikaans (Giliomee,
1998: 11).
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For more than half a century after Union the active
hostility towards Afrikaans had not significantly
attenuated. When the SA Broadcasting Corporation
was founded, separate transmissions were not
provided for. The English so vigorously opposed a
service in which they would be hearing Afrikaans as
well that the transmissions were separated in 1937
(Steyn, 1993: 13).
It was the National Party, voted into power
overwhelmingly by Afrikaners, and thus unfettered by
potential internal strife arising from recalcitrance of
English speakers to accept bilingualism, who applied
the principle systematically and effectively established
the market value of Afrikaans in the public service. For
appointments within the patronage of the new
government the 38-year period (1910-1948) of grace
for unilingual English speakers was at an end. The
bilingualism rule was going to be strictly observed.
The anglicisation process in the Cape and in the two
ex-republics - where most Afrikaners were replaced by
Englishmen after the Anglo-Boer War - meant that all
the senior posts in the civil service had been filled by
unilingual English persons. And short of dismissing
them for not complying with the bilingual requirement-
and such procedure was not resorted to - coupled with
the tradition that senior positions are attained by way of
rising through the professional ranks over long periods,
it would take many decades before they reached
retirement age and could be replaced by linguistically
properly qualified South Africans. As late as 1932
unilingists were still being appointed, as can be inferred
from the resignation of a member of the Civil Service
Commission because of the disregard of the
bilingualism rule, while OF Malan claimed in 1935 that
he was the only Minister in the Hertzog cabinet who
opposed the appointment by the Commission of
unilingual candidates when bilingual ones were
available (Giliomee, 1999: 51). In 1931, when Afrika-
ners made up just over one-half of the total number of
civil servants, they filled 22,1 per cent of the top
positions, bilingual English speakers 30,3 per cent and
unilingual English speakers 47,6 per cent (Pauw, 1945:
188). On the Railways, too, English speakers over-
whelmingly held the senior positions while some one-
half of the white labour force was Afrikaners.
A side effect of this situation was that junior
Afrikaner officials were obliged to communicate with
their seniors in English for the most part, to render
them occupationally more competent in English than
Afrikaans. When they entered the senior ranks they
contributed to the survival of English as the pre-
dominant language in the public service (Pauw, 1946:
189). In 1930, when a Translation Bureau was
created, just about every document submitted for
translation was drafted in English (Steyn, 1993: 13).
After the Pact Government had assumed the reins
of government in 1924, increasing numbers of Afrika-
ners were appointed so that when the National Party
took over in 1948, more than 60 per cent of the jobs in
Public Administration had already been filled by them.
While there is no certainty that the industrial
classification according to home language in consecu-
tive censuses encompasses entirely comparable
categories, it can be inferred that the Afrikaners' share
in Public AdministrationS employment would have
been:
58,9% in 1936
63,4% in 1948
68,2% in 1960
70,7% in 1970
79,4% in 1991
Sources: Population Censuses. The 1948 figure is an interpolation;
the 1991 an estimate.
The numbers included above represented 12,9 per
cent of the total Afrikaner labour force in 1936, 13,2
per cent in 1970 and 14,6 per cent in 1991. The post-
1948 government's role has been to apply the
principle of appointing bilinguals, who have risen in
the professional hierarchy, to the senior posts when
retiring English speakers created vacancies. Over the
years Afrikaners had become the majority aspiring to
these jobs through extended careers. The change in
the top structure of the civil service was reflected in
the 63 per cent of documents, which had to be
translated into English by the Translation Bureau in
1962, rising from practically zero in 1930 (Steyn,
1993: 13). The English speakers meanwhile were
drifting out of public service and into the more
lucrative jobs in the private sector.
The Afrikanerization of Public Administration has
been a gradual process having started long before the
1948 change of government, and allowed of a conti-
nuation of professional competence. There were no
instant secretaries, instant assistant secretaries,
instant chiefs of departments, etc. - in those days the
more exalted appellations of director-general, deputy
director-general, etc. had not yet been invented - and
they were nurtured in the traditions of the law-abiding
bureaucracy. Corruption, such as there was, was the
exception to the rule and came to the fore after many
decades of National Party hegemony in government,
demonstrating the corrupting influence of power.
During the early 1970's a visiting sociologist observed
that he had not yet come across a developing country
where the prevalence of corruption was at such a low
level as in South Africa (Giliomee, personal commu-
nication).
A great deal of dust was raised by opponents of
the government, which came into power in 1948,
about a few appointments which were considered to
represent political favouritism. The new Minister of
5. Variously described as Government, Public Administration and
Defence, and simply Public Administration.
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Defence was intent on reorganizing the defence force
and changing its character from that which it had
acquired during the Second World War - South
Africa's participation in which was opposed by the
National Party. He refused to appoint Major-general
Evered Poole as chief of general staff, a post for
which he, as deputy chief, was in lieu, while some 50
other senior members of the Force were discriminated
against (Giliomee, 1999(b): 56). (Poole was offered a
job in the diplomatic service and later became an
ambassador.) The Minister's successors were more
circumspect and avoided political considerations to
cloud their views. Another instance was that of
Marshall Clark who was appointed general manager
of the SA Railways and Harbours by the previous
government in 1945, over the heads of two Afrikaners
who were his seniors in the service. He was retired by
the new government, with a very generous pension. A
government law adviser, LC Steyn, was appointed as
chief justice in the face of many distinguished senior
judges. For the rest the general principles of
bilingualism, seniority and competence were ob-
served. Eventually, any discrimination that has been
practised has been equally directed against Afrikaner
dissidents. There was no purge of civil servants, such
as occurred after 1994.
Evidence of a negative nature, which materialised
during the post-1994 era, demonstrates the impor-
tance of Afrikaans. In the public sector (a more
comprehensive category than public administration)
Afrikaans has been divested of its status as attribute
of merit; it has no market value, rendering it easier for
newcomers with no knowledge of it to be appointed.
Not only have Afrikaner males practically no access to
jobs in the public sector (unless they become ANC
members), but incumbents are being replaced by
persons with less or no experience or competence,
thus lowering the efficiency of the service. Those who
do not envision a future for Afrikaners under the new
government-and whose expertise is internationally in
demand - emigrate to Canada, the United States, the
British Isles, New Zealand and Australia where the
official language is no different, for all practical
purposes, from that of South Africa. South Africa is
thus losing a great deal of skills, know-how and
expertise, already in short supply, which reduces the
country's ability to develop and grow economically.
7.2 Political favouritism
Among English businessmen there was a perception
or assumption and, among writers who were not
kindly disposed towards the National Party, an
accusation that the government had been bestowing
favoured treatment upon Afrikaner businessmen on
an extensive scale (see e.g. Financial Mail, 1965:
13). Among the latter a pioneer stockbroker
maintained that they benefited from having an inside
track to the government so that, for him, the 1948-
1994 period was a financially fun time (Retief, 1998:
10). It is difficult to evaluate such assertions when
they have not been substantiated by the citation of
specific instances. It is also difficult to know when the
redress of a patent imbalance can be portrayed as
censurable favouritism. For example, as the con-
troller of the use of certain natural resources it is the
government's prerogative to grant concessions for
their exploration and exploitation. When it allocated
fishing quotas and granted concessions to exploit
diamondiferous areas to Afrikaner businessmen, it
ended the exclusive rights enjoyed by the older
companies, arising from political decisions by
previous governments. When the Minister of Finance
was asked at a meeting of the Ekonomiese Instituut,
during the beginning of the 1950's, why he did not
issue more diamond exploration concessions to
Afrikaners, he reponded that he was not a political
representative of this population group only. When
some Broederbond members suggested that the
government grant quotas (during the era of import
control) and contracts to Afrikaner firms, the sugges-
tion was rejected by other members representative of
the Afrikaner business fraternity.
Naturally, one must assume that membership of the
same linguistic fraternity - analogous to the tradition of
the old school tie beloved of English business - provided
Afrikaner businessmen with relatively easy access to
government circles, and that this had some influence on
the latter's policy decisions, but need not therefore
involve a group-specific bias. In the universal business
practice of lobbying, Afrikaners did not have a monopoly.
Since the service departments of government buy
large amounts of goods and services from the private
sector (R33 billion in 1994 - SARB Quarterly Bulletin,
June 2000: S.130) there are opportunities for favouring
specific enterprises. However, in so far as contracts for
delivery are subject to the tender procedure where
market principles are presumed to prevail, the question
arises whether confidential information was leaked to
favoured parties, which afforded them a competitive
edge in the tendering process. It is known that the
northern Afrikaans Press, whose executives had close
ties with influential political figures of the North, received
very lucrative contracts from the government for the
printing of textbooks, journals, government stationery,
telephone directories and official yearbooks. When this
manifestation of prima facie political nepotism came to
an end, the companies involved folded. It did not,
however, entail discrimination against English
competitors only but equally against the southern
Afrikaans Press, which was, indeed, the target of some
hostile government action (Giliomee, 1999(b): 77).
There was a great deal of agitation about the aid
package made available by the Reserve Bank to Trust
Bank and Bankorp, which was held up as an example
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of preferential treatment. Apart from its being dictated
by the maxim or tacit assumption that big banks
cannot be allowed to go into liquidation because ofthe
disastrous economic consequences, it turned out that
similar aid was extended to five other banks, among
them Nedbank, while a further five (according to a
researcher) could probably have received such aid
when they experienced liquidity problems (Basson,
1999( a): 18).
To discover whether favoured treatment of notable
proportions had been meted out to Afrikaans business
by the National Party government, the considered
opinions of the chief executives of the companies
most likely to have benefited have to be solicited.
Such an exercise was carried out by a historiographer,
Hermann Giliomee, and the following are some of the
responses elicited by him (1999(b)).
Nasionale Pers
David de Villiers, SC, appointed manager director in
1969, asking himself whether Naspers derived unfair
advantage because of its ties with political perso-
nalities, came to the conclusion: "The answer was
clear and comprehensive: it did not do so. Both the
directors and top management were opposed to
anything of the sort. Although the Cabinet Ministers
who were directors of Nasionale Pers did not have
functions in those areas where patronage could be
bestowed, the sentiment grew that the system had to
change. This came about by the end of the 1970s
when PW Botha agreed to a proposal by Piet Cillie,
chairman of the Board, to end it" (p. 81) ... "De Villiers
is also adamant that Nasionale Pers never received
any printing contracts from any state body except after
a public tendering process in which it beat its
competitors" (p. 82).
Sanlam
It its submission to the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Sanlam asseverated: "Except for better
access to people in government, Sanlam as institution
did not enjoy preferential status from the National Party
when it was in power." One-time MD, Fred du Plessis,
declared that "Afrikaner business could not rely on
Afrikaner political power to be successful ... there was
no procurement policies or empowerment schemes that
could assist budding Afrikaner entrepreneurs" (p. 86).
Pepler Scholtz, MD during the 1970s and later
chairman of the Board of Directors, remarked that the
"Afrikaner is not entitled to a share [in the economy]
because he exists. He is only entitled to that share of
business that he conquers through his own abilities and
hard work" (p. 69). Andreas Wassenaar, another MD,
was an outspoken critic of government policies, as
evidenced, for example, in his publications Assault on
Private Enterprise (Tafel berg Publishers, 1977) and
Squandered Assets (Tafelberg, 1989).
Volkskas
One-time CEO, Pieter Morkel, stated in 1992: "It must be
stressed that people greatly exaggerate the benefits
Volkskas derives from business with the State or from
links with the National Party government ... most of the
business of the state proper ... was done through the
Reserve bank ... State business was an insignificant part
of the overall business of Volkskas. The one field in
which Volkskas traditionally was - and still is - over-
exposed is in credit to farmers and co-operatives, but
this is not a particularly profitable area of business and
the NP government did not help to establish links
between farmers and Volkskas" (p. 67). A top manager
who preceded Morkel testified: "Escom did business with
all banks; Armscor and Sasol mainly used us, but also
banked with the others ... The Bantu Administration
Boards used us in the Afrikaner areas, but in Natal and
Eastern Cape they used other banks. Some of the big
Control Boards were with us, like the Maize and the
Wheat Board, but for the transactions related to exports,
imports and the selling of surpluses they shopped
around for the best deals. We probably had the accounts
of most Afrikaner-controlled local authorities by the
1970s, but in subsequent years most local authorities
rotated their accounts among banks" (p. 67).
Volkskas probably captured the custom of most
Afrikaners, but to the extent that it involved relatively
small amounts, they did not conduce to profitability. It
is the accounts of the large companies which do that,
and Volkskas' share in this business, for many
decades, was minimal.
Rembrandt
Anton Rupert testified: "I never requested any
government department anything special for my
company. In fact, I only once saw a Cabinet Minister
alone and that was in 1945 when I asked permission
to convert a canning factory in Stellenbosch into
premises for the production of brandy. When our
company protested against the enormous quota
system that operated during and immediately after the
war hampered the production of our products, I always
went as member of a delegation of the entire trade to
see the Minister" (p. 61). It is, indeed, very difficult to
identify a way in which government could have
dispensed favoured treatment to the Rupert business
empire which might have contributed to its success on
an international scale.
J de Necker
The present author requested a contemporary of hiswho
has made his mark in the business world - Jan de
Necker - to write down his experience of govemment
favouritism, or its absence, during his career. His
credentials (over a period of more than forty years)
include the following: Manager of Wesgraan Co-
operative; Chief of the IDC Marketing Division; co-
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founder and managing director of Sansficor (a first
Afrikaner confirming house); managing director and,
later, chairman of the Rand Bank and Rand
Acceptances; co-founder (with Albert Wessels) and
director of Toyota SA and Wesco Beleggings Bpk;
chairman of the Board of Directors of Veka/Bertish;
chairman of the Johannesburg Afrikaanse Sakekamer;
chairman and, later, presidentoftheAHI. Here are some
excerpts (freely translated) from his letter of April 17,
2000. "Admittedly it was more pleasant and possibly
more conducive to successful outcomes to negotiate
with Afrikaans Ministers and senior civil servants than
with those of the previous regime ... but despite my
close involvement in Afrikaner business of those years, I
am not aware of any men who, or companies which,
were directly advantaged by the government of the time.
If there were such instances Iwas not aware of them. To
the contrary, I know of several instances where
companies within our Wesco group received niggardly
treatment at the hands of the government. I still feel
aggrieved about the refusal of the Reserve Bank to
come to the aid of Rand Bank when it experienced cash
flow problems. Other banks have, afterwards, received
such aid ... Wesco invested R23 million in a glass
factory, but because we could not procure the necessary
support from the Minister concerned the company had to
be sold to Plate Glass ... When Blacks were
translocated from Charlestown to Newcastle, involving
many workers who were employed by the Veka factory,
we implored the Minister and senior officials to
discontinue the operations, but to no avail. The training
of new personnel cost Veka a great deal of money.
When we applied for a permit to import Toyota vehicles,
we were granted a permit for only 10 units."
All in all it would appear that political nepotism did
not make a contribution of note to long-term Afrikaner
economic development.
7.3 Welfare Services
In the absence of statistics differentiating between
language groups with respect to recipients of welfare
services (Education, Health, Social Security, Housing)
and taxpayers, it is not possible to quantify the
dimensions of income redistribution, via the national
budget, in favour of Afrikaners. But such redistribution
must have occurred, taking into account the diffe-
rences, as between Afrikaners and other Whites, in
average personal income (subject to progressive
income tax), the tax on company profits (over-
whelmingly owned by English speakers), and the
higher incidence of indigence among the former.
During the initial years of National Party (NP) rule the
burden of government expenditure, as judged by the
ratio to GOP, did not become more onerous. As is
evidenced in Table 7.1, this ratio (and, concomitantly,
that of the Welfare Services account) even tended
downwards between 1948 and 1960 and increased
moderately during the following decade.
TABLE 7.1
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN PER
CENT OF GDP
1948 14,5%
1960 13,4%
1965 16,3%
1970 17,7%
1976 21,7%
1980 20,5%
1985 27,8%
1994 31,5%
Source: SARB Supplements to March 1994 and June 1999
Quarterly Bulletin.
A significant causal factor in this regard has been
the vigorous growth of the economy during the
prosperity phase of the (long-term) Kondratieff cycle
and the virtual disappearance of the poor white
problem in its acute form during the war and
immediate post-war years. Moreover, the two
population groups at issue in this redistribution (similar
income transfers also occurred between the White
group and the others) did not differ significantly in
size. The degree of redistribution was also attenuated
by some shifting of the burden of taxation from
companies to individuals and from direct to indirect
tax, as can be gleaned from the following percentages
of revenue by source collected by government:
Individual Company tax Indirect tax
income tax
1948 28,2% 16,6% 40,6%
1994 36,6% 11,8% 46,9%
Source: SARB Bulletin Supplement June 1999: B1-8; B168-169.
The marked increase in government expenditure
registered in Table 7.1 occurred when the thrust of
redistribution shifted to that between the non-Blacks
and the much larger Black population, while the
economy languished consonantly with the latter's
struggle for political power and their recourse to
international economic and financial sanctions. The
ratios in Table 7.1 increased from 17,7% in 1970 to
31,5% in 1994, while budget surpluses were replaced
by large deficits and concomitant government dis-
saving. During 1983-1992, a time of heavy
expenditure on defence and public order, welfare
services expenditure still outran government spending
on other services.
As will be argued in the next chapter, the most
telling government expenditure in Afrikaner life was
that on education, whose marginal social product was
(is) in excess of its marginal private product. With the
fiscal machinery under their control, the NP govern-
ments could ensure that no child would be denied
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some education because of geographic location or
because his/her parents could not afford school fees
and books. Primary schools were located throughout
the country and high or secondary schools were
established wherever that was justified by a spatial
concentration of households. In time they were
followed by commercial, agricultural, technical and
similar vocational schools and colleges. As a result of
the disparity in wealth, Afrikaans-medium universities
were disadvantaged in that they did not receive the
large donations the English-medium universities were
recipients of, and could not, in consequence, afford
such faculties as medicine and engineering, which are
more expensive to run than others. Government
subsidies and grants enabled some Afrikaans univer-
sities to establish these. Opportunities to qualify for
the better remunerated jobs and professions in their
mother tongue became available to students whose
parents could afford - hardly, for the most part - to
support them or who could gain scholarships or
procure loans.
7.4 'Civilized labour' policy
Already in 1911 the Mines and Works Act, re-affirmed
in 1926, made provision for discrimination in the work
place in favour of non-Blacks. Certificates of com-
petency in skilled occupations - such as blasting in
mines - could not be issued to Blacks, who were
considered a community, an ethnic group, a nation, a
race apart and not just a less developed class of
persons in an otherwise homogeneous population. But
the more concerted action towards the advantage-
ment of Whites, vis-a-vis Blacks, started in 1924 with
Gen. Hertzog's (premier in the Pact Government) pro-
claiming the "civilised labour" policy. It was posited
that Blacks, because of their level of living and habits,
while the majority still had a stake in the subsistence
agriculture in the "homelands", could accept unskilled
jobs at lower wages than Whites whose civilised
standards required higher remuneration. It implied, in
effect, that Blacks' labour supply curve would be
located below that of Whites so that in an unimpeded
market the negatively sloping demand curve would
always bisect the Blacks' supply curve at lower wage
levels with a concomitant preferred employment of the
latter. The large unskilled component of the Afrikaner
labour force acted as a substitute for Black labour and
not, as in later years, as a predominantly comple-
mentary factor of production. Government depart-
ments and parastatals were requested to employ
Whites at "civilised" wages. In consequence, South
African Railways & Harbours became a major
employer of these people - the majority of whom, it
can be confidently assumed, were Afrikaners - the
number of unskilled Whites employed during the first
year after 1924 increasing from 5 115 to 11 159
(Pauw, 1945: 195). In the process persons of colour
employed declined by 19 160 between 1924 and 1933
while White employees increased by 10640, with free
housing included in their remuneration package
(Bureau of Statistics, 1976: 7.4). The former's loss
was, however, only temporary, and towards the end of
NP rule there were 25 000 more of them than the 103
000 Whites on the Railways' payroll (Central
Statistical Service, 1994: 7.4; De Lange, 1992: 86).
Employment of Whites was also generated by
government spending on relief works such as road
and railroad construction, forestry settlements and
irrigation schemes; which meant that those employed
were not only provided with their daily bread, but they
also contributed to capital formation which, over time,
contributed to the growth of the economy which also
benefited those who, at the beginning of the civilised
labour policy, were effectively victims of the system.
When the NP came into power in 1948 the abject
poverty that was associated with the poor white
problem had, for all practical purposes, become
something of the past as a result, particularly, of the
opportunities of entering the army during the 1939-
1945 war and the rapid growth of employment in the
manufacturing industry arising from the exigencies of
the war and the post-war demand of a reconstructing
war-ravaged Europe. But it would seem that its soul
(like that of John Brown's body) went marching on.
Numerous laws were passed (or existing ones
reaffirmed or amended) which constrained the power
of Blacks to resort to collective bargaining and strikes,
to move freely between rural and urban areas, move
vertically in the" skill hierarchy and establishing
unlimited numbers of enterprises in urban areas.
Perhaps the most notorious of these was the Job
Reservation Act, which provided for quotas for the four
main population groups in the filling of, particularly,
semi-skilled jobs. It was an economically and demo-
graphically unintelligent policy tarnishing the image of
government out of all proportion to its economic
significance, affecting less than 3 per cent of the
labour force, and was, for the most part, inoperative:
no sooner had a determination in terms of the law
been made or it had to be suspended simply because
there were no Whites to fill the quotas allotted to them.
Questioned why a measure so obviously bereft of
sagacity was in force, the responsible Minister would
respond that it was a gesture to the government's
supporters that it cared for them. Eventually a three-
pronged policy of the NP government encompassed a
less constrictive procedure: (i) no White worker should
be dismissed to make way for a Black; (ii) the latter
should not be appointed in a position that accorded
him seniority over White workers; (iii) White and Black
employees of equal occupational status should not
operate side by side. As a sort of quid pro quo Blacks
would be allowed to exercise their economic, social
and political democracy in the Homeland areas
reserved for them.
Most of the legislation after 1948 with an econo-
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mically discriminating content could be interpreted as
not, primarily, a means of protecting White workers
from "fair" and "unfair" competition, but as an attempt
to prevent or delay the kind of permanent integration
of Blacks in the urban economy which would even-
tually, by way of their overwhelming numbers, pose a
challenge to the political hegemony of the White group
(not only Afrikaners). Such conclusion is underscored
by the "grand apartheid" policy which allowed Blacks
self-government and/or independence in demarcated
areas as a token that Whites conceded to Blacks the
right to self-determination (Le. without the impediment
of apartheid rules) that they claimed for themselves.
The administration and the economy of the self-
governing territories and the TBVC countries were
heavily subsidized and kept alive by very considerable
transfers of resources from White taxpayers. The
process was, in fact, continued and intensified after
1994, but now not under the cloak of a Homeland's
policy, but of the alleviation of poverty. The former
policy transferred resources for some economic
activity, however inefficiently performed, while the
post-1994 policy is predominantly a means of keeping
the unemployed alive.
7.5 Promoting economic growth and stability
The promotion of economic growth and stability could
obviously not be of an exclusive nature but would
redound to the advantage of Afrikaners as well as the
rest of the population. However, in the case of the
Agricultural sector the interests of Afrikaners could be
most directly furthered, simply because they prepon-
derated to the extent of 85 per cent by 1948, and it was
in a most unhealthy state. During the five years following
upon the destruction of 60 per cent of the two Republics'
agriculturally-based wealth, agriculture had to contend
with five years of economic depression while having to
transform from a preponderantly subsistence type of
cultivation and pastoralism to a market-oriented
economic sector, while having to face the tendency of
input prices rising faster than output prices. As a
countervailing supply force, emanating from a multitude
of individual producers against demand generated by a
limited number of traders, resort was had to the
foundation of numerous co-operatives, of which there
were already 81, when co-operative-promoting
legislation was promulgated in 1922, after which their
numbers increased further (Du Plessis, 1964: Ch. XII).
New legislation followed in 1939, which extended to
agricultural co-operatives the principle of limited liability
already enjoyed by companies in the other economic
sectors. The Land and Agricultural Bank, established in
1912, provided loans to farmers and co-operatives on
favourable terms. Other forms of aid included technical
services, agricultural schools, irrigation schemes and the
research laboratories at Onderstepoort. By the end of
the Second World War some 70 per cent of agricultural
products were handled by 307 co-operatives.
They did not however, solve the long-term problem
of agriculture: the chronic tendency of production to
exceed demand at prices that would clear the market
while providing a reasonable return to human effort
and other inputs. The unstable market was depicted
as "characterised by sudden sags in the price level
and the marketing of commodities from time to time in
such quantities that not only do the products of the
farmer's labour fail to bring a return sufficient to cover
costs, but sometimes they are unsaleable at prices to
cover marketing charges" (Davis, 1931: 167). Farm-
ers, or some of them, contributed to the parlous state
of their industry by biologically maladjusted farming
practices, injudicious use of credit and the low
productivity of farm workers (Groenewald, 2000: 368).
When a disastrous drought struck at the end of the
Great Depression of 1929-33, agriculture was in dire
straits, starting an exodus of people from the rural
areas in excess of the natural population increase.
Some products became virtually unsaleable at any
price (De Swardt, 1983). The government was
persuaded that "the problem had become too involved
to be handled by the thousands of ill-organised and
financially weak individuals with conflicting interests"
(Groenewald, 2000: 373) and intervened by having
the 1937 Agricultural Marketing Act passed by
parliament. It embodied the principle of one-channel
marketing through a statutory control board for each
product or group of products. Each Board bought and
sold the total output of the product it was responsible
for at prices determined by the Minister of Agriculture
or the relevant Board. Proceeds of sales were pooled
and distributed among farmers according to their
contributions. When surpluses occurred as the result
of prices, which did not clear the market, they were
stored at high cost, or destroyed, or exported, some-
times at prices lower than those paid by the South
African consumer. This implied subsidisation of
farmers, at the expense of the consumers, eliminated
price fluctuations and conduced to stability in
agriculture. Farmers knew before they committed
themselves to particular volumes of production
(weather permitting) what the price of their product
was going to be and could plan accordingly.
However, without being able to quantify the relative
amounts involved, but judging by national product
statistics, it can be argued that government inter-
vention in the case of manufacturing accorded much
greater benefits to industrialists who were, for the
most part, English speakers. Agriculture, moreover,
has been providing them with some of the foreign ex-
change they needed for their imports of capital and
intermediate goods inputs.
The foundation of the industrialisation process in
South Africa was laid by Gen. Hertzog when he
became Prime Minister in 1924, assisted by his
Ministers of Trade and Industries, FW Beyers, against
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the opposition of the "home" addicts (those who es-
poused the primacy of British interests in South
Africa). The protection of South African industries was
intensified through higher custom duties, effectively
curbing the competitive potential of foreign suppliers.
It was considered a means of creating new jobs,
particularly in view of the wasting nature, and eventual
demise, of the gold mining industry. When the new
government took over in 1948 there were 433 100
persons employed in this economic sector (SARB,
1994, Sept. supplement: B-O) compared to 191 600 in
1924/5 (Unie van Suid-Afrika, 1935/36: 571). It was
during their regime that manufacturing experienced its
most vigorous growth. A concatenation of economic
events and conditions obliged them to institute
measures that were most conducive to such growth.
In 1947 and 1948 "hot" or "funk" money entered the
country on a large scale seeking a haven of financial
security in a world of uncertainty engendered by the
fuel crisis in Britain, the Sterling convertibility crisis,
the fear of a capital levy in that country, the
nationalisation programme of its government, etc.
(Sadie, 1951 (a): 160). By the middle of 1948 these
foreign funds began to move back to their countries of
origin, but not before they had added fuel to the
foreign exchange consuming economic growth of
South Africa and inflationary pressures. The growth
was enhanced by the demand for South African
produce arising from the economic reconstruction of
Europe after the destruction inflicted by the Second
World War and by the international economic
environment that was most hospitable to South
African exports, the world product growing by 4,7 per
cent per annum while international trade was
expanding by 8 per cent per annum (Sadie, 1988(a):
3). But the net foreign exchange-consuming
manufacturing production, coupled with the outflow of
foreign funds, exposed the Achilles heel of the South
African economy: its international balance of
payments tended to be in deficit. To curb or prevent
the loss of foreign exchange reserves, import control
was instituted, followed later by restrictions on the
outward movement of foreign capital. Efforts to
procure an increase in the international price of gold
proved unsuccessful. Accordingly, and in concert with
Britain and the Commonwealth countries, recourse
was had to a 30,5 per cent devaluation of the currency
in 1949, to boost exports and curb imports. Import
control was the most severe measure of protecting
industries: it effectively guaranteed local producers a
portion of the local market unencumbered by foreign
competition, an outcome which custom duties alone
could not achieve.
For the following two decades and longer, import
substitution became the watchword and the engine of
growth in the South African economy (which did not
do much to relieve the pressure on the balance of
payments because of the imported input requirements
of the manufacturing industry). Manufacturing's share
in the economy (gross value added at 1995 prices)
rose from 11,2 per cent in 1948 to 23,0 per cent at the
pinnacle of its achievement in 1981 (compared to
Agriculture's contribution of 4,7 per cent), after which it
tended downwards (SARB 1999, June supplement: B-
16). Over the same period the number employed rose
from 433 100 in 1948 to 1 543 800 with the Black
component expanding from 285 300 to 870 900, and
the White component from 138780 (32%) to 326 500
(21,1%) (Dept. of Statistics, 1976: 7.4; de Lange,
1992: 24). The GOP grew at an almost sustained 4,5
per cent per annum average, raising the level of living
of all sections of the population and not only that of
the Afrikaners. When this growth gave rise to a
scarcity of high level manpower, a vigorous
immigration policy was initiated to attract the required
manpower. During the 1963-1976 period an annual
average of 28 000 persons entered the country (net of
emigration). It has been alleged that this immigration
acted as a substitute for the training of Blacks to
supplement the skills in question. But this would, of
course, have clashed with the government policy of
inhibiting their permanent integration in urban industry
by their occupation of strategic jobs. But, more to the
point, already-trained persons were needed whenever
vacancies or shortages occurred, and had to be
remedied at short notice, and training takes time. Also,
the skilled immigrants had a beneficial effect upon the
employment of unskilled and semi-skilled Blacks. But
Table 7.2 demonstrates that even with regard to the
acquisition of skills, they profited a good deal from the
thriving economy.
Of special interest to Afrikaners was the
assumption of the entrepreneurial function by conse-
cutive NP governments by way of the establishment,
and the expansion of existing parastatals. Best known
among these are Iscor (since privatised), Sasol
(privatised), Eskom, Transnet, Telkom, the Post
Office, the Industrial Development Corporation, the
Development Bank of Southern Africa, the Rand
Water Board, Denel and the Landbank. Many of these
became industrial or financial giants (some as
monopolies) dominating their respective fields, and
served the role of prerequisites for the generation of
economic growth. The asset value of 21 such
parastatals has been estimated at R174 102 million
(Mittner, 2000(a): 5.1). Into these enterprises scarce
savings could be channelled which sought security -
in the form of government bonds - and thus became
economically activated. They created opportunities for
Afrikaners they would otherwise have lacked. To head
these enterprises Afrikaner scientists and others, who
did not have access to English dominated firms in the
private sector, were appointed, thus serving as
training schools for the acquisition of technical know-
how, experience and executive capability which could
be applied in the private sector as well.
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Government action and the concomitant hospitable
economic climate - at least until it was disturbed by a
low intensity civil war after 1976 - also served the
interests of the "infant entrepreneur" - a more
appropriate appellation than "infant industry" - and
thus of the prospective Afrikaner and other business-
men. At the beginning the import control system
militated against Afrikaner business, since permits
were issued on the basis of past performance in this
regard, and they could not demonstrate such
achievement, since they were still at the beginning of
their process of transformation and progress in the
business world. During the war they had already
suffered a disadvantage in allocations arising from the
system of rationing. After representations the permit
system was revised to prevent exclusion of
newcomers. One of the parastatals, the Industrial
Development Corporation could also provide financial
and technical aid to viable enterprises in need of
capital and/or the re-organisation of management. It
had, among others, a section catering for the needs of
smaller concerns, an appropriate institution in an
emerging business community.
In the above context the government intervention
can be depicted as, in part, an operation of helping
people to help themselves by founding institutions
which furthered the cause of self-empowerment.
When the process of empowerment had borne fruit to
render the Afrikaner a meaningful force in the non-
agricultural economy, the interests of Afrikaners and
English businessmen appeared increasingly to
manifest a convergence. Both groups were being
affected by government action which was considered
to be inimical to the private sector as a whole. When
matters of common interest were to be brought to the
attention of government, representatives of both
groups would approach the Ministers concerned,
usually with an Afrikaner as spokesman of the
delegation. A one-time CEO of Sanlam, AD Wasse-
naar, became one of the most outspoken critics of
goverment policy, and doubtlessly voiced the
sentiments of the English business establishment as
well. In his Assault on Private Enterprise (1977), he
referred to "government intrusion into the private
sector" (p.15); "a growth rate of employment in the
public sector in excess of the growth rate of
employment in the private sector must...... be
regarded as a reliable index of excessively increasing
interference" (p. 74). He saw the growth of the public
corporations as a part of a "creeping socialism", and
singled out the Industrial Development Corporation as
one whose "main function has become the
establishment of other state enterprises .... as an
empire builder and as an investment and industrial
conglomerate in competition with private enterprise"
(p.142). In his Squandered Assets (1989), he
commented adversely on government initiatives to
further the interests of the bureaucracy in the public
sector: the buying back of years of pensionable
service, the 15% raise, over and above the 4% to 5%
increase provided by the notches in the salary scales,
in 1988 by the President when the Minister of Finance
and other financial experts were overseas; and the
inordinately favourable pension benefits to Ministers
and members of Parliament and to councillors of local
authorities.
The inference to be drawn was that while
government was promoting the financial interests of
Afrikaners in the civil service, it was doing an injury to
the Afrikaners in the private sector.
7.6 Non-Afrikaner beneficiaries of government
action
The domination of the post-1994 socio-political
scene by the denunciation of the sins of apartheid -
the most grievous of which was the violation of human
dignity, particularly of the majority population group,
the Blacks (Africans) - bears out the Shakespearian
dictum that "evil that men do lives after them, the good
is oft interred with their bones". Reference to the
"good", even though not proffered as a condonation
of, or counterpoise to, the "evil" - the injury to the
human psyche - has apparently become a mal-a-
propos. (Obviously, the two types of action involved
have impacted at different levels of human
experience.) However, deliberate omission of such
reference would introduce bias in the portrayal of
history. As the numerically dominant population group,
the Blacks qualify as the main victims as well as the
principal beneficiaries of government policies and
initiatives. Accordingly, the observations below will, for
the most part, relate to them.
Politico-economic initiatives of the pre-1994
government(s) cushioned the deleterious effects of
economically discriminating legislation. The bark of
the latter was, in the main, worse than its bite, since
its stipulations were at variance with the demands of
the economy in terms of the relative supplies of labour
emanating from the ranks of the White and the Black
population groups respectively. The former could not
provide the manpower necessary to fill all the
vacancies for which the Whites received most
favoured treatment. Until the conditions created by the
"struggle" began to take its toll, the economy gene-
rated increasing opportunities for Blacks and Whites
alike. The numbers of the former in manufacturing, for
example, rose by 4,6 per cent per annum, which was
almost twice that of the total Black labour force. But,
most importantly, as the Whites moved into the higher
skill-demanding jobs, vacancies occurred which were
filled by Blacks to raise significantly the skill compo-
sition of their labour force. This is borne out by the
figures in Table 7.2 which demonstrate that the skill
content of this population group grew a good deal
faster during 1960-1980 than did that of the White
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employed work force. When weights are allotted to the
various categories in accordance with their lower-
order-occupations job creation potential (white-collar
category: 1=7; 11=3; 111=1;IV=O and the blue-collar
category: 11=2; 111=1; IV=O) it is found that the
improvement in skill content of Blacks was 2,2 times
that of Whites. Their Category II numbers, for
example, burgeoned from 35 800 in 1965 to 250 000
in 1985, or at a rate of 10,2 per cent per annum, while
the blue-collar component of this category showed up
even better, at a growth rate of 14,5 per cent per
annum (Sadie, 1991: 175).
TABLE 7.2
GROWTH OF EMPLOYED NUMBERS PER SKILL
CATEGORY AS MULTIPLES OF GROWTH IN THE
AGGREGATE 1960-1980
Whites Blacks
Teachers 1,52 2,11
White-collar Jobs
I Executive 1,35 2,74
II Professional, 1,84 2,00
Technical
III Semi-skilled 1,05 1,56
IV Unskilled 0,77 1,31
Blue-collar Jobs
II Skilled 0,83 8,20
III Semi-skilled 0,62 1,02
IV Unskilled 0,11 0,78
Aggregate 1,0 1,0
Source: Sadie, 2000: 157
It is clear that the skill content of the Black
employed labour force grew rapidly, and much faster
than that of Whites (Afrikaners and English) who, of
course, had a head start by 1960.
Well-nigh uninhibited opportunities for the creation
of jobs for Blacks in the public sector (if not in the
private sector) occurred when the NP government
implemented its "Homelands Policy" as a gesture of
conceding to Blacks in the areas concerned the right to
self-determination, which the White-elected government
claimed for its own supporters. This permitted the
governments and inhabitants of the Homelands to act
and live untrammelled by the iniquities of apartheid.
Those domiciled in the "Common Area" were free to
jOin them if they so desired. The governments of the
Self-governing States and the TBVC regions were not
required to limit their expenditure to the amounts of
revenue collected from their own constituencies, since
they could rely on generous subsidies from the
government in the Common Area which provided the
major portion (more than 80 per cent) of the financing
required. The number of civil servants of all ranks
appointed in the nine states at issue increased rapidly
to reach some 518 000 by 1994 (Inferred from CSS
1994(c), 1995, SSA October 1998).
Before the Homelands' governments assumed
responsibility for their own destiny, the NP govern-
ment had undertaken many projects to promote the
enhancement of traditional subsistence agriculture
and economic growth in general: the reclamation and
conservation of millions of hectares of land; more than
100 000 kilometres of fences put up for grazing camps
and farm layouts; the settling of subsistence farmers
on economic units; improvements in stock-breeding;
the introduction of fish-breeding and other non-
traditional crops such as industrial fibres and sugar
cane; and to enhance the carrying capacity of the
Homelands 5434 000 hectares of land at a cost of R1
220 million were added to their surface area as a gift
from taxpayers (Department of Co-operation and
Development, 1963-1985).
With their assumption of political power in 1948 the
NP government inherited an educational system and
state of affairs in which only 24,5 per cent of Black
children of school-going age were enrolled as pupils.
The government's reaction to the situation was to
initiate a process of mass education to address both
the backlog and the natural increase, which latter was
more than twice that of the White population while, in
time, it founded tertiary institutions for technical,
vocational and academic education. Seven new
universities were established for the benefit of Blacks.
Over the period 1948-1994 Black children enrolled at
school grew at a rate of 5,5 per cent per annum,
compared to a 2,8 per cent per annum increase in the
number of Black children 6-19 years old, raising the
attendance ratio from 24,5 per cent to 84,5 per cent.
From 1984 to 1994 enrolment at Black universities
increased by 15 per cent per annum, or from 36 684
to 148817 (The Education Foundation, 1994: 19),
compared to a 4,1 per cent per annum increase during
1994-1998 (The Education Foundation, 1998: 10).
At the beginning the White/Black per pupil ratio of
government expenditure on education varied around
10 to 1, but declined in course of time to 5,6 to 1 in
1984 and 3,05 in 1994. This differential, to the
detriment of Black children, was not a simple reflection
of discrimination, but was in large measure dictated by
demographic forces: (i) Black children represented the
dominant majority of the school population - by 1994
there were 9 246 000 of them compared to 977 000
White children; (ii) they grew fastest in number so that
their primary/secondary pupil ratio was, at 2,7 to 1,
almost double that of Whites; (iii) their classes were
heavily weighted with repeaters. Factors (ii) and (iii)
were responsible for 47 per cent of the differential,
while the lower qualifications of Black teachers
accounted for an additional 23 per cent. Because of
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their numerical preponderance the absolute amounts
spent on their education (in 1994) was more than
twice that spent on White pupils, the per capita
differential notwithstanding.
From the curricula it cannot be inferred that Bantu
Education had, intrinsically, to be of inferior nature. A
critic of the government of the time wrote that "the
syllabuses for primary schools appear to be edu-
cationally sound and, one is glad to know, have been
revised in accordance with modern approaches and
methods" (Horrell, 1968: 150), while the syllabuses for
the junior and senior certificates conformed to those
complied with in schools for White children. And
mother tongue instruction and adaptation of curricula
to a community's social and economic conditions were
endorsed as received pedagogical principle at an
African Education Conference sponsored by Unesco
and the Organisation of African Unity (Unesco, 1994:
138). It would appear that opposition to Bantu
Education emanated from its separate enactment
which was perceived as another weapon in the
armoury of the apartheid system and, therefore,
inferior by definition; particularly, as its introduction
was accompanied by a ministerial pronouncement that
"education must train and educate people in accor-
dance with their opportunities in life ... Education
should thus stand with both feet in the Reserves (the
Homelands) and have its roots in the spirit and being
of a Bantu Society" (Hansard, 1953, column 3585).
This was in accordance with the government's vision
that the Homelands were going to be the areas of self-
determination for Blacks in which they were supposed
to create "their opportunities in life".
The government could obviously not decree that
Bantu Education be inferior, because its academic
status could be determined by teachers in co-
operation with pupils. But they did not hanker for its
success; they opted for liberation before education
and acted accordingly. In the event, the per capita
expenditure differential was rendered inconsequential.
Economic resources were wasted. A generation of
illiterates ensued.
Another positive initiative of the pre-1994 govern-
ment assumed the form of a Population Development
Programme (PDP) which made family planning
services available to all in need of them. The purpose
of the PDP was to establish the concept, and further
the implementation, of provident parenthood and
heighten the consciousness ofthe economic effects of
improvident parenthood on a family's welfare. It
benefited the Blacks most since they exhibited the
highest levels of fertility among the four main ethnic
groups, and experienced the economically most
inimical youthful age structure. The PDP, in con-
junction with urbanisation, increased participation of
women in the wage-labour market and rising living
standards, brought about a lowering of their total
fertility rate (TFR) from 6,75 during 1951-1960 to 3,7
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by 1996. The percentage of the population in the
economically active ages 15-64 increased from a low
of 52,2 per cent in 1970 to 59,4 per cent by 2001,
while the youthful portion, 0-14 years old, declined
from 44,2 per cent to 36,9 per cent (Sadie, 1988(b):
48; 1993: 22-25). The diminishing TFR, coupled with
urbanisation and improving medical services raised
their average life expectancy at birth from 41 to 63
years. The infant mortality rate, the most sensitive
indicator of a community's physical well-being,
declined from 162 to 55 per 1000 births, or by 66 per
cent between 1948 and 1994" (Sadie, 1988(b): 45).
In family context the demographic changes meant
fewer children requiring the vital attention of the
parents, less pressure on the breadwinner's financial
resources, more children reaching the age of entry
into the labour market, a greater ability to finance
longer educational careers for children who would be
better prepared for the labour market and higher
average living standards.
The above developments promoted an appreciable
increase in Blacks' disposable personal income per
capita at a rate of 1~ times that of Whites; so that the
differential ratio declined from 11,7 to 1 in 1960 to 9,9 to
1 in 1975 and to 7,4 to 1 in 1995. The 1995 ratio
becomes 6,0 to 1when incomes are related to the 15-64
age group instead of the total population, the lowering
reflecting the effect of the demographic factor (Nel, 1975;
Nel et al.,1984; Martins, 1989; Martins et a/.,1994; Van
Wyk, 1995). Even during the years of economic
stagnation after 1981, until the new government took
over, when the average income of Whites were
diminishing at a rate of 1,17 per cent per annum, that of
Blacks continued to grow by 0,4 per cent per annum.
The government contributed to their personal
income by way of cash transfers, while social
transfers in kind (government services rendered for
which no payment was exacted) not reflected in their
income, raised their effective levels of living. In 1994
the total amount of cash dispensed to all four
population groups was R17 357 million, while
transfers in kind amounted to R43 084 million: a total
of R60 441 million in allocable expenditure (SA
Reserve Bank, 1999 June: B.169). The quest is: how
much of this amount could be apportioned to the
Black population as beneficiaries, and how much did
they contribute, in the form of taxes, to the financing
of benefits received, to arrive at an estimate of the
amount of redistribution involved? It is known, for
example, that R5 825 million was paid out in old age
pensions to Blacks compared to R1 289 million to
non-Blacks (Central Statistical Service, 1995: 6.1).
But the required statistics on other items of
expenditure were not readily available and had to be
inferred from diverse sources of information. In some
instances the writer had to rely on ratios which
pertained to years before 1994. Table 7.3 presents
the (minimalist) outcome of the enquiry.
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TABLE 7.3
ALLOCABLE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON
BLACKS 1994
R'OOO000
9880
14340
7530
1 850
33600
Tax contribution 23400
Net transfer 10 200
Sources: Martins et al.1994; Van Wyk. 1995; RSA. 1990, 1994;
The figures in Table 7.3 signify that Blacks
contributed some R23 400 million to government
revenue while receiving R33 600 million in allocable
cash and in-kind transfers from government, which
represents a net redistribution of resources in their
favour. It means that their contribution to the fiscus
yielded them a net return of 44 per cent and a gross
return for 144 per cent. Implicit in the above
computations is the assumption that Blacks do not
have to contribute to the financing of the adminis-
tration of the country, the interest on public debt, the
cost of defence, policing and justice and other non-
allocable expenditures. If it is accepted that they
should be debited with an amount based on the ratio
of their personal income to the GOP, R16 440 million
should be added to the benefits received in the
redistribution process. (The amount becomes R22 260
million if the ratio of their personal income to total
personal income of all four ethnic groups is used.) In
the event, the net transfer involved in the redistribution
is R26 640 million, yielding a net and gross return to
their tax contribution of 114 per cent and 214 per cent
respectively. This required an unrequited contribution
by non-Blacks to the fiscus of just over R40 000
million, Le. for which they did not receive allocable
government services in return. This redistributive
process was in large measure responsible for national
budget deficits on current account (current
expenditure exceeding current revenue) which started
at R890 million in 1982 and reached R28 330 million
in 1994, adding to the public debt which burdened
the annual budget with an extra R14 580 million in
interest (SARB, 1996, S-61; Supplement to June,
1999: B-169).
Those who - in face of the above facts - still prefer
to avoid crediting the pre-1994 government with some
benevolence, can opt for an accolade to the non-Black
(and particularly White) taxpayers.
7.7 Parallels between pre- and post-1994
government action?
It has been suggested that parallels can be drawn
between the pre- and post-1994 governments in that
the latter is doing no more than favouring and
benefiting the Blacks in a fashion similar to that
practised by the former to further the interests of
Afrikaners and other Whites. Both could presumably
qualify for the characterisation of pigmentocracies, but
the content, the modus operandi and the scope and
the economic effects of the two approaches are
appreciably different.
The stage for the Afrikaners' empowerment was
set when, at the 1939 economic conference, it was
declared that "a nation rescues itself' and "if we don't
rescue ourselves, nobody else will". The better off
Afrikaners believed that they had a moral obligation to
arrest the retrogradation of their less fortunate fellow-
men. The main theme was self-empowerment. The
British, or their South African appendage, were not
called upon to make restitution for their role in the
pauperisation process through the destruction of
wealth and other outrages committed, and violation of
their human dignity. When Federale Mynbou acquired
control over an existing company, General Mining, an
Afrikaans newspaper Die Vader/and decried it as a
renunciation of the principle of self-empowerment
(Schoeman, 1980: 82).
A great deal of the policies pursued by the post-1994
government(s) appears to have premised a unique
causality founded in the aetiology of apartheid as the
root of all ills of South Africa, which warranted restitution
for the disadvantaged. When the New National Party
negotiated an agreement of political co-operation with
the ANC in 2001; it had to endorse a statement of
commitment to seven principles, three of which read as
follows: to acknowledge the injustices of the past; to
honour those who had suffered in the interest of justice
and freedom; and to make restitution for the injustices of
the past (Die Burger, 2001: 2). Redress of an economic
nature was being sought for what was, primarily, injury to
peoples' psyches, which has no, or an indeterminate
market value. To justify congruent action, words such as
transformation, Black empowerment and affirmative
action were(are) employed, ostensibly to embody self-
evident verities which brook no critical enquiry. The buzz
words also had to serve the purpose of underpinning the
establishment of the commanding presence of Blacks,
and some others ofthe correct political persuasion, in all
walks of life and all seats of power "from sports to
economic activity, so that they would emit an Africa
character" (Tsedu, 1999: 14), in accordance with the role
of demographic "representivity". The ANC secretary-
general, asked in an interview what he wished to
transform, he replied "everything" (Retief, 1998: 10). In a
sample survey carried out at the beginning of 2001 it
was found that more than "50 per cent of Africans feel
Whites will have to accept second place in what is
basically an African country, that affirmative action
should be carried out further and that Whites have to be
forced to make sacrifices for Black advancement"
(Schlemmer, 2001: 1). There has been no discernible
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suggestion of the acceptance of some own responsibility
for at least part of their economic arrearage. (A Black
businessman, who achieved success during the
apartheid era, warned against the "indipe" or "begging
bowl" mentality (N Motlana, 1991, August 25), while
another Black leader counselled that individuals and not
groups be empowered (Sono, 1999)).
The transformation was carried into effect ex-
peditiously. Black empowerment - apart from the self-
empowerment emanating from the successful Black
entrepreneurs of the pre-1994 era - became a
government-driven operation arising from political
power and the spoils of political patronage, while
White business - presumably to establish auspicious
relationships with government and Black clients - co-
operated. (Sanlam was a pioneer in this regard.) The
most conspicuous of the post-1994 African business-
men became managers, managing directors and
directors by way of transfer of existing assets and
appointments to the boards of directors in existing
companies. This contrasts with the Afrikaners' em-
powerment process, which did not involve mere
redistribution of assets, but generated new productive
measures.
The transfers from formerly White-controlled
business to Black empowerment enterprises was
accomplished with a minimum of cash investment and
a maximum of borrowing, rights issues, redeemable
preference shares, the issuance of N-shares, instal-
ment buying of shares and business pyramids. In the
case of Anglo-American's promotion of Black
Economic Empowerment (BEE), for example, it was
noted that "concessions were necessary since most of
the transactions could not have been carried through if
they were handled in terms of normal commercial
practices" (Von Keyserlingk, 2001: 6).
Legislation provided for the establishment of a
National Empowerment Fund for "the historically
disadvantaged persons" which had its capital expen-
diture and operating costs funded by parliamentary
appropriations, apart from income generated by the
Fund itself. Only Black South Africans, or companies
run by them, could become shareholders who would
benefit from the concession that the Fund could
acquire shares in state-owned enterprises at prices
"less than the market related price of the share" (RSA,
1998( a) B-121, 0-98, Section 23(b)). The Competition
Bill, which prohibits restrictive practices such as price
fixing, collusive tendering and abuses arising from
dominant positions in an industry allowed for exemp-
tion from these regulations in the case of Black firms
(RSA, 1998(c) B-128-98, Section 10). When govern-
ment contracts are put out to tender, Black tenderers
will enjoy a price preference of 20 points out of 100
when the contract is worth R500 000 or less, and 10
points if it exceeds R500 000; which means that price
competition as a consideration in the awarding of
contracts will have a weight of 80 per cent and 90 per
cent respectively, and not 100 per cent (Leuvenvink,
2001: 2).
This eventuated after Black businessmen had
complained that a uniform 90 per cent weight accor-
ded to the price factor was too much (Business Day,
1999). It has also been suggested that BEE com-
panies were given a better chance of securing
government contracts by way of the specification of
projects to be competed for (Coetzee, 1999: 16.)
The BEE Commission's recommendations confirm
the quest for empowerment by entitlement through
government intervention. Its executive summary report
declares that "an Integrated National BEE Strategy is
integral to transformation and growth. This has to be a
state-driven programme" to which end a National BEE
Act has to be passed that defines BEE and sets
guidelines. The view that the process cannot succeed
without government involvement has also been aired by
other prominent Black businessmen (Van Zyl, 2001: 1;
Du Toit, 2001: 3; Mazwai, 2000: 23). Some ofthe targets
to be achieved within 10 years as formulated by the BEE
Commission comprise the following: representation of
Blacks in productive land ownership, 30 per cent; equity
participation in each sector of the economy, 25 per
cents; JSE shares, 25 per cent; JSE directors, 40 per
cent; private sector procurement, 30 per cent; senior and
executive management in private sector companies, 40
per cent. Proposals for government intervention include
the following: "At least 30 per cent of the equity of
restructured state-owned enterprises should be owned
by Black companies and collective enterprises; at least
30 per cent of long-term contracts and concessions
within the public sector should incorporate Black-owned
companies and collective enterprises; at least 40 per
cent of government incentives to the private sector
should go to Black companies; at least 50 per cent of
state-owned and government procurement ... should go
to Black companies and collective enterprises; in the
proposed public restructuring programme the following
measures should always be considered: discounts,
deferred payment; terms where possible, new BEE
funding mechanisms including claw back, earn-in and
vendor funding; where a contract is awarded to an
established firm, government should stipulate conditions
demanding targets for ownership changes, skills
transfer, and the inclusion of Black sub-contractors
during execution and set aside a portion of each contract
exclusively for Black suppliers; every public offering of
a state-owned enterprise must have a significant retain
scheme with a discount to encourage Black participation"
(South African Institute of Race Relations, 2001, May:
5-8).
The ANC government (short for the ANCI
COSATU/SACP Alliance government) has been
acting in a number of ways to implement the policy of
Black empowerment. Regional Share Funds have
been founded to provide risk capital to small firms
(Swart, 2000: 2). "Previously disadvantaged groups"
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were accorded greater export incentives than others.
The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) has, in-
creasingly, been focussing attention on BEE which
involved a rise in financial aid from R262 million in
1998 to R506 million in 1999 (Mittner, 1999; de Lange,
1999). In the year 2000 27 per cent of new loans
could be attributed to BEE transactions (Mittner,
2000(a): 1); and in that year the IDC "made a
provision of R200 million against possible bad debts in
its investment in BEE companies" (Finance Week,
2000(b): 4). Eskom's contribution is in the form of
providing a guaranteed market for coal produced by
BEE companies. The Department of Public Works
regards itself as the forerunner in the BEE stakes,
having spent more than R775 million during the first
six months of 200 1 to this end by way of procurement
programmes, while it has allocated R600 million to
coach Black contractors how to tender for projects as
fully-fledged contractors instead of sub-contractors
(Duvenhage, 2001: 1). A task force was appointed to
determine how BEE could become a reality in the oil
industry, a target of a 25 per cent share for BEE
having been set as a conditions of deregulation
(SakeBurger, 2000: SA). With the privatisation of
SAFCOL, the forestry parastatal, 10 per cent of the
shares had to go to Empowerment Companies (IFR,
1999).
Black-controlled companies have been awarded
contracts whose value, as a percentage of that of all
government contracts put out to tender, bears no relation
to their contribution to the GDP. For example, during
nine months of 1998 the value was R4 100 million out of
an aggregate of R8 600 million (Finance Week, 1999(a):
7). It can happen that contracts are awarded to tenderers
who have no record of experience of the productive
processes involved. In the bidding for the acquisition of
state forests, for instance, it was claimed that "many
empowerment companies bring nothing to the table.
Most add neither management expertise nor money"
(Finance Week, 1999(b): 9).
All this makes for the use of Black "fronts" by
White-controlled companies as well as many mergers
and acquisitions to introduce a BEE component into
such firms or to transfer control to BEE companies. It
has been reported, for instance, that during 1998
there were 111 transactions of this nature with a value
of R21 000 million compared to 52 transactions worth
R8 300 million in 1997 (Booyens, 1999; Reuter, 1999).
Though estimates of the market capitalisation of BEE
companies on the JSE Securities differ, it would
appear that at the crest of the wave in 1998 it had
reached a 9,6 per cent share. It has diminished since
then (McGregor, 1999).
There is no parallel between the above starting-at-
the-top process of asset redistribution of BEE,
extensively promoted by government intervention, and
the starting-at-the-bottom "hard-slog" (expression
used by Bruton, 1998) of the Afrikaner in his quest for
progress in the non-agricultural sectors of the eco-
nomy.
A conclusion of similar nature holds good with
regard to the ANC government's policy of Affirmative
Action (AA), the second main string to the trans-
formation bow. On the surface it might appear that AA
is no more than the obverse of, and restitution for, the
discrimination practised by the NP government which
inhibited the free competition of Blacks with Whites in
the labour market. However, the surface can be
deceptive: the character, the incidence and the
economic effects were decidedly different.
When the National Party took over the reigns of
government in 1948, continuity in public administration
was ensured by an official bureaucracy steeped in a
corruption-free tradition, whose members owed their
positions, by and large, to academic qualifications,
years of experience and know-how. Those in
command of departments rose through the ranks to
become competent professionals. Change was
marked by gradualism. The change in government in
1994 was characterised by disrupting discontinuity.
Precipitate change was the order of the day with AA
as the byword for the establishment of ANC dominion.
The llPOW motive was very much in evidence in the
pronouncement of the government's chief of Com-
munications Services that transformation comprised
"the extension of the national liberation movement's
power over the defence force, the police, the
bureaucracy, the intelligence structures, the judiciary,
parastatals, the public broadcast, the central bank,
etc. etc." (Du Toit, 1998). Such action was to be
reinforced by support from the private sector in that a
Deployment Committee of the ANC had to ensure that
BEE companies were headed by ANC supporters who
could be called upon to buttress government policy
and initiatives when the need arose. (It has been
depicted as crony capitalism (Sono, 1999: 21 ).)
According to the White Paper on Affirmative Action
in the Public Service (RSA, 1998(b)) three designated
groups, namely Blacks (in this case a generic term for
Blacks/Africans, Indians and Coloureds), women and
persons suffering from disabilities, had to be targeted in
AA employment to render the public service represen-
tative of "the make-up of the population within all
occupational classes and at all post levels of the public
service". A distinction is drawn between "unfair" and
"not unfair" discrimination. The former refers to "mea-
sures, attitudes and behaviour that obstruct the
enjoyment of equal rights and opportunities in em-
ployment for Black people, women and people with
disabilities" (p. 51). The Employment Equity Bill, section
6(1), states that it is not unfair discrimination to take AA
measures. By inference, discrimination againstthe non-
designated group(s), Le. Whites in particular, which
occurs in the process of discrimination in favour of the
designated group(s), would be legitimate and not unfair.
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However, since pigmentation, gender and physical
disability on their own could not qualify as norms for the
suitability of a candidate for employment, some further
yardsticks had to be framed. The process has gone
through a number of stages, the ANC having stated
that it wished "to get rid of merit as an overriding
principle in the appointment of public servants" (SA
Institute of Race Relations, 1997: 22). Renouncing
traditional "standards" (or proven merit in the Euro-
centric tradition) as a criterion, "competence" was
offered as a more appropriate one (Central Statistical
Service, 1994(b )). But a sub-committee of the Constitu-
tional Committee considered that "competency" would
be too severe a requirement since it would "exclude
people without specific quailfications and experience"
(Constitutional Assembly, 1995), and substituted
"ability" for "competency". The "ability" requirement was
toned down in the Employment Equity Bill by adding the
"capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the
ability to do the job" (RSA 1998(d), 13 60B-98). Finally,
"potential" seems to have become the effective criterion
when the White Paper on Affirmative Action in the
Public Service prescribed that selection panels be
"appropriately trained in selection and interviewing
techniques especially for identifying potential" (1998(b),
par. 3.33). The only logical conclusion is that the rule of
meritocracy was being jettisoned.
The same White Paper formulated the AA targets
to be achieved: "Within four years all departmental
establishments must endeavour to be at least 50 per
cent Black at management level. During the same
period at least 30 per cent of new recruits to the
middle and senior management-echelons should be
women ... " (Ch. 10.6). Officials responsible for
appointments who did not achieve set quotas would
be subject to punitive measures. The Public Service
was not going to "entertain an apologist stance to
Affirmative Action nor should any individual from the
historically disadvantaged feel apologetic about
benefiting directly from the programme" (RSA,
1998(b), par 1.18). And Mandela in his 1998 State of
the Nation address to parliament proclaimed that "we
shall not be discouraged by the sirens of self-interest
that are being sounded in defence of privilege, and the
insults that equate women, Africans, Indians and
Coloureds and the disabled with a lowering of
standards" (Government Communications, 1998: 4).
The metamorphosis of the criterion of suitability
from "standards" to "potential" permitted of the
creation of instant directors-general, deputy directors-
general and other heads of departments, executives
of parastatals, generals, diplomats, etc. where lack of
experience and know-how could wreak great eco-
nomic damage. The NP government's discrimination
impacted most on lower skilled echelons, did relatively
little or no harm to public administration and the eco-
nomy at large and was not accompanied by a decline
in the number of Blacks employed, but by an increase,
and not only at the lowest occupational levels. Amidst
discrimination the principle of meritocracy was not
discarded for the most part. Discrimination that did
occur at senior levels was mostly against dissident
Whites.
Within four years of taking office the ANC-in-
government had already appointed 28 of the 35
directors-general and departmental heads of similar
status. Only one of the nine provinces had a director-
general who served underthe previous government. A
White head of a department has become an oddity. Of
the 65 deputy-directors-general at national level, 47
owed their appointment to the ANC (Capraro, 1998:
9). The national director of public prosecutions and the
new president of the Reserve Bank were deployed
from the ranks of ANC politicians and a new chief
justice was publicly favoured by Mandela, ahead of a
decision by the Judicial Services Commission which
was supposed to come to a decision independently of
political considerations or intervention. All conceivable
seats of power over which government holds sway
was filled by Blacks or others of the correct political
persuasion. Demographic "representivity" was
evidently not a condition. The White incumbents were
required to accept early retirement. It is not known
precisely how many of them have become victims of
displacement. In respect of the formal sector of the
economy as a whole Whiteford & Van Seventer found
that "the majority of the job losses over the period
(1991-96) were borne by Whites, with White em-
ployment declining by almost 10 per cent, amounting
to a loss of 186 000 jobs" (2000:24). The number of
Whites employed in the first and second tier public
administrations appear to have been reduced by
45 800 between June 1994 and December 1997
(CSS, 1997(a)). Most of these have probably been
senior members of the civil service. Of 11 000 non-
executive jObs especially created for AA purposes,
which presumably required pertinent professional
knowledge, only one-third had been filled, while
another third were rescinded.
It does not appear as if the loss of expertise
through displacements has been compensated for by
the employment of thousands of consultants at high
fees (varying from R510 to R890 per hour), who,
during the two years 2000 and 2001, for example,
have been paid R2 300 million (Finance Week, 2001:
42; Gunning, 2001: 21).
In sum, after 1994 a policy of employment sub-
stitution has been pursued, entailing a loss of jobs for
another component of the labour force (mostly
Afrikaners). The NP government's discrimination was,
contrawise, accompanied by increased employment
for all population groups. The number of Blacks
employed in the first and second tiers of government
during their term of office grew from 162 200 in 1960
to 778 100 by June 1994, or at a rate some 55 per
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cent higher than that of Whites (Bureau of Statistics,
1964: H-38; CSS, 1997(a): 7). And there was no loss
of professional profiency and disruption in service
delivery involved. To the extent that there was some
substitution in the gross, stemming from National
Party discrimination it was in favour of a minority. The
ANC's favouring of a majority group was bound to
take a greater toll. Again, the NP practised dis-
crimination in favour, for the most part, of the lower
skilled Whites; the ANC's discrimination favours a
Black elite.
What with AA accepting "potential" as sufficient
condition for appointment to posts, it inevitably implied
the substitution of inexperience for experience; of the
lesser qualified for the better qualified. As a matter of
simple likelihood the policy could not but induce a
deterioration in the standards of public service
delivery. Whatever the enthusiasm or passion of the
new incumbents might have been it could not
compensate for the experience-induced know-how
required of a successful bureaucracy. Many reports
bear testimony to the outcome.
The Auditor-General, in his annual reports, has
repeatedly drawn attention to the unsatisfactory
conditions prevailing in the public service. In his 1997
Report he wrote: "many of the problems are caused
by a shortage of staff with the necessary experience
and skills and the proper training for newly appointed
staff' (RSA, 1997). In his 2001 Report he concluded
that a shortage of capable personnel at operational
and managerial level to implement government policy
effectively and economically remained one of the
crucial problems of official structures, with deficient
financing managerial ability as the single most
important factor (Leuvenvink, 2001). A 15 member
audit team appointed by the DG of the Department of
Public Service and Administration found that the
replacement of White public servants by way of early
retirement resulted "in a lack of skills and expertise,
that most provinces had no qualified financial
managers and that unqualified finance personnel were
administering budgets of billions in the absence of
proper financial management training and skills"
(Shindler, 1998). The Deputy Minister of Safety and
Security maintained: "We are inclined to say that
Afrikaners had their chance, and then we appoint
people in their place who do not do the job or we look
for candidates overseas" (Van Burick, 2001: 12).
The following episode (confirmed by the DG of the
department at issue) demonstrates how AA can
become a source for the practice of nepotism. The
Minister of Foreign Affairs submitted the names of 30
persons to the Ministers of Public Service and
Administration for appointment to posts in the
diplomatic service, for most of which a baccalaureate
plus ten years of experience was the customary
prerequisite. In respect of 8 there was no mention of a
previous employer or experience. For a further 9 no
CVs were submitted. One of them was appointed to a
senior post in Norway and another became High
Commissioner in Pakistan (Gunning, 1997). And a
one-time partner of the Minister of Justice who had
been disbarred for the misappropriation of funds was
offered an appointment as consul-general in India
(which he turned down after a public outcry - Braid,
1999).
A well-known ANC member who resigned her
position as member of two Commissions described
her experience in these Commissions as "virtually a
nightmare". She attested that doing one's best in the
company of persons not properly skilled was con-
sidered reactionary. Frustrated commissioners were
reluctant to expose the incompetence of some Black
members - who considered themselves entitled to
their jobs because of their "struggle" career - since it
would have been regarded as racist (Kadalie, 1999).
Bureaucratic shortcomings are exacerbated when
they are accompanied by corruption which can include
fraud, theft, bribery, nepotism and wilful mal-adminis-
tration (which does not stem purely from ignorance or
incompetence). The true incidence of corruption under
the pre-1994 government cannot be known if there had
been some covering up; but the most conspicuous
instances have been exposed and seemed to have been
induced by political power maintained over too many
decades. The frequency of reported incidents among the
ranks of the new regime accords them the complexion of
not being a few isolated instances, and they are
occurring at the inception of the new government's term
of office and not after many decades in power. The
findings of the Auditor-General, various commissioners
such as the Heath Commission, researchers of political
parties, journalists reporting from parliament or practising
investigative journalism, and individuals appointed to
investigate alleged irregularities, have the air of a litany
of transgressions. The findings of two sources of
information can serve as illustration. The Corruption
Barometer, 1994-1998 of the New National Party listed
911 cases of fraud, theft and maladministration for
personal gain which occurred during the first four years
in the life of the new government, involving an amount of
R21 000 million for which top officials at both the first and
second tier government levels had been responsible
(Vorster, 1998). The Auditor-General disclosed that in
one of the nine provinces some R700 million had been
lost during 1994-1998 as the result of unlawful
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promotions and of salaries paid to between 26 000 and
30 000 ghost officials. (For further evidence cf. Sadie,
2000: 368-375.) Mandela, for one inveighed against "the
freedom fighters who had become corrupt after
becoming members of the government ... stealing
money intended for our children" (Sadovsky, 1998).
The AA policy has not been confined to the public
sector. Private sector enterprises employing 50 or
more persons (designated employers) are coerced by
law to institute AA measures "to ensure that suitably
qualified members of the designated groups (Blacks,
women, disabled persons) have equal opportunities
and are equitably represented in all occupational
categories and levels in the workforce of a designated
employer" (RSA, 1998(d) section 15(1 )). The state-
ment that this is not to be interpreted as "an absolute
barrier to the prospective or continued employment or
advancement of people who are not from the
designated groups" (section 15(4)) - which means
that exceptions are not wholly excluded - confirms the
rule. "Suitably qualified" need mean no more than "a
capacity to acquire within a reasonable time the ability
to do the job" (section 20(3)), while an "employer may
not unjustly discriminate against a person solely on
the grounds of that person's lack of relevant
experience" (section 20(5)). Employers are required to
prepare plans to show how progress is due to be
made towards the implementation of the AA goals
over a period of one to five years. Thereafter job
audits are to be submitted which reflect the
demographic profile of their labour force at various
occupational levels. Contravention of the law would be
punishable by fines ranging up to R800 000, and the
burden of proof would be on the employer.
It is clear that the rule of meritocracy and the
Eurocentric principle of striving for excellence - the
source of nourishment of economic progress - are
spurned. There is no parallel to be discovered in the
agenda of the pre-1994 govern ment.
While the latter, as a result of looking after its poor,
contributed to stability of income distribution among
Afrikaners, the new government favoured its political
elite and middle class to exacerbate the inequality of
income among its supporters (Whiteford & Van
Seventer, 2000: 23).
In sum, differences between the past and the
present regimes are much more in evidence than
similarities.
CHAPTER 8
EDUCATION AND OCCUPATIONAL
ADVANCEMENT
8.1 Education
The major force in the economic progress of the
Afrikaners was the high rate of human capital for-
mation, which assumed, in a way, the role of a
substitute for, and cherished above, physical capital
and its financial counterpart, which they lacked. It
proved to be of inestimable value in their economic
advancement.
During the era of pastoralism the knowledge that
was needed did not require book learning, but related
to the chores around the homestead. School and
academic education was not considered, and was,
indeed, not relevant. Rural parents on the whole were
satisfied to allow their children an education which
was adequate to permit their being confirmed as
members of the congregation. And as long as the
philosophy of "back to the land" prevailed, education
of the youth languished. It was reported that in a 1932
sample survey it was found that one-half of Transvaal
boys and almost two-thirds of Free State boys opted
for farming as their preferred occupation (Malherbe,
1933: 15) amidst an exodus of people from farming
areas. Several authors commented upon the mise-
rable state of Afrikaners' educational achievement at
the time. The 1932 Carnegie Commission maintained
that the rural population did not hold school education
in high esteem since it was not required for survival in
the pastoral economy. In 1910 only 5,6 per cent of
Transvaal pupils were to be found in the secondary
school grades (Symington, 1944 : 238). One of the
reasons was the Education Act of 1907, which
decreed that promotion to a higher grade was
conditional upon the compliance with the requirements
of English as a school subject. No such condition
applied in respect of Dutch (Afrikaans). And there was
only one high school with Dutch/Afrikaans as medium
of instruction. Poverty, too, whether as a manifestation
of a culture or a simple phenomenon of cumulative
causation, took its toll. If the 40,3% incidence of
malnutrition among White boys, as found by the Dept.
of Public Health in 1939, can serve as an intimation of
prevalence of poverty, it must have had a pernicious
effect on the ability of such children to benefit
effectively from educational facilities, having regard to
the apathy that is induced by malnutrition (Coetzee
1942:49).
In the early days ofthe twentieth century many of the
teachers were under-qualified. However, it has been
asseverated that they regarded their profession as a
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vocation. "They were inspired by a sacrificing, almost
sacred, sense of duty to provide children with education
of quality. They did not strike for higher salaries [which
would have been considered infra dig]; they did not miss
classes without very good reason ... they could not
afford the cost of improving their academic qualifications,
but equipped themselves better by self-education"
(Zietsman, 2000: 6 - freely translated). They disciplined
themselves and their pupils who respected the authority
of the teacher and accepted it as an ingredient of
education, so that those who progressed through the
school system received a thorough grounding, even if it
did not allow much scope for self-expression. The three
R's received ample attention.
Although the improvement in the educational
status of the people was a gradual process, the great
push forward or, at least, a significant acceleration
appears to have occurred around the end of the
1930s. Three events that proved to be of seminal
nature in this process were (i) the recognition of equal
status for Dutch (later Afrikaans) in the 1910
constitution of the Union of South Africa; (ii) the
founding of the Helpmekaar fund; and (iii) the
philanthropic actions of Mr Jannie Marais. The
Helpmekaar (Mutual Aid) fund came into being to help
those who participated in the 1914 rebellion and were
held responsible for damages incurred. The amount
left after all claims had been settled and financial aid
provided to those who had been impoverished by the
rebellion, formed the nucleus of a fund which was
used to promote the education of promising young
men and women who could otherwise not afford to
continue their studies at school or university. 6 Some of
the persons thus aided became leaders in their
respective fields of study, such as Professor CGW
Schumann, dean of the Faculty of Commerce of the
University of Stellenbosch for almost three decades.
Others were Dr MH de Kock, one-time governor of the
South African Reserve Bank, the heart surgeons
pioneers Chris and Marius Barnard, and the
educationist MC Botha. The Fund has been continuing
its activities ever since. In 1996 its management
initiated a new project which concentrated on students
who showed promise of assuming the entrepreneurial
function rather than becoming employees.
The third event occurred when the establishment of
the University of Stellenbosch as an autonomous
Afrikaans tertiary institution was in the balance. The
issue was decided by the bequest of £100000 by Jannie
6. Sadie, 1966:27 (Privy Council Office, reproduced with the
permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government
Services Canada 2001).
Marais (one of the few Afrikaners who shared in the
fortunes of the Kimberley diamond industry). He also
bequeathed £60 000 to Het Jan Marais Nationale Fonds,
which was to be used, and is still being used, to promote
the Afrikaner cause. By the end of the twentieth century
the assets of the Fund, as a result of successful invest-
ments, amounted to some millions of Rand.
When the drive towards higher levels gathered
speed - most parents desiring their children to have a
better education than they enjoyed, even at the cost of
great personal sacrifice - there was a tendency to
concentrate on "book-learning" of a general nature,
non-specific with respect to future occupations, except
in so far as it allowed access to postgraduate degrees
or baccalaureates or diplomas in teaching, the
ministry of religion, or the legal profession. Since at
the outset the acquisition of an academic handle - a
token of achievement - seemed to have been the
prime objective; the soft options among the subjects
that could be studied would serve the purpose. Mathe-
matics and the natural sciences were preferably
eschewed, and the more occupationally orientated
studies in engineering, medicine, economics, business
economics, accountancy, etc. received scant
attention. The Arts faculties at universities
bourgeoned. The 1970 Population Census showed up
the following shares of Afrikaners among holders of
five types of certificates, diplomas and degrees:
General acade'11iceducation 69%
Degree in Agriculture 68%
Specialized BComm degree 24,8%
BSc Engineering 21,8%
Craftsmanship and Artisanship 39%
(Source: 1970 Population Census, Volume 02-01-09)
It is seen that Afrikaners dominated in the category
of general education. It was regarded as a passport to
a white-collar job, which, in their view, had a status
superior to that on the factory floor.
There prevailed a sentiment and/or prejudice
against vocational and technical training in industrial
schools and similar institutions, which provided access
to blue-collar jobs. The latter were associated with
indigence and an inferior status (Pauw, 1945: 100).
The provisions of the Apprenticeship Act were also to
blame: the age-of-entry restriction, the long training
period, the low wages earned during this period and
the inefficiency of technical classes available to
apprentices. Again, the skilled trades environment
was not convivial to the Afrikaner. To him it had a
foreign character: it was dominated by foreigners -
imported from England or the result of independent
immigration - for whom the mine owners, in particular,
manifested a decided preference (Esterhuizen, 1965:
172-176); and the trade union leaders were nurtured
in the traditions of the British workshop, and
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maintained the exclusiveness of an industrial elite
whose interests had to be jealously guarded. When
the Afrikaners entered the (to them) unfamiliar urban
industrial world, they encountered active hostility on
the part of the existing labour force. Amongst others,
the latter attempted to exclude Afrikaner apprentices
from certain occupational categories (O'Meara, 1983:
241). The Trades and Labour Council, which came
into being in 1903, saw to it that the British workers'
interests would not be endangered by the appointment
of burghers of the ex-republics. In 1904 even unskilled
workers (navvies) were imported from England for
railway construction, but proved to be so unsatis-
factory in their work performance that the recruitment
was terminated in the same year.
When Afrikaner railway workers entered the arena of
trade unionism by establishing their own organisation,
Spoorbond, whose membership soon exceeded that of
the other labour organisations, the Railways' manage-
ment denied it recognition as representative of
personnel, terminated stop order facilities and prohibited
it from canvassing members on Railway premises
(Pauw, 1945: 209). When Afrikaners formed an own
Afrikanerbond van Mynwerkers (ABM - League of
Mineworkers) the existing Mine Workers Union (MWU)
considered them a threat and negotiated, without
opposition from management, the application of the
closed shop principle, which meant that the ABM
members could be excluded from employment. (In 1947
success was achieved in exposing maladministration of
the MWU, and in electing a new Afrikaner-dominated
board of management).
In 1939 it was reported that of 118 trade union
secretaries, 100 were foreigners who were hostile to
anything and anybody of Afrikaans origin (FAK, 1939:
184). One of these secretaries portrayed the industrial
labour scene as follows: "Afrikaners ... looked upon
trade unions and the Labour Party as foreign orga-
nisations; and the workers' organisations looked upon
the Afrikaans people with an air of disdain ... The labour
movement has so far failed almost entirely to appreciate
fully the development, traditions, sentiments and
aspirations of the masses of Afrikaners ... People of a
ruling race, including even class conscious workers,
usually fail to understand the feelings of a conquered
nation, of an oppressed people ... " (Sachs, 1938).
In such circumstances it was not incomprehensible
that the new generations of meaningful numbers of
studying Afrikaner youngsters opted for white-collar
occupations (barring agriculture).
Whatever the shortcomings of the studies of these
generations, they, at least, increased the number of
thinking members of the community whose mental
horizons broadened, exciting new aspirations. They
experienced a resurgence of national pride and
became very conscious of the economic arrearage of
the society they were members of. The amount of
human capital increased, allowing new opportunities,
1926 1939 Sample Survey
National Totals Major cities only
Afrikaans British Afrikaans Others
% % % %
Executives 0,5 1,6 0,1 1,4
Professionals and 1,2 2,9 2,2 10,0Technicians
Teaching and 1,3 1,2 2,2 1,4Religion
Trade and 6,5 12,5 5,4 19,7Commerce
Public Service 10,4 6,4 10,1 3,5
Transport 12,1 6,5 12,8 5,4
Clerks 6,3 14,1 6,6 11,9
Artisans 17,2 23,9 17,7 22,7
Semi-skilled 4,5 3,4 4,1 2,8workers
Unskilled 8,9 1,8 12,0 1,2
Mining 9,9 5,1 13,0 4,6
Other 21,2 20,6 13,8 15,4
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: Pauw, 1945: 217-219; 230-233.
TABLE 8.2
OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURES: AFRIKANERS
VS OTHER WHITES
8.2 Occupational advancement
In light of the discourse above, it is not to be
expected that the occupational composition of the
Afrikaner labour force in the early days of the
twentieth century would reflect that of an economically
well-developed community. This is illustrated in Table
8.2.
In a comparison7 between Afrikaners and "others"
(or "British South Africans") in 1929 it is seen that,
apart from Mining, the former predominated numeri-
cally in the unskilled category in a ratio of 8,9 per cent
vs. 1,8 per cent for the British South Africans in 1926.
If the sample study is considered representative of the
total urban white population, the situation would have
worsened to 12,0 per cent vs. 1,2 per cent by 1939.
They were also comparatively over-represented in the
two sectors where government was in control, namely
Public Service and Railways (Transport). The teaching
profession also attracted increasing numbers of them
so that by 1939 their representation outscored that of
"others". Government service - public administration
and teaching - remained a favoured occupation
among Afrikaners over many decades and as the well
educated in their ranks and their experience were
augmented they began increasingly to occupy the
senior positions.
7. Comparisons relate to the components of the White population
only.
TABLE 8.1
LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED BY
AFRIKANERS
Sources: Office, Bureau, Department of Census and StatistiCS,
Central Statistical Service: Population Censuses.
at better rates of remuneration, to be taken advantage
of. The process of cumulative causation went into
action, every new generation parent being able to
afford better educational facilities for his/her children.
Table 8.1 bears testimony to the progress achieved.
Table 8.1 reveals that the human capital content of
the population has been increasing rapidly (since the
1960s). While the total population numbers have been
expanding at a rate of 1,4 per cent per annum, and
the age group 18+ by 1,9 per cent per annum, those
with a Std. X or matriculation certificate increased by
4,55 percent per annum, and those with a post-school
qualification by 4,5 per cent per annum. In this respect
they had, by 1991, almost caught up with the non-
Afrikaner component of the White population. The
subject-mix of the qualifications has also been
changing, with the professionally oriented subjects
gaining increasing prominence, particularly when the
Afrikaans medium universities added medicine, den-
tistry and engineering to their faculties, and the world
of business aroused the interest of increasing
numbers of students. By the turn of the century, for
example, the Economic and Management Sciences
Faculty had become the largest on the Stellenbosch
University campus. The function of this and similar
faculties at other Afrikaans universities was to
acquaint students with the problems and challenges of
business and the national economy, with emphasis on
the strategic role of the entrepreneur and manage-
ment, and to create an awareness of the job oppor-
tunities existing in a field of economic endeavour of
which they had little experience. An academic pioneer
maintained that these faculties made a major
contribution to the rise of the Afrikaner in the South
African economy (Schumann, 1964).
The process delineated above can be depicted as
liberation through education (in contrast with the battle
cry of "liberation before education" of more recent
origin among another economically underdeveloped
component of the South African population).
The results are reflected in the changes in the
occupational composition of the labour force.
Increase
1960 1970 1980 1991 per
annum
1960-
1991
Std.X{now
191900 257280 439500 763190 4,55%Grade12)
%ofWMesat
40,0% 43,9% 49,5% 53,0%issue
Post-school
105030 144580 273540 411120 4,5%qualifications
%ofWhilesat
43,5% 46,9% 46,7% 50,0%issue
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TABLE 8.3
SHARE OF AFRIKANERS IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR
1926 1936 1960 1970
As % of White public 38,4% 58,9% 68,2% 70,7%
servants
As % of Afrikaner 10,4% 12,9% 13,0% 13,2%
labour force
Source: Population Censuses; Pauw, 1946: 218.
The percentage of the Afrikaner labour force that
entered the public service after 1936 changed very little
but they became the dominant group among the White
civil servants, to the extent of 70,7 per cent in 1970.
Some 28 per cent of the rise could be attributed to the
faster growth of their labour force, while the English
speakers - because they did not regard bilingualism as a
worthwhile objective or believed that they could not look
forward to a promising career in govemment service -
shunned the civil service and moved into the more
lucrative jobs in the private sector. Positions in the former
became more remunerative in 1987 after the President
of South Africa - without prior consultation with his
Minister of Finance - raised the status of a secretary of a
department to that of director-general, and created other
new titles such as deputy director-general, chief director,
executive director, director, assistant director, etc.,
accompanied by new salary structures considered
appropriate to the new statuses. The considerable
degree of concentration in the public sector (the relevant
percentage of the labour force will be higher than the
13,2 per cent, as in Table 8.3 above, when all the
branches (such as parastatals) are included) rendered
the Afrikaners very vulnerable to a change in
government which is intent on the extension of its
hegemony into all the strategic positions in the public
sector and on the application of affirmative action without
a regard for the principle of continuity and meritocracy.
Public administration was not the exclusive occu-
pational haven of Afrikaners it appeared to be. While the
total number of White civil servants in 1994 amounted to
227700, the Black component numbered 528 700,8 58
per cent of them in the self-governing territories and the
TBVC countries, where the restrictive practises of
apartheid did not apply and thus permitted of unshackled
career opportunities for Blacks (Central Statistical
Service, 1997, Statistical Release P0251; RIEP 1994).
8. Excluding teachers. Their inclusion adds 222 300 to the 528 700.
The numbers for the TBVC countries were not available and had to
be in ferred.
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TABLE 8.4
THE AFRIKANER LABOUR FORCE ACCORDING
TO 3 BROAD OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES
1936 1946 1960 1970 1980 1991
% % % % % %
Agriculture 41,2 30,3 16,0 10,1 7,0 4,7
Blue-collar 31,3 40,7 40,5 38,3 31,5 29,1
jobs
White- 27,5 29,0 43,5 51,6 61,5 66,2
collar jobs
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: Population Censuses.
When the labour force is divided into three broad
categories, as inTable 8.4, the statistics trace out the usual
pattem of shifts in the occupational structure in the process
of economic development The proportions economically
active in Agriculture declined monotonically from 41,2 per
cent in 1936 to 4,7 per cent in 1991, while the sector's
contribution to the GDP increased by 283 per cent (SARB,
1999, June supplement), testifying to increased productivity
stemming from better education and training and greater
entrepreneurial initiative. Those who left the rural areas
during the first half of the twentieth century found an
economic refuge in the Railways, gold mining, manufac-
turing and personal service, as unskilled workers for the
most part, to raise the proportion of blue-collarworkers from
31,3 per cent in 1936 to 40,7 per cent in 1946. It remained
almost unchanged until 1960, after which it started on a
downward trend to end up on 29,1 per cent in 1991. The
better educated became teachers, civil servants,post office
workers, clerks, etc. raising the proportion of white-collar
workers slightly during the 1936-1946 period. Thereafter
this category expanded rapidly in relative size to
encompass two-thirds of the labour force by 1991.
TABLE 8.5 (A)
OVER (+) AND UNDER (-) REPRESENTATION OF
AFRIKANERS IN THE LABOUR FORCE BY
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY
1946 1960 1970 1980 1991"
I Professionals -16,3 -12,0 -8,6 -5,7 +0,9
and
Technicians
II Executives -33,9 -26,5 -23,1 -22,1 -12,8
III Clerical -16,3 -7,5 -0,5 +2,4 -1,4
workers
IV Sales -25,9 -19,0 -17,4 -15,3 -9,0
workers
V Farming +32,1 +30,5 +28,5 +23,8 +18,
2
VI Mining +10,0 +15,5 +25,6 +27,7 +7,0
VII Transport +19,4 +23,0 +26,1 +26,5 +11,
a
VII Craftsmen -5,4 +2,5 +2,5 +5,8 +0,5
I
IX Services -3,7 +10,5 +9,1 +7,5 +5,9
X Unspecified +3,8 +10,5 +6,8 -2,4 0,0
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
TABLE 8.5 (B)
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION IN PER CENT
1946 1960 1970 1980 1991'
I Professionals 6,5 9,0 12,9 17,7 18,8and
Technicians
II Executives 0,9 2,5 3,0 4,3 8,9
III Clerical 10,0 21,0 26,4 28,2 31,7
workers
IV Sales workers 4,5 5,6 7,5 7,0 5,5
V Farming 30,3 16,0 10,1 7,0 4,7
VI Mining 3,8 3,5 2,1 1,6 1,4
VII Transport 13,1 9,0 3,8 2,8 2,7
VII Craftsmen 20,7 25,0 23,2 21,0 17,8
I
IX Services 6,7 6,0 8,0 9,0 7,1
X Unspecified 3,5 2,4 3,0 1,4 1,4
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: Population Censuses.
• In the absence of direct evidence on occupation by
home language in the 1991 Census reports, the
relevant figures were inferred from a cross-classi-
fication of religion by home language with religion
by occupation, using the evidence revealed by the
three Afrikaans (sister) churches as frame of
reference.
The occupational progress of the Afrikaners is also
evidenced by changes in the under- and over-
representation in the various classes, in the form of
deviations from norm, as in Table 8.5, the latter being
their share in the total White labour force. In mining,
transport and among industrial craftsmen and pro-
duction workers they had been increasingly over-
represented up to 1980; but the degree has osten-
sibil dropped precipitately, between 1980 and 1991.
Their over-representation in services - many of them
performed by semi-skilled persons - has been steadily
declining. Afrikaners never lost their majority status
(among the White population, that is) in farming,
mining, teaching, the police and Railway Adminis-
tration. The occupation denoted in censuses as
"labourer" - meaning unskilled worker - had all but
disappeared from the Afrikaner labour scene.
Their progress among white-collar workers is
manifested by diminishing under-representation in the
categories professionals and technicians, executives,
clerical and sales workers. In the first of the four
occupational classes the sign has already changed
from a minus to a plus. Among the executive class,
however, they still exhibit a considerable arrearage,
this category constituting 8,9 per cent of the Afrikaner
labour force compared to 14,8 per cent in the case of
the English (or non-Afrikaans) group. Nevertheless, it
9. The word is used because of the fact that the information had to be
inferred in an indirect manner.
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still represents a creditable performance when the 8,9
is compared with 0,9 of 1946. It would seem that the
English group owes a good deal of its success to the
inflow of new blood from overseas, some one-third of
them in this category having been born overseas.
Moreover, if we include farmers in the entrepreneurial
class - a characterisation of a large percentage of
them would richly deserve - the comparison is
changed to 13,4 per cent for Afrikaners and 16,9 per
cent for the others.
When these percentages are compared with the
Afrikaners' contribution to the economy as reflected in
their control, as entrepreneurs, over industrial capital-
as discussed in Chapter 4 - it appears that the latter
underrates their function in the generation of the GDP
and economic development. Their human capital
content would accord them a greater share by reason
of, among others, their management of economic
processes in some enterprises controlled by the
industrial capital of non-Afrikaners. Managerial control
would put their share at 41 ,6 per cent rather than 33
per cent mentioned earlier.
The role of women in this population group needs to
be expressly mentioned. In 1936, when social mores still
prescribed that women's place was in their home, only
13 per cent of those 15 years and over were
economically active, and one-sixth of them worked as
domestic servants. By 1946 their labour force
participation rate had risen to 18 per cent. This rate
increased thereafter as follows: 1960: 23,2%; 1970:
29,1%; 1980: 34,7%; 1991: 39,2% (Population
Censuses; Sadie, 1991, Chapter 5).
Their average working life expectancy is yet
slightly lower than that of English-speaking women,
partly because of a somewhat higher - though ever
diminishing - fertility rate, but the gap is closing stea-
dily. The type of modern occupations which they en-
tered, made a considerable contribution to the
increasing percentage of the total Afrikaner labour
force found in white-collar employment. Of the pro-
fessional/technical jobs held by Afrikaners their
number represents more than 40 per cent, and not
only because they form a majority in the teaching
profession. White domestics have become an almost
extinct species.
In sum, while the occupational status of the
Afrikaner is, on average, slightly inferior to that of his
English-speaking counterpart, the arrearage has
greatly shrunk.
CHAPTER 9
Sources: Population Censuses. Figures for 1980 are omitted on
purpose because of what appears to be a statistical aberration in
that, contrary to the data provided by the other censuses and to
conceivable probability, more Afrikaners than others were reported
to be found in the upper income brackets (in this case R55 000+).
It is seen that from an average personal income
per Afrikaner income receiver (the zero income
receivers being omitted) of barely one-half of that of
the other White population component in 1946, it has
grown to 83 per cent by 1991, and at the turn of the
century it would have been approximately 88 per cent.
Inversely, the average English income receiver had 77
per cent more at his disposal in 1946, but only 14 per
cent more by the year 2000. The smaller differential
shown for rural areas in 1960 - which has probably
been reduced to zero by now - is not surprising: the
income earners there are, for the most part, entre-
preneurs, while the large majority of urban earners are
RISING STANDARDS OF LIVING
The occupational progress was bound to be reflected
in per capita income and, accordingly, in material
levels of living. A correlation is to be expected
between the advancement over time in the occu-
pational hierarchy portrayed above and income or
earnings per income received and/or per capita of the
total population. When allowance is made for under-
registration of personal income in population census
returns, as revealed by comparison with national
income statistics, the per capita income of Afrikaners
in 1991 amounted to a R23 000 average, which is still
25 per cent lower than that of English speakers, which
was R30 840 (Sadie, 1994: 13). However, the former
realized a growth rate of 2,8 per cent per annum over
the period 1946-1991 (at constant 1990 prices),
compared to 1,18 per cent for the latter, which meant
that the gap was narrowing continually. This is borne
out by the data in Table 9.1.
not in this category.
When personal incomes are translated into
averages per head of the total Afrikaner and English-
speaking populations, the differentials exceed those
per income receiver. The figure for 1946 becomes
47,8: 100 compared to its counterpart 55:1 00, and that
of 1991,75:100 vs. 83:100. The phenomenon arises
from three factors: the greater youthfulness of the
Afrikaner population due to higher fertility (relatively
fewer persons in the economically active ages); the
somewhat lower labour force participation rate of their
women; and, as a matter of greatest likelihood,
because there are more rentiers among the English
speakers as a result of their advantage of having
benefited from a very much longer participation in the
process of industrialisation, economic growth and
accumulation of wealth entailing larger returns in
terms of interest, dividends and rent.
Some of the credit for the Afrikaners' progress in the
private sector should go to their English countrymen who
were economically in the lead. Moving upwards in the
occupational hierarchy, particularly while the country was
enjoying great prosperity (up to the middle of the 1970s)
and despite in-group favouritism, openings were left
which could not be filled from their own ranks. The
process was similar to that which occurred in the
Black/Non-Black juxtaposition, the former gaining in
occupational status as the latter was moving into the
higher grade, better remuneration, jobs.
With a diminishing disparity in average income and
an increasing preponderance of Afrikaners in the
White labour force, the latter were steadily catching up
with English speakers in the aggregate amount of
personal income they disposed of. At the time of the
1946 population census their aggregate (population x
income per capita) was 59,5 per cent of that of the
other Whites. By 1970 it had progressed to 95 per
cent and in 1991 the ratio had grown to 110,5 per cent
or R67 540 million vs. R61 130 million (Sadie, 1994:
13). In the year 2000 The Bureau of Market Research
found the annual expenditure totals (which would
reflect disposable incomes in relative terms if income
tax and savings ratios were equal) to amount to R146
502 million and R116 604 million for the two groups
respectively, representing a 25,6 per cent excess for
the Afrikaner group (Martins, 2000: 58). The rising
levels of living permitted them to become active on the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange to the extent of
becoming the majority group of operators. In 1999,
1 123 000 of them (though this figure would include
some Afrikaans speakers from other ethnic groups)
were thus active, compared to 956 000 English
Per Income
Receiver
Per Capita
TABLE 9.1
PERSONAL INCOME: RATIO
AFRIKANERS/ENGLISH
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speakers (to whom the same qualification would
apply)(Giliomee, 1999(b): 98).
Having in mind the increasing disparity between
the developed and the underdeveloped parts of the
world - but disregarding the recent performance of the
Newly Industrialised Countries - the narrowing of the
economic gap between the two White communities is
not a common occurrence. Having shed the traits of
pastoralism, the descendants of the semi-nomadic
generation entered the mainstream of Western
economic culture, together with those who had
remained in touch with the economic development of
the Western World, and surged ahead to contribute
handsomely to the national product; changing their
status from an economically backward people to a
reasonably well developed community. It was for the
most part a self-empowerment, bootstrap operation,
as it was intended to be according to the 1939
Volkskongres rallying cry.
Equally remarkable is the stability in the degree of
inequality of income within the Afrikaner community. In
terms of the Gini-coefficient (0 = absolute equality; 1 =
absolute inequality) the situation changed as follows: 10
1946: 0,461
1960: 0,440
1970: 0,429
1991 : 0,476
Inequality, instead of increasing, declined slightly
and remained at a fairly low level before rising
somewhat after 1970. Income distribution is marginally
more unequal than in the highly developed
economies, but is less than among English speakers
in whose case it was 0,513 in 1991. Remaining fairly
stable in downward progression, it contrasts sharply
with the experience among Blacks in South Africa
whose Gini-coefficient rose from 0,35 to 0,51 (CSS,
1997: 50). The stability observed can be viewed as
the outcome of the way in which the economic
struggle was initiated, as reflected in the solidarity
evidenced in the initiation of the economic struggle of
the Afrikaner at the 1939 Economic Conference: "A
people rescues itself' rather than "everybody for
himself'. It bears testimony also to diminishing
inequality in human capital distribution engendered by
a mass participation in the educational process. The
propagation of virulent class-consciousness and a
politically divisive class struggle were pre-empted.
10. A debt of gratitude is due to Professor S van der Berg for his
technical aid in the calculation of the magnitudes. Sources:
Population Censuses.
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In retrospect the moot question is to which of the
factors involved in the economic progress of the
Afrikaner - as discussed in preceding chapters -
could the greatest weight be attached? Writers whose
views are confined to the formidable power wielded by
government prefer not to look beyond the influence of
the latter. While such influence was, indeed, not mini-
mal, it does not tell the full story.
A major initiative of the pre-1994 government was
the empowerment of Afrikaans and, consequentially,
of its speakers. But it was no more than a correction of
a situation in which the official policy of bilingualism
was honoured more in the breach than in the
observance. The government's intervention in the
labour market with its colour bar legislation benefited,
for the most part, the lower end of the skill structure,
and its influence was soon diluted and rendered
nugatory by the vibrancy of economic activity, which
created vacancies that could not be filled by Whites
whose labour supplies became inadequate. The
increased and improved education facilities provided
were not confined to Afrikaner pupils and students,
and if they benefited most it was because they were in
the majority among Whites and their teachers were
dedicated educationists. The parastatals helped to
raise the national product and acted as training
schools for some Afrikaner professionals; but their
operations also became prejudicial to the Afrikaners'
private sector interests, while most of the achieving
entrepreneurs did not pass through their portals.
These latter, who were responsible for the in-
creasing participation in the entrepreneurial function,
entered into their role as individuals and achieved
success overwhelmingly independently of government
intervention in their favour. To the extent that the
government created an ambiance favouring economic
growth, their English counterparts benefited most by
reason of their ascendancy.
In the last resort, a government can provide a
business-friendly environment and facilities for edu-
cation and training, but their efficiency would still
depend upon individuals who are prepared and eager
to make use of the propitious circumstances and
facilities. Afrikaners, for the most part, studied and
worked themselves out of the groove of economic
retardment and poverty. It was a process of liberation
through education and entrepreneurial endeavour.
CHAPTER 10
THE ROAD AHEAD
In the exposition above, the sequence of events and
circumstances has been the reverse of the usual
process depicted in historic discourses, where the fall
of empires, cultures or communities is preceded by the
rise. The moot question is whether the latter sequence
is to occur in the Afrikaners' economic history in the
post-1994 era if we can assume that the last quarter of
the twentieth century was the time of their peak
performance. It is to be understood that the reference is
not to a population of Afrikaans or Afrikaner origin, but
to the cohesive community as depicted above, and as
identified at the 1939 Volkskongres by dr Kestell (see
Chapter 4) and as evidenced in the concerted struggle
for the recognition of Afrikaans (all of which defines the
Afrikaner at issue).
Of cardinal importance is the fact that they had
irretrievably lost their political power in 1994, since in the
majoritarian system of government they are hugely
outnumbered and will remain so against an unassailable
majority, who could not be expected to be kindly
disposed towards them. The new government almost
immediately after coming into power, using its political
power and its political patronage, and in the name of
wrongs (real and imagined) its electorate had suffered-
the most important of which was the violation of their
human dignity rather than the result of measures of an
economic nature - assailed Afrikaners where they were
most vulnerable, that is, in the public sector. Affirmative
Action became the buzzword and the criterion for its
application needed to be no more than the "capacity (of
the prospective appointee of the correct political
persuasion or colour) to acquire within a reasonable
time, the ability to do the job" (RSA, 1998(b): section 20).
The "capacity" requirement was subsequently attenuated
to "potential". Superior qualifications were no longer the
passport to a job in the public sector. "The ANC has
said," reported the SA Institute of Race Relations, "it
wishes to get rid of merit as overriding principle in the
appointment of public servants" (1997: 22). Accordingly it
became possible to replace Afrikaners in their
thousands. Questioned in the National Assembly about
the number of replacements, the Minister of Public
Service and Administration revealed that by February
1999, 56 985 early retirements had already been dealt
with, which comprised most of the senior positions and
contributed significantly to the increase in the Gini-
coefficient (the measure of inequality of income) of the
Black population. The reports of the Auditor-General
bear testimony to the dire effects on efficiency and
probity in the public service. Most of the prematurely
retired persons had to seek a new career and not all of
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them knew how to invest wisely the funds put at their
disposal.
The marginal returns to (White) human capital
formation thus well nigh reduced to zero in the public
sector, emigration to countries where this condition is
not prevalent became an option. Until 1990 emigration
of Afrikaners has never been an issue of any signifi-
cance. But it has become one, with large Afrikaner
communities having been established in countries
such as England, New Zealand, Australia, Canada
and the USA. The majority of the breadwinners among
the emigrants are highly qualified, leaving those left
behind poorer in human capital content.
There has also been another, and probably more
far-reaching, assault on the other vulnerable chink in
their armour: their language, notwithstanding assuran-
ces to the contrary in the new constitution (Du Toit,
2001: 21). The target is a feature that is central to the
existence of their identity. The new government has
been gnawing away steadily at the status of Afrikaans
to erode its market value. English has been declared its
official medium of communication. To all intents and
purposes Afrikaans is not required for any job within the
government's ambit. Knowledge of Afrikaans is not only
a non-merit but, to the person who uses it as mother
language, it is a demerit. Affirmative Action effectively
emasculated it. PANSAT, an institution for the
protection of language rights in South Africa has found
that the Post Office, Telkom, Transnet and the
Department of Public Works have acted in violation of
such rights, but without eliciting corrective action.
English has been recommended as the unique medium
for the Defence Force and as language of report of law
courts, and Afrikaans has become a non-obligatory
subject for the LLB degree (Van der Merwe, 2000;
Steyn, 2000). An Afrikaans-speaking long distance train
driver has been demoted to shunter because he was
not communicating in English. Spoornet dismissed an
employee who spoke Afrikaans to his Afrikaans-
speaking colleagues and to Spoornet's Afrikaans-
speaking clients. The SA Airways, in the face of all
tenets of effective business practice, refused to provide
service in Afrikaans, and had to admit to suffering loss
of income, while its competitors such as British Airways
were profiting from its economic folly. SABC-TV
channels 1, 2 and 3 decided to broadcast in English at
peak hours for 74 per cent of the time compared to
Afrikaans for 9 per cent, Nguni for 4,5 per cent and
Sotho for 3,5 per cent (Du Toit, 2000: 10). Of the
viewers, 29,9 per cent were Afrikaans speakers (who
included other than White persons), Nguni speakers
28,6 per cent, Sotho speakers 21 per cent and English
20,5 per cent (TABEMA, 2000: 4). The SABC's medium
of communication is English, and it is expected of
journalists employed that their contributions should be
first of all in English, after which they may be delivered
in any of the other languages of which Afrikaans is one.
Accordingly, the Afrikaans radio transmission, RSG,
has difficulty covering important events meaningfully,
the journalists electing to take the easy way out and do
their interviews and analyses in English only (Louw,
1999). A radio station in Gauteng decided in 1997 no
longer to accept advertisements in Afrikaans though its
Afrikaans-speaking listeners outnumbered the English.
The University of Stellenbosch (SU) whose primary
- but not exclusive - medium of instruction is
Afrikaans came under attack from ANC Cabinet
Ministers for its language policy. It has always been
the most liberal tertiary institution with respect to
language; it provides facilities for non-Afrikaans
speakers and there are 14 universities whose medium
is exclusively English, while there are six more parallel
medium universities. On the face of it there seem to
be no non-politically inspired rational grounds for
government's antipathy to the US. The attacks have
the appearance of attempts at striking a blow at an
institution which could be considered a cradle and
bastion of Afrikaans, whose demise as such would
further the anglicisation policy of the government.
As it is, an investigation into the linguistic handling
of 513 courses and subjects at traditionally Afrikaans
universities revealed a severe whittling down of Afri-
kaans between 1995 and 2001. At the US the score
for the two years was as follows: Afrikaans only from
12 to 13, parallel medium from 7 to 20; double me-
dium from 21 to 65; English only from 3 to 31. The
researcher concluded that institutions which practise a
double medium policy switch effortlessly to parallel
medium and from there slide into (English) unilin-
gualism (Nieuwoudt, 2001: 13).
The above is but a selection of episodic evidence
of similar import.
There is a very significant difference between the
post-1900 or, for that matter, post-1806 anglicisation
process and the post-1994 policy. With regard to the
former there always existed a prospect that the situation
could be changed by way of the attainment of political
power; which change was indeed brought about. After
1994, for all practical purposes, no such potential reme-
dy exists. Politically, the country has been irretrievably
converted from a "White man's land" - the goal of, the
National Party - to a "Black man's land" - the factual
situation under,. if not the goal of the ANC/COSA TU/
SACP government. Those backing the new policy are
overwhelmingly and unassailably large in number, to
which, incidentally, the NP government, for all its faults
and misdemeanours, contributed liberally by means of its
health services, including family planning. (During its
term of office Blacks' infant mortality rate was reduced
from 162 per 1 000 births to 55, and their life expectancy
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at birth rose from 41,2 years to 62 years. In this context it
might be maintained that the NP government was
instrumental in adding just over 40 per cent to the Black
population's numbers). In addition, no, or very little, help
is to be expected from the English-speaking section of
the White population since the new policy suits them:
they are relieved from the obligation of achieving
bilingualism, which was the objective of the NP, which
never considered afrikanerisation as substitute, and
retribution, for anglicisation.
The official policy is aided and abetted by actions
in the private sector. The treatment meted out to
Afrikaans in the secondary and tertiary sector of the
economy, where English-speaking businessmen
preponderate has seldom, if ever, been more conside-
rate than the official post-1994 stance. Under the
assumption or pretence that "of course everybody
understands English", and knowing that, as a linguistic
group, they had, and have, a monopoly in the pro-
duction of most items in household consumption they
did not consider it necessary to use Afrikaans in the
labelling of their products or displays in their busi-
nesses or the provision of services to their customers.
While, in 1997, the purchasing power of Afrikaans
speakers in South Africa was 5,7 per cent more than
that of English speakers, 25 companies which were
spending the most on advertisements channelled 49,4
per cent of their advertising to English medium and
22,4 per cent to Afrikaans newspapers and journals
(Duvenhage, 1998). When the chairman of the
Afrikaans arts festival, KKNK, was confronted with the
accusation that the sponsor of the festival was not
using Afrikaans on the labels of its dairy products, he
said that bilingual labels in South Africa are few and
far between, and that if somebody were to boycott
companies which did not accord to Afrikaans the
same status as English, he would have difficulty
preparing a decent meal (Van Eeden, 2000: 7). From
the chairman's further remarks it could be inferred that
the neglect of Afrikaans was a condition for "the
building of a South African nation".
It would appear that Afrikaners themselves are no
less responsible for the neglect or marginalisation of
their mother tongue. Lawrence Schlemmer, in re-
search undertaken for a dissertation in Political
Science, found that ethnic commitment was the fee-
blest among the independent, professional, top
businessmen (in contrast with professional employees
and owners of small business enterprises) who be-
lieved that a modern, global outlook on life was not
compatible with cultural interests (Pienaar, 1999: 9).
Some of them do not deem it necessary to publish
annual reports in Afrikaans (Scholtz, 2000 (a) and (b)).
These are the people who, or whose predecessors, in
days gone by, combined their profit making activities
with a protective regard for their community and its
language, and who were responsible to a great extent
for establishing and maintaining the market value of
Afrikaans. Their more recent behaviour might be
motivated by the belief that their business success is
tied up with the new Black elite, Black empowerment
and the economic activities of the new government.
Some of them were members of a group who paid a
visit to the South African president, presumably to
signalise support for his government's policies (but
probably not those related to the treatment of
Afrikaans). An interim chief of Die Stigting vir
Bemagtiging deur Afrikaans (Foundation for Em-
powerment through Afrikaans) remarked that the fact
that Afrikaner middle and top managers have not
participated in the language debate in South Africa
was a dramatic non-event, indicating that their
emotional ties with Afrikaans have been severed
(Bigalke, 2000(a): 9). It has been suggested that their
mental processes might have become such prisoners
of their memory of apartheid that they have lost the
critical faculty with respect to the new government
because "the new regime is better than apartheid"
(Geldenhuys & Malan, 2001: 7). Another writer would
have it that however hard the ANC could try, they
could not succeed in perpetrating the hara-kiri on
Afrikaans as Afrikaners themselves do (Anon, 2001:
11). The CEO of the Foundation for Afrikaans
(forerunner of the Empowerment Foundation), re-
ferring to the fact that Afrikaans speakers disposed of
the largest disposable income (of all linguistic groups)
and make the largest contribution to the Treasury,
maintained: "There are Afrikaner businessmen and
companies who imagine that it is politically incorrect to
have an Afrikaans identity" (translated from Du Toit,
2000: 11). A journalist recorded how an Afrikaans-
speaking academic addressing a meeting of Afrikaans
businessmen in Afrikaans, liberally interlaced his
sentences with English words. One example will
suffice: "Companies het deesdae almal mission state-
ments. Dit is belangrik maar waardeloos as daardie
companies nie ook value-driven is nie. As hulle nie
ethics in hul eie companies toepas nie. Dit is 'n
bewese feit dat wanneer companies value-driven is,
dit hul bottom line maak, kan hulle hul vernaamste
kompetisie verbysteek. Dit is die challenge" (Van der
Walt, 2001: 12). The journalist believed that his man
would never dream of spicing his English presen-
tations with Afrikaans words.
An employee of a well-known Afrikaner-controlled
bank told an ex-editor of an Afrikaans newspaper that
its official medium of internal communications was
English; and he could not discover a document in
Afrikaans required to be filed in by him (G Joubert,
2001: 6). And it would seem that when mistakes are
made at the local level in the case of large trading
companies with nationwide outlets the language
favoured is never Afrikaans but English (Dempsey,
2001: 6). For the most Afrikaans of all rugby unions in
South Africa it had been proposed that official
documents to the personnel be written in English
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(Volschenk, 2001: 1). At the Johannesburg Press
Club's celebration of the newsmakers of the year, who
were Afrikaans-speaking, where most of those atten-
ding were Afrikaans-speaking and the sponsor's CEO
was an Afrikaner, not one word of Afrikaans was
spoken during the entire ceremony (Richard, 2000:
16). The executive producer of the SABC's Radio
Sonder Grense (RSG) news programme maintained
that his primary mission was not news in Afrikaans,
but news, and that English has not only become the
language of political power, but is the "intellectual
language of South Africa", and that when one wanted
an informed opinion one has often to turn to English
speakers. To which an ex-SABC journalist responded
that he had a surprise for the executive producer: in
his experience enough Afrikaans speakers well versed
in every possible aspect of South African life - eco-
nomic, social, scientific, etc. - were always available
(Blom, 1998: 8). The statement about the intellectual
language in South Africa does not merit comment.
The result is a programme that is not only English in
part, but also allows an Afrikaans that is interlaced
with English words and often with a syntax that
reflects a direct translation of the English idiom. "The
jackboot treatment of Afrikaans by ourselves" writes
an Afrikaans journalist, "is at least as bad, if not
perhaps more, than that of the authorities" (Spaar-
water, 1997: 10). An Afrikaans writer, attacking
another, maintained that Afrikaans has only become
an albatross around Afrikaners' necks and should be
shed (Mischke, 2000: 4). It is not known whether he
appreciated the radical implication of his wish.
The chief executive of the Stigting vir Bemagtiging
deur Afrikaans asserts: "Why should I complain about
the so-called disparagement of the language in shops,
banks and restaurants when I have the right to speak
it every day? Why should I be resentful when I am
answered in English when we understand one
another? Why should one always make an enormous
issue of Afrikaans?" (Translated from Die Burger,
2001: 3). A newly appointed vice-chancellor of a
traditionally Afrikaans university maintained that he did
not have an ideological approach towards Afrikaans,
and to want "Afrikaans on yoghurt cartons is surely
smallminded nonsense" (translated from du Preez,
2001 :48) and the ardour of some staff members ofthe
foremost Afrikaans daily newspaper for the Afrikaner
cause shows signs of waning.
Those who do make a public issue of it are often
referred to as agonizers or activists who would want to
"push Afrikaans down other speakers' throats". The
inference to be drawn is that English, despite
centuries of historic evidence to the contrary, has not
been and is not being pushed down peoples' throats.
Anglicisation, in this context must, presumptively, be a
sort of natural order of things, representing a first
order human right which is not applicable to other
language groups. The process had, of course, the
benefit of active support from an English business
class who, as the preponderant component in the
secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, called
the tune.
The agonizers would deny that they are seeking
more than what was (is) promised in the constitution.
They are acting in accordance with a consciousness of
the truth embodied in the adage: the price of liberty is
eternal vigilance. They are not interested in a come-
home-to language that will survive until the last couple
of its speakers have died, or that flourishes only on
special occasions such as arts festivals. They wish to
see it remain vibrantly alive in schools, colleges,
universities, on the radio and television, in the shops, in
the boardrooms and the annual reports of business
firms, produce labels, business windows and name-
plates, in advertising, news media and journals, etc.
etc., in accordance, to some extent at least, with the
economic importance and demography of its mother
tongue speakers. As minimalist goal they would want to
stem the tide of marginalisation, of denial, of the fruits
of a hostile government's attitude, of apathy and of the
quaint, if not weird, posture that it is ridiculous to expect
service in Afrikaans, because "it would hurt peoples'
feelings" (translated from Pienaar, 2001: 11; Visser,
2001: 18; reporting and not asserting).
Writers, poets, other individuals, PANSAT,
TABEMA, the Mine Workers' Union (MWU), the
Rapportryers, The Friends of Afrikaans, the AHI, the
Group 63 for Minority Rights, the FAK, the ATKV,
PRAAG and others are taking up the cudgels for
Afrikaans to prevent the realization of the truth in the
adage adapted to the South African situation: for
tyranny [of numbers] to succeed it is enough that good
men remain silent. Some inchoate progress can be
intimated. PANSAT has charged TELKOM with
violating its employees' language rights by the use of
English only as medium of communication (Rapport,
2000: 6); the MWU has established a Fund for the
defrayment of costs involved in court cases for the
furtherance of Afrikaans and multi-Iingualism
(Rapport, 2001: 13); when the private television
company started the Afrikaans KYKnet programme,
SABe 2 had to change its policy and transmit
longer hours in that language (Bigalke, 2000(b): 11)
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(TABEMA's negotiations and protestations could have
made a contribution to this outcome); signs of resis-
tance are surfacing in Afrikaans poems; matriculation
pupils achieving the highest marks in six of the nine
provinces in 2000 had attended Afrikaans medium
schools, which event has been hailed as proof of the
importance of mother tongue instruction (Joubert,
2001: 14).
The experience of other countries would suggest
that in order to survive, a language cannot be left to its
own devices. The German government asseverated
that the use of the language in the private sphere only
is not sufficient to guarantee its long term survival
(Scholtz, 2000( a): 11), and the French are adamant
that English is not going to threaten the future of the
French language (Scholtz, 2000(b)). Two investigative
journalists proclaiming that the "World speaks English"
as the global lingua franca while the globalisation
process is continuing added: "If countries act now to
strengthen minority languages that they can exist
alongside a dominant language, such as English, the
future need not be grim. Languages are like windows
on the world each providing a slightly different view.
Globally we shall all be poorer if we opt for a unilingual
future - viewing the world from a single perspective -
when a multi-lingual future is still possible and
ultimately desirable" (Drohan & Freeman, 1997: 8).
In light of the analysis above one is constrained to
the conclusion that while there is some light in the
tunnel for the Afrikaners, the odds are heavily stacked
against their survival as the cohesive entity which has
been the object of the discussion in this monograph,
honouring Afrikaans in every sphere of life - which
does not imply the relinquishment of bilingualism -
and with their entrepreneurs and executive-class
supporting the market value of their mother tongue.
There is, of course, no reason why persons of
Afrikaner origin - that is, whether their home language
is Afrikaans or not - could not continue to progress,
and eventually catch up, entrepreneurially and
economically, with the community of English origin.
But this population component would not be quite the
same as the Afrikaner specie which has been involved
in the depiction above of the fall and rise of the
Afrikaner in the South African economy.
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